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**The Role of Print and Broadcast Media
in the articulation of the European
Public Sphere:
Comparative qualitative analysis of selected
Eurosphere media representative interviews**

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Comparative qualitative analysis of selected Eurosphere media representative interviews

Anna Selmeczi and Robert Satal

1 Introduction

Following the overall assessment of the in-depth interviews the national teams of Eurosphere conducted with journalists of major newspapers in each partner country, we set out in this paper to take a closer look at certain pertinent perspectives of the mass of qualitative data we have gathered. In this attempt to enquire into media representatives' notions of diversity, attitudes towards EU centralization, citizenship, migration, EU enlargement and the European Public Sphere, we will aim to look into the possible correlations between the concepts central to the Eurosphere research project. In order to gain a more nuanced insight, we have selected for our analysis five countries and two of their main newspapers respectively, with one journalist representing each newspaper.²

In choosing the newspapers to be included in our analysis, we did not consider tabloid media, but we aimed to diversify our selection sample according to the political–ideological characters of the papers. So as to have a diverse set of cases and consequently a more intriguing comparison, we have chosen two old (Germany, France) and a new member (Hungary), a non-member (Turkey), and a Euro-skeptic country (UK) to be the subject of our comparison. This selection seems relevant also due to displaying possible cultural differences, and due to including a major sending (Turkey) and three prime receiving countries (France, Germany, and the UK) in terms of migration – an aspect that, as we will see below, emerges prominently from the interviews under scrutiny.

We cannot overemphasize that our goal was not so much to construct a sample that is representative of all the interviewed media representatives' opinions, but to see whether EU-membership, the length of this membership, a member-state's assumedly negative or positive attitude toward the EU, its affectedness by international migration, the difference in cultural-religious contexts within the different countries, or some other factor is reflected in the

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² In case of the UK our space for selection was limited as there were only two interviews conducted with print journalists coded into our database.

relationships between the central variables of our research project: attitudes to diversity, attitudes towards policy aspects of the EU, and last but not least, the European Public Sphere. To predict the findings discussed below, we will show that while it seems significant differences between opinions voiced by media representatives of the old and the new member states do not exist, journalists of EU member and non-member countries have very distinct concepts of migration or citizenship or, unsurprisingly, of the limits of EU-integration. In terms of the European Public Sphere, such trends are not so easily visible and the views of the selected journalists seem to reflect the average patterns of all the media interviews: most of them (five out of eight respondents) believe that there is no common European communication space. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult to grasp significant relationships between conceptions of this variable and those of diversity or aspects of the EU polity. What, on the other hand, clearly emerges from the selected interviews is the centrality of issues concerning migration and the fact that concepts of and attitudes towards migration seem to influence views on the openness of citizenship policy, explicitly or implicitly expressed notions about Europeanness, or the institutional level on which these issues should be regulated in the opinion of the media respondents.

2 Notions of diversity and regulating migration

Based on an overall impression of our selected interviews, an interesting distribution seems to gain visibility: in terms of the most relevant issues in the context of diversity, old member states' media responses consistently differ from those of the new member Hungary and non-member Turkey. Whereas the latter two tend to represent the ethnic (and, in the case of Turkey, religious) minorities as most relevant for a diverse society, journalists of old member states almost invariably emphasize the relevance of immigrant groups and issues related to immigration. This is so even if migrant groups were not always mentioned under the original question that inquired about the most relevant groups for defining a diverse society today. Furthermore, although one of the Hungarian respondents (the editor in chief of the major leftist-liberal *Népszabadság*) said migrant groups and ethnic groups are the most relevant for diversity,³ in their entirety – in line with the general conclusions of the according chapters of the Hungarian country report – the interviews with Hungarian media representatives disclosed a much stronger focus on autochthonous minorities (with special emphasis on the Roma minority) and Hungarian minorities abroad, largely ignoring questions of immigration. Thus, the empirical fact according

³ According to the interviewer: „He understood ethno-national diversity first of all as a phenomenon related to immigration, and only after the interviewer's repeated questions was he willing to address other dimensions” (NSZ, 04/08/2008).

to which Hungary is not significantly affected by international migration neither as a sending nor as a receiving country, seems to be reaffirmed by the newspaper editors' responses.

Similarly, even though Turkey is indeed affected by international migration as a major sending country (this also features in the responses of its journalists and is discussed below), considering diversity, ethnic and religious minorities seem to determine the views on diversity of the Turkish respondents. As for which of these two is more pertinent, the two selected Turkish papers also differ, seemingly in accordance with their respective profile. That is, the representative of *Zaman*, the newspaper whose audience is more conservative and predominantly religious, emphasized the importance of religious groups,⁴ while the editor of *Cumhuriyet* – a more secular paper – designates the majority of the population as the most relevant group, and warns of the predominance of a minority group as a risk inherent to diverse societies.⁵

Contrary to the above presented views, views of media respondents of the other three selected countries clearly reflect the significant effect international migration has on their home states. French, German, and British respondents all emphasize the prominent relevance of immigration for notions of diversity, and most of them mention dynamics of immigrant persons'/groups' integration as possibly or factually producing societal tensions within the host country. More or less visualizing this pattern, *Table 1* summarizes the most important groups for societal diversity identified by the respondents of the different media outlets:

⁴ “Mehmet Kamis states that *Zaman* does not speak in behalf of anyone, but their reader profile is comprised of “conservative” people and people in whose life “religion is more prominent in their social life” (source: *Eurosphere Institutional Data*, Nesstar Knowledge base).

⁵ “*Cumhuriyet* targets an audience which upholds the Republican values and supports the ideology of Kemalism and it is an ardent supporter of these values and Turkish modernity and secularism” (source: *Eurosphere Institutional Data*, Nesstar Knowledge base).

Table 1: Groups relevant for a diverse society

Country	Newspaper	Groups designated as relevant
UK	Daily Telegraph	Immigrants
	The Guardian	Gender groups, ethnic groups
Germany	Süddeutsche Z.	Social class, migrant groups, religious groups. Relevance of migrant groups increasing.
	FAZ	Gender groups, national belonging; but: migrants' claims should be given priority
France	Liberation	Cultural belongings.
	Le Figaro	NA.
Turkey	Zaman	Ethnic groups, religious groups, interest groups.
	Cumhuriyet	Social class, ethnic groups, language minorities
Hungary	Népszabadság	Migrant groups, ethnic groups
	Magyar Nemzet	Social class, ethnic groups, life-style groups.

Considering the relevance that respondents of old member states attribute to international migration, it is interesting to see how their views on the advantages and disadvantages of ethno-national diversity relate to those on international migration, that is, whether there are any contradictions between these views once the question is actualized, hence it is brought closer to the issue that is communicated as most topical. To begin with, all respondents mention cultural richness as the advantage of ethno-national diversity (with the exceptions of one of the British journalists, who does not specify any positive or negative feature of diversity). Furthermore, except one German respondent who also sees diversity as a societal goal and the editor of *Libération* who conceives diversity as an ontological matter, all of the respondents approach ethno-national diversity existentially, that is, all think diversity is an intrinsic feature of contemporary societies. When it comes to the question whether their views on ethno-national diversity and international migration cohere, one finds equal consistency in the respective responses of British, French, and German media representatives, although the direction of their answers displays different views (per country)

Taking a closer look at the three old member states, thus, an interesting difference appears in the responses of British versus French and German respondents concerning issues of diversity and international migration. Both British journalists view ethno-national diversity as more beneficial than harmful: actually, none of the respondents mentions any disadvantages at this point. In accordance with their rather liberal approach that characterizes all of their responses, they see international migration also as being mostly beneficial, in both economic and cultural terms – although one of the respondents mentions that Islamist radicals – “those who aim to turn the country into an Islamic dictatorship” – should not be let into the country (The Guardian, 20/02/2009).

Showing quite a different picture, German and French media representatives all mention the difficulties of achieving social cohesion among different groups as a disadvantage of ethno-national diversity, and all of them put emphasis on the possible tensions emerging from international (labor) migration. Now, what makes this difference more interesting, is its possible relation with the respondents' opinion about how these issues should be regulated. While British respondents seem to believe that issues related to migration should be primarily dealt with at the member-state level, both French and German journalists expressed their opinion that – given the permeability of borders – EU-level regulations should be put into place. While three of them thought the Union should formulate clear cut regulations concerning this issue area,⁶ *Le Figaro's* editor expressed his belief that nation-states should still play the determinative role – even though he admitted the need for coordination:

...[T]he national states should maintain a kind of sovereignty in connection with emigration. But, it could always be admitted that, in adopting migratory policies, the national states are obliged to become more and more coercive in view the increasing requests and applications to emigrate towards them (Le Figaro, 10/12/2008).

In light of their responses to the relevant questions, it seems that this view is substantiated by a higher trust in EU-institutions and the process of integration in Germany and France than in Britain.

Displaying the same distribution, while British respondents thought that there should be no restrictions in terms of migrant groups to be let in the country or in terms of free movement once acquiring valid residence in the EU, French and German ones believed that such restrictions should apply or, at least should be addressed though a common EU-policy, which impedes one country carrying all the burden of another one's more liberal policies. More specifically, French and German respondents thought that it would make sense to regulate the type of migrants to be allowed into the EU or the country. According to one of them, only particular groups, labor migrants, highly qualified people, and those with similar social backgrounds should be granted entry. He argues that [t]his brain drain should not be additionally promoted, but one should not call only unlearned persons from Anatolia either. [...] Not because they probably would not find a job [...] the social costs of integration are extremely high.” And in response to why he would treat immigrants from EU-countries and countries with historical relationships to Germany preferentially he says: “...because the compatibility is the highest. The costs of acclimatization are the lowest. There are one million Australians in England, [...] did you know it? [...] Why

⁶ “There is no European immigration policy at all, and this is a problem” (Libération, 29/01/2009).

not? [Because] it makes no difference” (FAZ, 19/05/2009). Similarly, the journalist of *Libération* also argues that labor migrants and highly qualified people should be allowed to enter and he supports his opinion in favor of differentiating between immigrant groups with a presumably successful example (that of Canada).

Characteristically, and displaying the other side of the immigration coin, responses of Turkish journalists are apparently determined by their awareness of Western perceptions of and policies dealing with Turkish immigrants. Interestingly, one of the Turkish respondents approaches issues of immigration also from the perspective of a receiving country: as being affected by poor Asian migrants wishing to access Europe through Turkey, which, he thinks is problematic. The respondent argues that “It is not very healthy to receive this migration. Turkey receives migration from [places like] Bangladesh... they migrate because they want to go to Europe. There is another type of migration which might be useful: cheaper workers from Moldova, Romania and Armenia come to Turkey” (*Zaman*, 03/12/2008).

In addition, while Turkish journalists approach both ethno-national diversity and international migration as intrinsic features of the contemporary world, their perspective on international migration is defined primarily by socio-economic concerns. That is, both Turkish respondents mention economic inequality as the root of migration, for which more developed countries are responsible and have to bare the consequences of. When ethnic and religious identity emerges in the context of international migration, interestingly, one respondent emphasizes the traumatization of the migrants: their cultural and religious roots are cut when they leave their homelands and it is this trauma that becomes the source of tensions for the receiving society, as it causes a sort of undecidability whether migrants belong to the West or the East.⁷ Their associational priority of socio-economic concerns is reflected in one of the respondents’ views on the type of migrants to be let into the country: similarly to the views of journalists from the major receiving countries, he thinks these should be labor migrants (even though at another point of the interview he refers to the negative aspects of economic migration). According to the editor of *Cumhuriyet*, UN quotas should be applied in this concern. Likewise, this respondent believes that issues of international migration should be regulated on the supranational level (implying the UN and not the EU). For the journalist of *Zaman*, on the other hand, it is the member state that should be the primary regulator of migration: the EU should only provide

⁷ “Those who migrate, they are being cut off from their cultural *birikim*, and roots. One starts living in a totally different country, as a totally different person and in totally different life conditions. This is a big trauma. The children of all the families who migrate, especially the Turks have experienced this trauma over the years. Are they Eastern or Western? Neither Eastern nor Western. This creates a considerable source of anxiety for the other side as well” (*Zaman*, 03/12/2009).

flexible frameworks. Interestingly, when the question of free mobility emerges in the EU-context, both Turkish respondents opt for no restrictions at all: once the right to enter or reside in the EU is granted in one state, it should be valid in all the others. Thus, apparently, as opposed to questions of international migration which they approach primarily from the perspective of a nation-state that is affected by inwards migration, their perspective on the issue of EU-citizenship is predominantly defined by the position of Turkey as a non-member and sending country.

As opposed to their Turkish counterparts, Hungarian respondents did not concur on issues of diversity and migration. Whereas the editor in chief of *Népszabadság* gave very similar responses to those of the German journalists, the representative of the right-wing *Magyar Nemzet* displayed some evident inconsistency in his views on ethno-national diversity and on international migration – claiming diversity was beneficial, yet he wanted migration to be restricted. In the first respect he emphasized mostly the positive aspects of diversity (it makes the state stronger), claiming

[a]s a Hungarian person, he has only one answer to this question. More ethnic groups only make a state stronger, which is the basic principle of Saint Stephen [the most famous Hungarian king](...) Diversity strengthens the country, it is fundamentally a positive value in itself, although on the long run it can tear a society apart (*Magyar Nemzet*, 09/01/2009).

Yet, he insisted that international migration should be restricted because it endangers Hungarian culture. Granted, he mentioned possible societal tensions as the disadvantage of ethno-national diversity too, but at that point its advantages outweighed its disadvantages. In a similar vein, while *Népszabadság* editor-in-chief thought free movement within the EU should not be restricted for those having a valid visa in a member state, his colleague at *Magyar Nemzet* expressed the view that free movement of third country nationals should be restricted. These inconsistencies, while they are not necessarily justified, are explained by the right-wing journalist's special (and expressed) attachment to issues related to autochthonous minorities, his concerns with the Roma minority, and the Hungarian minorities living abroad. As, it is assumed, the former are already part of the national culture and the latter cannot be threatening by definition, the risks he associates with international migration do not seem to be relevant in the context of co-nationals.

Table 2 below summarizes the media respondents' views on ethno-national diversity and international migration, and offers a comparative schematization of these views.

Table 2: Views on ethno-national diversity and international migration

Country	Newspaper	Views on diversity		Views on international migration	
		Advantages	Disadvantages	Advantages	Disadvantages
UK	Daily Telegraph The Guardian	Specific advantages or disadvantages are not mentioned but diversity in general is not disadvantageous.		only positive effects on societies and it is the normal state of human affairs.	
		Easier to achieve an economically successful society; cultural richness	societal tensions but overall it is not disadvantageous	<u>No distinction</u> between migrant groups to be let into the country.	
Germany	Süddeutsche Z. FAZ	Cultural richness	Difficult for social cohesion and a “safe society”.	Specific advantages or disadvantages are not mentioned. Overall, the respondent favors free movement and <u>would not restrict</u> entry based on the country of origin.	
		Cultural richness	Difficult for social cohesion, national identity, women’s rights and gender equality	<i>Sending</i> : better qualified labor force on potential return <i>Receiving</i> : cheap labor force The respondent <u>would distinguish</u> between groups to be let in. <i>Sending</i> : remittances <i>Receiving</i> : benefits of qualified migrant labor. <u>Would distinguish</u> between groups to be let in.	<i>Sending</i> : brain drain, loss of labor force <i>Receiving</i> : fear of infiltration and of cheap labor is not as serious as the disadvantages for the sending countries. <i>Sending</i> : brain drain <i>Receiving</i> : potentially “creating a Third World in the own country”; potential social tensions.
France	Libération Le Figaro	Cultural complexity	Difficult to achieve social cohesion.	<i>Sending</i> : -- <i>Receiving</i> : economic advantages of labor migration	<i>Sending</i> : -- <i>Receiving</i> : problems of integration
		Not mentioned.	Difficult to achieve social cohesion	<i>Sending</i> : -- <i>Receiving</i> : economic advantages of labor migration	<i>Sending</i> : -- <i>Receiving</i> : problems of integration
Turkey	Zaman Cumhuriyet	Cultural richness, easier to create a society with less rigid identity ascriptions, creates a “culture of living together”	Difficult for social cohesion, political unity, national identity, solidarity, equality of citizens before the law, potential of one group to dominate over others.	No benefits. <u>Would distinguish</u> : only labor migrants should be let in.	Migrants are cut off from their cultural roots. Potential societal tensions in the receiving country.
		Cultural richness	One group might dominate the others.	No advantages specified. <u>Would distinguish</u> : based on UN standards. Makes the world more colorful. <u>Would not distinguish</u> between groups to be let in.	International migration is a fact of life and is due to economic inequalities. <u>Would not distinguish</u> Threat of terrorism.
Hungary	Népszabadság Magyar Nemzet	Cultural richness; economically more successful society.	Cultural tensions, makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion.	<i>Sending</i> : remittances. <i>Receiving</i> : benefits on the short run but societal tensions on the long run.	<i>Sending</i> : freezing the country on a low level of development. <i>Receiving</i> : societal tensions on the long run due to the unwillingness of 2 nd and 3 rd generation of immigrants to integrate.
		Cultural richness; a more dynamic society, a society with less rigid identity inscriptions.	Difficult to achieve political unity and national identity.		

Finally, we can also note that the liberal approach of the British respondents is mirrored in their opinions on the question whether and what kind of political rights non-citizens should be granted. Significantly, both of them said non-nationals who live and work in the United Kingdom, should get all the political rights citizens have, expanding from active local to passive national voting rights. Concerning this rather evident factor of openness toward immigrants, responses of the media representatives of other countries stayed in line with their more cautious attitudes, outlined above. German respondents would grant voting rights on the local level, with one of them also extending these rights to the EU level. Similarly, French editors would grant local voting rights to all, depending on the period of residence, but would extend political rights practiced on the national and European levels only to citizens of the EU: “I am of the opinion that the foreigners could vote, but they will be granted this right depending on the years of residence, etc. It is a different issue the case of the foreigners coming from the other countries of the European community” (*Le Figaro*, 10/12/2008).

While one of the Turkish journalists seems to imply that long term residents should enjoy the same political rights as citizens – “[i]f they have an intention to stay here... if they are not temporary and thinking of migrating to Europe from here, of course there citizenship rights must be recognized” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26/12/2008), this is not reflected in his responses to the questions concerning these rights individually (though the data is not available in the database). The other Turkish respondent would extend active and passive voting rights on the local and the EU levels to non-citizens. (Yet it would be interesting to note what the respondents would argue if they were asked about immigrants to Turkey.) Similarly to the Turkish division reflecting the fragmented nature of the national public sphere itself, the responses of the Hungarian journalists are also revealing a break between the two main dailies: while the *Népszabadság* respondent thinks it appropriate to extend to all non-citizens active and passive voting rights on local and EU-levels, his counterpart at *Magyar Nemzet* believes all political rights should be granted but only to non-citizens coming from other EU member states, making a sharp distinction between EU and third country nationals.

3 Conceptions of adaptation, citizenship, and EU-integration

Bearing in mind the respondents’ views on ethno-national diversity and international migration as outlined above and the patterns that emerged looking at relationship between diversity and migration, in this section we will assess whether the trends above are reflected in the journalists’ opinion on the need for adaptation to and of minorities within the different societies. Furthermore, we will aim to assess whether their attitudes to the former are reflected

in the way they approach questions related to national and EU-policies that have an impact on diversity, more specifically, to citizenship and EU-enlargement. Thus, we will try to answer questions whether more cautious attitudes towards international migration influence respondents' thoughts on citizenship (would they apply stricter conditions?); whether fears of migration imply a more limited ideal of enlargement, and whether these questions are approached differently by the respondents of the non-member Turkey compared to EU member countries.

As we have seen above, there were differences in the way respondents from the three old member states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom approached international migration. It is therefore interesting to see, whether this difference is also present in their opinions on citizenship. What is apparent already from the first sight of the Eurosphere questionnaire data is that the British respondents' approach is yet again liberal and open with regards to citizenship as well, at least in the national context. That is, both journalists from the UK believe that regulation of citizenship should become less rigid, and that all those who live and work in the UK should be able to acquire citizenship, as long as they observe the basic democratic values of the country and the rule of law. In terms of EU-citizenship, only one of their answers is available: the respondent from the *Daily Telegraph* thinks only citizens of member states should become EU-citizens, as it is still nation states that are considered to be the sovereign masters of this question.

When taking a look at British views on adaptation of national institutions to the needs of minorities and to their expectations about minorities' adaptation, it becomes even clearer that they see the rule of law and the democratic political system of the British nation-state as the guarantor of societal peace. Both respondents answer identically that institutions should not adapt to the special needs of minorities, and all minorities should adapt to – beyond learning the language of the country which is necessary for daily life – the political system. One of them explicitly warns of the risks of “multiculturalist approaches” as these could lead to segregation – “You have to be careful so that you don't end up institutionalizing inequality. For example, I was reading that the city council of Utrecht had opened two information desks for Muslims, one for men and one for women. You don't want to institutionalize these prejudices as a public authority. I particularly think that public authorities should not privilege any religious groups” (*Daily Telegraph*, 23/02/2009).⁸

⁸ According to the interviewer: “The respondent thinks that there is a risk in multiculturalist approaches that suggest that citizens should live separated from each other according to their cultural/ethnic/national/religious background” (DT, 23/02/2009).

Further affirming the rule of law and respect for individual rights as primary norms for society, both British respondents think that the state should interfere with minorities' religious or traditional practices if these violate individual rights and freedoms. Quite consistently, this liberal attitude also seems to define the British opinion about EU-enlargement: both British respondents emphasize that conditions of accession should be equal for all candidate states, and while the representative of *The Guardian* says the Copenhagen criteria should be applied to aspiring members, the journalist of the *Daily Telegraph* goes as far as stating that accession should be voluntary, with integrating all those states that would like to join the EU. Based on the above described attitudes, it is little surprise that when asked about the effects of the last round of enlargement to diversity or various groups relevant for diversity, they respond rather positively: the journalist of *The Guardian* says that the latest enlargement round increased diversity and was beneficial economically but had no effect on the relevant groups for diversity, while respondent from the *Daily Telegraph* agrees that diversity was increased and he is more positive about its effects since he further argues that enlargement has also been beneficial to all the groups relevant from the perspective of societal diversity.

Let us now turn to how the same relations take shape in French and German media respondents' answers. As we have seen in the previous section, we encountered a more reserved attitude to international migration and ethno-national diversity in the views of these two countries' representatives. As a further visible difference from their British counterparts, all four of them agreed that issues related to diversity and migration would require EU-level regulation. The German respondents' answers related to citizenship, adaptation, and EU enlargement display consistent continuities with this attitude – especially in the responses of the *FAZ* representative. Thus, in line with the potential risks they attribute to ethno-national diversity, the German journalists' approach to adaptation requires more efforts on both sides – the minorities and the public institutions as well – than the British respondents have argued. Both German journalists state that public institutions should be adapted to the needs of minorities: they should be made multilingual according to the respondent from *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and public servants should undergo multicultural training according to the representative of *FAZ*.

Whereas in general French media representatives' responses show consistent resemblance with those of the Germans, they are not always on the same opinion. According to the journalist of *Libération*, the state should not adapt to the needs of minorities, as learning the language of the host country is indispensable for daily life, and underlines his argument with the difficulties experienced in Germany, where many of the Turkish immigrants do not

speak German (or mix it with Turkish).⁹ Touching upon the cultural aspects of integration, he traces potential tensions to the distinct characters of “democratic” or “modern” and “traditional” cultures: whereas the former respects individual freedoms, the latter prioritizes the community – something incompatible with republican values so dear for the French. Concurring at this point rather with his German colleagues, *Le Figaro*’s editor believes institutions should adapt to immigrant groups’ needs by becoming multilingual. He thinks integration is not rightly expected when the state does not foster it through its own means. Nevertheless, he also locates potential conflicts between the fundamental principles of the liberal state and the socio-cultural background of immigrant groups, and firmly states that immigrants must adapt to French legislation: “In case they do not like it, they are free to return where they came from. It is not forbidden. I might prefer to go to a swimming pool where the people are naked, but the legislation does not allow it, so I have to abide by the laws” (*Le Figaro* 10/12/2010). Unsurprisingly, they concur in claiming that the state should intervene in minority cultural practices in the cases when they restrict individual liberty.

So do the German editors, nevertheless, their approach to the requirements of adaptation on the minorities’ part demonstrate differences in this regard. Whereas the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* respondent expresses requirements similar to her British counterparts (learning the language and observation of basic norms such as sending children to school), the *FAZ* editor states that the condition of integration into society is the knowledge and observation of the political system and its fundamental laws, and introduces the notion of *Leitkultur* (‘guiding culture’) in relation to his views on socio-cultural adaptation and notes that “[t]he term “*Leitkultur*” [guiding culture] might be burdened and wrong but there is an idea on how we live here, how the French or the Swedish and other countries live. It is a bit different for the classical countries of immigration” (*FAZ*, 19/05/2009). That is, he thinks the German way of life is in a sense prior to those of the countries where immigrants come from. Very much in line with this prejudiced view, he thinks the condition of acquiring German citizenship, beyond descent, should be residence in the country, and notes: “...it has to be found a way to say: I want to become German”. The journalist of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* also thinks the condition of citizenship should be descent but she adds birth in the country too – which then implies the descendants of immigrants too. With regard to EU-citizenship,

⁹ “Learning the language of the host society is indispensable for having a successful integration. On the other hand, hesitating between both languages causes problems in relation to asserting the identity. The case of Turks in Berlin is significant and self-explanatory. In some schools where there were few Turks, they were well integrated. Whereas, in other schools, where the number of children of Turkish origin was increasing, the pupils tended to speak an equally Turkish and German language, hence sounding like extraterrestrial aliens” (*Libération*, 29/01/2009).

unsurprisingly, both German respondents say it should only be granted to citizens of a member state.¹⁰

Considering the continuity of a more reserved approach than that of the British journalists, it is of course interesting to see how French and German media representatives think about EU-enlargement and the role of the EU in governing issues related to groups relevant to diversity. As one might expect, they are in favor of a more limited enlargement. What is more, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* respondent thinks no more countries should be integrated for the time being (she nevertheless designates the Copenhagen criteria as the condition of accession). Her counterpart representing the *FAZ* says the conditions for accession should be that the country is located within the geographical borders of Europe, adheres to the principle of the rule of law, and accepts the EU's norms and regulations concerning gender issues. Nevertheless, the quote from him under this question makes it clear that this latter condition is targeted on Muslim countries: "If [a country] is non-democratic, if it is ruled dictatorially, and there is no market economy; and if it does not belong to Europe. [...] A Muslim country will always make more problems. But it cannot be a criterion." (*FAZ*, 19/05/2009). Consequently, then, both German respondents are against Turkey's accession, although the journalist of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* notes that her refusal is not grounded in cultural reasons, rather in the limited capacities of the EU.

"In principle, I'm against Turkey joining. For several reasons. [...] To all intents and purposes, because I think the limit has already been reached. Not so much a cultural limit [...] that wouldn't be my argument, but I regard the EU as already being virtually incapable of action, and it would be even worse if more members were added" (*SD*, 16/02/2009).

Turkey is considered to be beyond the limits of the EU according to French media respondents as well, although not for the same reasons as those of the Germans. While the journalist of *Libération* thinks the question of (cultural) belonging is at stake and *Le Figaro*'s editor mentions the complexity of Turkey's integration, they do not altogether exclude the possibility of Turkey's accession. They would nevertheless postpone it a bit further in the future – with one of them mentioning a possibly "two-speed Europe", so resolving the possible problems arising from Turkey's in-between situation. For the editor of *Le Figaro*, such delays are not necessary in the case of the Western Balkans: they should be integrated immediately.

¹⁰ French respondents' views on questions of citizenship are not available.

Showing consistency with their views on the role of EU-level regulation in issues of international migration, both German and one of the French respondents see space for EU-structures and policies in governing the relations of groups relevant for diversity. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* respondent thinks EU structures and policies are necessary concerning issues of ethno-national diversity, gender equality, and other groups relevant for a diverse society, while the journalist of *FAZ* believes only incentives for national adaptation should come from the EU, as nation-states are still sovereign and should be free in making policies on these issues, yet harmonization of these policies across Europe would be ideal. According to the editor of *Libération*, both EU incentives for national adaptation and support programs by the EU would be welcome in issue the areas ethno-national diversity and gender equality.¹¹

In view of the French and German respondents' aversions, let us now see what media representatives of Turkey, the non-member state in our case selection, think about the same dimensions of social-political openness of the states and the EU. Interestingly, when it comes to the adaptation of public institutions to minorities' needs or the adaptation of minorities to the host country's norms, both Turkish respondents mention issues related to learning German language or education in Turkish as negative examples:

For instance in Germany for years there is a demand for education in Turkish but is has not been resolved. There is no education in mother tongue but there are elective courses... This is a demand that is voiced in many countries and you know it is debated in Turkey as well. But I do not think it will be resolved in a short time (Cumhuriyet, 26/12/2008).

What is more, the journalist of *Zaman* states that this condition is anti-democratic and that he is against such kind of integration: "For instance the obligation in Germany to know German is nonsense. It is wrong. [...] But a statement such as 'you do not have a place here because you have not learnt this [German]' is very despotic and very authoritarian" (*Zaman*, 03/12/2008). The journalist of *Cumhuriyet* also mentions the concept of integration and assimilation: as concepts which he rejects totally. With regards to the adaptation of public institutions to minorities' needs, the representative of *Zaman* says needs of religious groups should be attended to – which is at least curious, given the secular character of the Turkish state, but can be explained by the newspaper's profile targeting a more religious readership and the current developments in Turkish politics. The other respondent notes that this issue is

¹¹ *Le Figaro* editor's answer is not available.

problematic, but gives no specific answer about the mode or the extent of adaptation of public institutions to suit minority needs.

In terms of granting Turkish citizenship, the journalist of *Cumhuriyet* specifies long-term residence and birth in the country as preconditions, whereas the respondent from *Zaman* expresses his opinion that everyone who would like to live in the country, should be granted citizenship. Their approach to EU-citizenship is more interesting: both of them state that EU-citizenship should not be derived from citizenship in a member state – and one can clearly see this is done so as to open the possibility of acquiring such abstract EU citizenship for Turkish people, especially those that work in different member states without the citizenship of the host country. Although it seems that in the interview the question about the limits of EU-enlargement was formulated differently than in other countries, the two Turkish respondents are on the same view again: the EU only wants to integrate countries with a Christian background (even though according to the journalist of *Cumhuriyet*, the limits of enlargement are actually political and economic dynamics). While this respondent does not mention Turkey specifically, the representative of *Zaman* says Turkey is within the cultural boundaries of Europe, and should be a member of the EU.

How far should the EU enlarge? Until its cultural boundaries. Is Turkey included in this? If I were one of the decision makers in the European Union I would definitely include Turkey for the sake of a political argument (*Zaman*, 03/12/2009).

Interestingly, although the *Cumhuriyet* journalist expresses his aversions to Western-biased politics of EU-enlargement, he is positive concerning the norm-spreading potentials of the EU, and thinks that both EU incentives for national adaptation and support programs should be introduced in the issue areas of ethno-national diversity and gender equality: “If the EU countries can solve these problems within themselves first then they can perhaps disseminate certain norms in this area. ... They need to solve [problems] about sexism, they have not solved yet. They need to solve the migrant problems in their countries” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26/12/2008).

Finally, let us see how these issues are approached by media representatives of Hungary – a country that is not affected by international migration (but has significant minorities abroad as well as autochthonous minorities within the state). If nothing else, Hungarian respondents are consistent in the way their distinct responses reflect the ideological-political fragmentations of the country. Whereas the editor-in-chief of *Népszabadság* represents views that are somewhere between those of the British and the

German respondents, views of the *Magyar Nemzet* editor clearly display his preference for Hungarian minorities and his fear of immigration. The *Népszabadság* editor argues for non-restrictive citizenship requirements, adaptation to language and political system, insufficient human rights records as the impediment to EU accession, and supports the integration of Turkey, with a strong preference for secularism:

Countries where state and church are not separated should not be allowed to become member states. Countries, whose constitution do not guarantee European basic rights, the right for freedom, human dignity, freedom of speech and opinion, and countries that have death penalty, should not be allowed to become member states. Countries, which discriminate against different minorities should not be allowed to become members. [...] It is a strategic interest of Europe to accept Turkey (*Népszabadság* 04/08/2008).

In stark opposition, the *Magyar Nemzet* respondent argues that beyond adapting to the political system and learning the language, “immigrants have to adhere to the basic rules of European behavior”. Whereas he would facilitate the citizenship of co-ethnics, he would require from other immigrant groups the proof of “true, well-founded motivation to live here”. Unsurprisingly, then, he is against the accession of Turkey, and defines the limits of integration as those of Western Christianity. Furthermore, displaying his concerns for Hungarian minorities living abroad, he thinks enlargement was beneficial for ethnic groups, and says that he would favor rigid EU-legislation in issues concerning ethno-national diversity. In relation to gender and other groups, he thinks EU-incentives and support programs would be sufficient, no legislation is needed. One of the very few points where the Hungarian respondents concur is their opinion that EU-citizenship should only be granted to those already citizens of a member state.

4 Views on the EU-polity and the European Public Sphere

Arriving at the final aspect of our assessment, maintaining as our gauge the trends gaining shape above, in this section we aim to relate media respondents’ views on the future of the EU polity and the European Public Sphere (EPS). As mentioned in the introduction, a general skepticism characterizes the journalists’ responses in relation to the existence of the EPS. Even those few who think there is a common European communication space, note that this space is limited and tends to exclude certain groups or the population at large. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see in what kind of dynamics this doubt is with the respondents’ conceptions about the direction the EU polity should develop into, what impact integration has on

diversity, or how our selected journalists see the functions of their own medium within these processes, with a special emphasis on informing the public.

Following the structure above, let us start by taking a look at the way the British journalists' responses take shape on the EPS. We have seen that whereas they generally favor enlargement and see the effects of diversity and international migration as mostly positive, they see the member state and its democratic political system as the guarantor of smooth common life of various ethno-national and social groups. Thus the state is the prominent player, while the EU and its structures or policies do not feature significantly in their ideal scheme. Arguably, this pattern is also apparent in the way they respond to questions about the future of the EU-polity, as both of the British respondents state that the direction in which the EU should develop is towards a more democratic polity: more transparency and accountability needs to be ensured on the European level.

In terms of the structure of the Union, the journalist of *Guardian* argues that a federal EU is not a possible outcome at the moment and that the current economic crisis could even endanger the Union: “[t]he federal European state is out of discussion. The economic crisis might also bring the disintegration of the common market” (*Guardian*, 20/02/2009). In line with this second point, he says that the impact of further integration could be just more protectionism and thus would only contribute to weakening ethno-national diversity. The current economic crisis also features prominently in the responses of the *Daily Telegraph* respondent when he names it as the third most important issue within EU-politics currently (for the *Guardian*'s journalist this issue is the single most important at present). Further, his comment on the impact of further integration is not too far from his counterpart at the *Guardian*, as he states that the EU is in fact against international immigration and this negative approach could intensify with future rounds of integration: “[t]he EU has never been much of a friend to immigration outside of its own borders. It has always been paranoid if not hostile to the notion of immigration, even to the notion of migration inside the EU” (*Daily Telegraph*, 23/02/2009).

In view of these opinions, it is not at all surprising that the British media respondents do not believe in the existence of a common European communication space, a European Public Sphere, and that they are convinced that at the present, the nation state is the largest unit of existing communication spaces. As one of the respondents puts it:

“There is not a European communication space today because we still have national media and there is not a European public in spite of the fact that there are European parties. There is probably a potential for a European public, because there are mutual

concerns. If you have a look at different newspapers published in different countries they cover European stories in different ways for different audiences” (Daily Telegraph, 23/02/2009).

This response not only denies the existence of the EPS, but raises further issues: first, the journalist says that there is a potential for the EPS to emerge, as there are mutual concerns of the European publics – but, at the same time, does not think that there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication. In fact, he is rather suspicious about the “EU’s attempts to communicate itself” (Daily Telegraph, 23/02/2009).

On the contrary, the representative of the *Guardian* thinks that there should be more opportunities for trans-European communication and claims that even with the specific status of the UK, EU-politics are becoming more important than national politics, since more and more decisions take place on the European level: “[t]hings are increasingly determined here, with Europe as a bloc, legislative powers increasingly shifting to European institutions, despite all the British opt-outs and other countries’ opt-outs” (Guardian, 20/02/2009). Taken together, our interviews thus suggest that while British editors see the European public as a possible correlate of integration, they do not see the EU polity having an active role in its creation. While they disagree on whether it is the duty of their medium to contribute to the European communication space or the EPS (with the *Daily Telegraph* respondent denying such duty), they believe it is their duty to inform the audience about EU-politics and the perspectives of other member states but, it seems, they imagine the fulfillment of this duty through doing their job, i.e., through credible journalism.

Considering that German and French respondents showed more trust towards the role and functions of EU structures and policies in issues of diversity and international migration, the question now is whether their diagonal position to their British colleagues persists in their views on the future of the EU-polity as well. As far as the editor of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is concerned, this assumption seems to be confirmed since she says she is very much in favor of a more centralized EU:

[i]n principle, the central EU institutions need to be strengthened. I am a supporter of an EU with strong political institutions, even if the number of members prevents this. Then, of course, you can think about reverting to the notion of [...] a political core Europe and a broader economic space (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/02/2009).

In consistency with this preference, although she says that there is no common European communication space today, she thinks ideally the EPS would constitute a single, unified

communication space, as this would facilitate the development of a common, well-functioning political system of the EU:

[the EPS] would certainly promote European integration and also the readiness to collaborate more closely politically if we knew more about the countries. [...] Joint media or any other kind of exchange of information, regardless of how they are organized, would be useful (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/02/2009).

Somewhat more cautiously, the representative of the *FAZ* is of the opinion that there should be no change in the development of the EU-polity, and that the direction set out by the Lisbon Treaty with empowering member states is the correct one, since it is still the nation-state that can bound loyalties of the people. Nearing his views to those of the British respondents, he also notes that there is a democratic deficit in the operation of EU-polity – he understands this circumstance as another reason for supporting the Lisbon Treaty though, unlike his British counterparts. Mirroring this suspicion about the democratic character of the EU-polity, he thinks a common European communication space exists currently only for the European political and economic elite but not for the populations of the member states at large. It is somewhat puzzling, then, that in reaction to the next question he claims no one is excluded from this space and that it enables different groups to voice their concerns:

[The EPS] is a social and political distinctive feature. [...] The Opel workers organize transnationally. [...] The level people observe [...] in the lower social groups is still the regional one: the locality, the nation, less the European space. But the European space also provides possibilities to these groups [...] to organize transnationally, to a greater extent than before and even beyond the scope of [...] lobby-groups or interest groups in Brussels. I recently saw it in the case of Opel (FAZ, 19/05/2009).

Concurring with his colleague at *FAZ*, *Liberation*'s editor believes there should be no change in the direction of the EU-polity's development; nevertheless, his response seems to be more descriptive than prescriptive, as it rests on the statement that nation-states will retain their predominant sovereignty. Whether this view is reflected in his assessment of a common European communication space, we do not know, as his answer is not available in the data but he does call for more possibilities for trans-European communication. More in line with the journalist of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Le Figaro*'s (10/02/2008) representative would like to see more centralization within the EU-polity, although only on specific policy fields, and unlike her, he claims to lack a "global vision about Europe". He is also slightly more pessimistic when the EPS is concerned, even though he notes that "[t]here has been enhanced

communication within the European Union, providing a public communication space”. However, he depicts nation-state as the main level of communication spaces:

We never think of the European audience, since it is not a criterion for our dissemination policies. The Italians read the Italian newspapers, whereas the French read the French newspapers. Language is a barrier. It would have been a different case if Europe spoke English. But, that would have harmed cultural diversity (Le Figaro, 10/12/2008).

What is lacking, based on his answer, is a more active collaboration among media actors across the EU, but whether he would indeed prefer to see more possibilities for trans-European communication and collaboration, remains unanswered.

As for the role of their medium in the creation or functioning of the European communication space or the EPS, both German respondents think they should and do contribute to it actively, and see it as their duty, or their newspaper’s task to inform their audiences about EU-politics. Furthermore, they both indicate that present information flows and exchanges on the EU are insufficient, and both claim that informing the public is mainly obstructed because the EU is too complex to explain to a generally disinterested audience. Finally, somewhat surprisingly given their support for the creation of the EPS, they both think integration could have a kind of backlash in terms of nation-states, national identities, and national cultures.¹² Although the patchy availability of French journalists’ answers does not allow for real comparisons, it is worth to note that the problem of the disinterested audience emerges here too, but the journalist of *Libération* still conceives of informing readers about perspectives of other member states as their duty.

Reflecting one of the most interesting findings of the present analysis, Turkish media respondents, despite their condemnation of what they perceive as the EU’s bias towards states with Christian backgrounds and their suspicions about the way EU-members address ethno-national or religious differences – “The EU looks as if it is democratic but it does not tolerate things that are different” (*Zaman*, 03/12/2009) – they are the most enthusiastic in judging the

12 “Basically, I can imagine the stronger the EU becomes politically - which implies a certain subordination of the national states [...] - that in turn this cultural diversity is emphasized. [...] That we say [...] if we’re no longer really independent politically, at least we want to be culturally autonomous” (SZ, 16/02/2009). “It is clear that it [ethno-national diversity] grows. [...] Mistrust towards immigration, mistrust towards the decisions in Brussels. I feel that the national aspect comes to the fore to the same extent the [...] autochthonous population is unsettled - in contrast to a Brussels apparatus which is perceived as far-away and intransparent. [...] I can imagine that there will be two syndromes: on the one hand the elites have the opinion [...] that the solution for many present and future questions, questions of globalization, governance, cooperation [...] is to find European regulations and guidance. On the other hand, the populations in the majority want just the opposite and turn their back on it. I don’t know whether this process will be promoted by an ethicizing but I would not be surprised” (FAZ, 19/05/2009).

norm-spreading impact of integration. Thus, even though both Turkish journalists express doubts that the EU can become a federal state or a union similar to the USA; (since EU-members demonstrate a much greater diversity) they seem to believe that integrated Europe and Turkey's membership within the Union would have positive effects on their country. As one of them argues:

I believe the European Union should continue its existence, but [it should do so] only believing in differences and diversity. It is not possible [for the EU] to become a state like the USA. [...] I do not find its political aims too correct ... But for someone who lives in Turkey what makes me excited about the EU is that it brings contemporary norms (Zaman, 03/12/2009).

This belief in the EU's norm-spreading power, one could argue, implies a conception of the common public sphere, or a communication sphere that functions as the medium of the norms' dissemination – even though none of the Turkish respondents state that there is a common European communication space or an EPS. While the representative of *Cumhuriyet* argues that what exists today is only a common space for the elites and cannot reach to the grassroots levels, the journalist of *Zaman* only says that he has no information on this matter. But, again, both journalists show a strong belief in the power of such a common sphere (should it emerge or open up more), due to its potentials to empower disadvantaged groups:

Of course there are efforts of migrants and women's organizations and other who are excluded from this sphere. Perhaps they need to show more efforts and enter into serious discussions with the states and public institutions. Perhaps then it could expand and become more bottom-up. It might expand from [being] theoretical to practical (Cumhuriyet, 26/1/2009).

Accordingly, they both see it as the duty of their respective mediums to inform their audience about EU-politics. Approaching this question from different directions, whereas the journalist of *Cumhuriyet* says they fulfill their duty to inform their Turkish audience about EU-politics in a credible way,¹³ the representative of *Zaman* formulates his newspaper's role in a somewhat reversed direction, as informing the world in general and Europe in particular about Turkey in a credible way. Correspondingly, both Turkish editors think their journals contribute to the European communication space; and contribute in a correct, unbiased

¹³ "Of course we do [see it as a duty] but not from a multiple direction. As I said earlier we try to convey the realities about the European Union but we do not, like some others do, convey the EU as an idealized model. We try to tell what is happening in all its transparency" (Cumhuriyet, 26/1/2009).

manner: “[the newspaper] contributes a lot. Especially, it is instrumental in terms of informing the European and world public opinion about Turkey in a healthy way” (*Zaman*, 03/12/2009).

Although approaching the issue from a very different perspective (especially due to Hungary’s membership in the EU), the editor of *Magyar Nemzet* also believes in the potential of a common European communication space to empower disadvantaged groups. Similarly to his fellow journalist at *Cumhuriyet*, he thinks that in order to this potential, the EPS has to open up first more to the civil society, as at present it is reserved for the European elites:

The connection and cooperation between civil society and the EU, interest groups, churches and Brussels should be better. There should be more communication spheres, which should be connected to each other. Civil society should have a greater maneuvering space, which could ensure that citizens’ interests are better represented and asserted at the EU level. For instance, Hungarian peasants could form a coalition with their Spanish counterparts (*Magyar Nemzet*, 09/01/2009).

Unsurprisingly in view of their permanent opposition that reflects the duality of Hungarian realities, the editor-in-chief of *Népszabadság* thinks the exact opposite and claims it does not make sense to talk about a European communication space, as communication occurs interpersonally. Accordingly, there is no need for further possibilities of trans-European communication – such efforts can easily have adverse effects if they turn out to be “empty, formalized shells” (*Népszabadság*, 01/08/2008). Although he questions the existence of a common European space, he thinks that, beyond increasing diversity, integration contributes to the spread of European norms such as the respect of individual rights and freedoms:

Enlargement can be regarded as a positive development from the point of view of ethnic minorities living in the new member states, since it contributed to the spreading of European values in Eastern Europe. It brought European behavioral patterns, norms and values, such as the respect of individual rights to these countries. Yet, enlargement has not increased ethno-national diversity since the majority of people do not move around (*Népszabadság*, 01/08/2008).

Furthermore, he is in favor of a more centralized EU – at least on certain policy areas such as foreign policy and defense. With this opinion, he seems to reaffirm the claim of the *Magyar Nemzet* editor, who thinks that those on the left are in favor of a centralized EU, or even “a new Moscow”.¹⁴ On the contrary, the conservative journalist would favor a federal Europe,

¹⁴ “As I see it, even in Hungary this issue is viewed along the conservative - liberal dividing line, while the conservative side prefers the federal Europe the liberal left fed by Bolshevism seems to be seeking a new Moscow” (MN, 09/01/2009).

where nation-states could preserve “a healthy degree of self-consciousness” (*Magyar Nemzet*, 09/01/2009). This is also in line with his view (the only one shared with the representative of *Népszabadság*) that integration increases diversity, but as he believes in the beneficial power of the EU to discipline its members in terms of the way they treat their minorities, this is not depicted as a harmful effect.¹⁵ Surprisingly in the context of his rather conservative views, the *Magyar Nemzet* respondent even mentions gender inequality as positively affected by integration – although he is more reserved than his Turkish colleague at *Cumhuriyet*. Altogether, once again, we cannot conclude anything else but that the Hungarian respondents’ views display the political-ideological orientation of their papers as well as the fragmentation of the domestic public sphere in Hungary along the lines of left and right, and thus are less telling of what the possible stance of a new member state’s media elite could be on the issues at scrutiny here.

Table 3 summarizes the most important views expressed by the media respondents of the different countries on the subjects of the future of EU integration, the impact of integration on diversity, and their attitudes towards the European Public Space and more collaboration and cooperation opportunities on the European level, as well as their opinion about whether their own medium contributed or not to informing the public about European issues. It is interesting to note that British journalists displayed the most uniform view with regard to the future of EU integration, both calling for a more democratic Union, while the other countries show responses ranging from no change to further centralization, to further autonomy for the member states. The same can be said about the impact of integration on diversity, only the British respondents voted clearly for integration weakening diversity, while the Hungarian journalists argue the opposite with the same univocal voice. The rest of the opinions show no clear pattern for the other countries. The most uniform attitude among media respondents concerns the existence of the European Public Sphere, which is denied by the vast majority of respondents. Almost the same unity is observed when it comes to the duty of media to inform the public about European issues – most of the respondents believe that it is a task for their newspapers to perform this duty, though differences exist in their beliefs on how important and overarching this duty is.

¹⁵ “There is a pressure to adhere to European values: then for instance there are various interest assertion possibilities available to Hungarian minorities, like Tökés in Strasbourg who declared that he will represent all Hungarian minorities abroad thus at the European level. [...] In my opinion, the aspiration to meet expectations is visible in our neighborhood as well, which is why they do not apply repression against Hungarian minorities, and they are forced to carry out at least some sort of show-politics” (MN, 09/01/2009).

Table 3: Views on the future of the EU-polity, integration, and the European Public Sphere

Country	Newspaper	EU-polity's future	Integration's impact	ECS/EPS	Medium's roles
UK	Daily Telegraph	<u>More transparency and accountability</u> ; this would lead to increased legitimacy.	<u>Weakening diversity</u> as the EU is "paranoid" in relation to migration.	<u>No ECS</u> . Media is still national. Potential for the emergence of a European public due to mutual concerns. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>No</u> .	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>No</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: n.a.
	The Guardian	<u>More democratization</u> is needed. Federal Europe is not a possibility presently.	Possibility: <u>weakening diversity</u> within member states due to protectionism.	<u>No ECS</u> . Communication spaces in Europe are national. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Yes</u> .	<u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> . Sufficiency: No.
Germany	Süddeutsche Z.	<u>More centralization</u> and a broader economic space.	Both weakening and strengthening <u>focus on the national</u> .	<u>No ECS</u> . <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Yes</u> . <u>EPS should be organized as a single, unified CS</u> → better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Yes</u> .	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>Yes</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> . Sufficiency: No.
	D/FAZ	<u>No change</u> . Lisbon Treaty's direction is good.	<u>Strengthening nation states and national culture</u> , national identity. Strengthening diversity → anti-European attitudes.	<u>No ECS</u> . Only for the (economic) elites through transnational media, for experts, political parties and leaders, European media. Still: <u>what exists enables people</u> to voice their concerns <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Hesitant</u> .	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>Yes</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> . Sufficiency: No.
France	Libération	<u>No change</u> .	n. a.	n. a.	<u>Contributes to</u> ECS. <u>Duty to inform</u> about member states': <u>Yes</u> .
	Le Figaro	<u>More centralization</u> in certain policy areas.	n. a.	<u>No ECS</u> . Despite enhanced communication within the EU.	<u>Does not contribute to</u> ECS. Sufficiency: <u>No</u> .

Turkey	Zaman	<u>More autonomy</u> for the member states. Too diverse to constitute a union like the US.	<u>Weakening nations, etc; weakening diversity</u> within member states; weakening ethnic minorities' spread. ← Europeanization = homogenization.	He has no information.	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>Yes</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> . Sufficiency: <u>Yes</u> .
	Cumhuriyet	More layered and flexible ways of political integration. Federal Europe is doubtful.	Double process of integration and disintegration. Impact on gender equality: remains on the elite level	<u>No ECS</u> . Only for the EU-elite. Needs to be more open. → better opportunities for empowerment. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Yes</u> .	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>Yes</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> .
Hungary	Népszabadság	<u>More centralization</u> but only in certain policy fields.	<u>Strengthening diversity</u> .	<u>No ECS</u> . Communication happens interpersonally. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>No</u> .	n. a.
	Magyar Nemzet	<u>More federalization</u> .	<u>Strengthening diversity</u> , strengthening spread of minorities.	<u>There is a common ECS</u> of social movements, European media, European institutions. It <u>excludes</u> the socially disadvantaged. <u>More possibilities</u> for trans-European communication: <u>Yes</u> .	Need to contribute to ECS: <u>Yes</u> . <u>Duty to inform</u> about EU-politics: <u>Yes</u> . Sufficiency: No.

5 Conclusions

Despite the general doubts concerning the existence of the European Public Sphere, media respondents of the countries selected for our analysis allow us to draw some tentative and rudimentary conclusions about the way media opinions about notions such as diversity, migration, citizenship, and European integration relate to what they think about the European Public Sphere. To be sure, this should not be treated as conclusions inferred from studies of a representative sample but this was neither our intention here in this paper. Instead, we aimed to zoom in on the qualitative data of the Eurosphere project, so as to assess the possible correlations between different basic concepts of the project that could be later tested on a more representative selection or the entire database. As stated above, our selection of the countries that aimed at the largest diversity possible was also intended to trigger the most interesting and possibly conflicting dynamics of our research tenets in order to highlight possible avenues for further research.

The most consistent trend, as we showed, was apparent in the British journalists' rather open and liberal approach to issues of diversity, international migration, policies of citizenship, and European enlargement. Apparently, they saw the democratic political system of member states (or at least Britain) as the guarantee of the creation or the fostering of tolerant and equal societies in Europe. Having doubts about the fully democratic operation and the integrative capacities of the EU, they did not refer to the union's level as having major influence on the issues related to diversity and this, in turn, seems to have impacted upon their approaches to the European Public Sphere.

Outlining quite the opposite chain of relations, media representatives of France and Germany, countries often thought of as Euro-optimists and staunch supporters of the Union, were much more cautious about the possible or already tangible effects of ethno-national diversity and international migration – possibly because of their difficulties in dealing with immigration and the integration of immigrants – and this caution was shown to expand to most of the other issue areas as well. That is, both French and German respondents emphasized the potential tensions deriving from diversity and migration, and demonstrated more restrained views about citizenship or the limits of EU-integration. Further, in line with their depiction as being more EU-friendly, they attributed greater impact and responsibility to EU structures and policies concerning the matters under discussion than their British counterparts.

Our remaining two countries show less clear patterns. While less consistency was to be found in the responses of Turkish media representatives than we saw earlier for German or British journalists, they certainly displayed a common, yet unsurprising criticism of what they

perceive as biases against Turkey as a Muslim country in what they saw as the EU's preference for countries with Christian cultural and religious heritage in the context of enlargement. Probably due to the fact that Turkey is a major sending country within international migration, their views on national and EU-citizenship were the most progressive and called for clear EU rules over member-state authority. Interestingly, while they found the EU's more restrictive policies non-democratic, they demonstrated a strong belief in the power of disseminating European norms that would be guaranteed by enlargement or Turkey's membership.

Although Hungarian media representatives were also optimistic about the "normalizing" effects of integration, their views seem less able to disclose the possible stances of journalists of a new member-state than the political divisions ruling the domestic public sphere. Nevertheless, as opposed to the other three country's representatives who focus largely on immigrant minorities, in case of the Hungarian journalists autochthonous minorities seem to determine clearly the respondents' perspective on questions of diversity and citizenship, and this preoccupation with co-ethnics living abroad is often the most important factor in determining how they think about the EU, European communication, or the European Public Sphere.

Altogether, although the discussion above does not permit the formulation of sweeping conclusions, it might give us some clues about the way media representatives situated simultaneously in their national context and that of the European Union conceptualize societal diversity as well as the core values or problems attributed to the latter – especially when paralleled with similar studies of think tank, social movement, or political party respondents that were part of the Eurosphere research project. Accordingly, we think that future studies of the project data should inquire into how media respondents' views on diversity, immigration, EU citizenship, or their general attitude towards the European Union compare to the way others approach ethno-national diversity and how do these views compare to attitudes expressed by other important societal organizations. Furthermore, one could study whether media people are in any way different from representatives of other organization regarding their views on the development of the EU polity, the role they think the EU should play in regulating issues of diversity and citizenship – as these seem to influence the attitudes towards the European Public Sphere.