



EUROSPHERE

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

Work Package 6.1/2 Report, 2011

**Minorities, the European Polity and a nascent
European Public Sphere
&
Nationalizing spaces**

**Jan H. van de Beek
Floris Vermeulen
Mikko Lagerspetz**

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
<http://eurospheres.org/publications/workpackage-reports/>
ISSN 1890-5986

EUROSPHERE ONLINE WORKING PAPER SERIES

Title: WP6.1/2 – Minorities, the European Polity and a nascent European Public Sphere & Nationalizing spaces

Authors: Jan H. van de Beek
Floris Vermeulen
Mikko Lagerspetz

This version: October 2011

Webpage: <http://eurospheres.org/publications/workpackage-reports/>

© EUROSPHERE, 2011

<http://eurospheres.org>

© 2011 by authors

All rights reserved.

Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including notice, is given to the source.

The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the EUROSPHERE Project.

The statement of purpose for the EUROSPHERE Online Working Paper Series is available from the EUROSPHERE working papers website, <http://eurospheres.org/publications/workpackage-reports/>

Author Contact Information:

Jan H. van de Beek

University of Amsterdam
the Netherlands

J.H.vandeBeek@uva.nl

Floris Vermeulen

University of Amsterdam
the Netherlands

F.F.Vermeulen@uva.nl

Mikko Lagerspetz

Tallinn University
Estonia

mikko@ehi.ee

ISSN 1890-5986 (online)

Table of Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Actor selection and a priori categorization	4
2.1	Introduction: three categories of ethnic groups.....	4
2.2	Organisations affiliated with majorities	6
2.3	Organisations affiliated with national minorities	7
2.4	Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities	8
3	Methodological issues	10
3.1	Data & Method.....	10
3.2	Fishers model	13
4	Typology of the organizations.....	15
4.1	State-nationalist.....	15
4.1.1	Ethno-national diversity	15
4.1.2	European Polity	16
4.1.3	European Public Sphere	16
4.2	Peoples nationalist.....	16
4.2.1	Ethno-national diversity	16
4.2.2	European Polity	17
4.2.3	European Public Sphere	18
4.3	Regional national minority.....	18
4.3.1	Ethno-national diversity	18
4.3.2	European Polity	19
4.3.3	European Public Sphere	20
4.4	Jews & Roma, (non-regional national minority).....	20
4.4.1	Ethno-national diversity	20
4.4.2	European Polity	21
4.4.3	European Public Sphere	22
4.5	Immigrant	22
4.5.1	Ethno-national diversity	22
4.5.2	European Polity	24
4.5.3	European Public Sphere	24
4.6	Pro-immigrant / Anti racist	25
4.6.1	Ethno-national diversity	25

4.6.2 European Polity	26
4.6.3 European Public Sphere	26
5 Comparisons between the types of organisations	27
5.1 Diversity	27
5.2 Group rights for national minorities and immigrants	30
5.3 Adaptation of society to minorities and vice versa	33
5.4 Correspondence of vision with dominant national discourse.....	36
5.5 European Polity	38
5.6 European Public Sphere	40
5.7 Summary of the findings	44
5.7.1 Organisations affiliated with majorities	44
5.7.2 Organisations affiliated with national minorities	45
5.7.3 Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities	46
6 Conclusion.....	47
6.1 Introduction	47
6.2 Organisations affiliated with majorities	48
6.2.1 State-nationalist – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) – Austria	48
6.2.2 Peoples-nationalist – Voorpost Nederland – The Netherlands	50
6.3 Organizations affiliated with national minorities.....	52
6.3.1 Regional national minority – Federació Convergència i Unió (CIU) – Spain	52
6.3.2 Jews & Roma – OJB Shalom – Bulgaria	54
6.4 Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities	56
6.4.1 Immigrant organisations - Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland – Germany	56
6.4.2 Pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations – Free Mobility Network (FMN) - Finland	57
6.5 Taxonomy of discursive frames	58
6.6 The structural consequences of ethno-national diversity	61
Appendix: Selected organizations.....	63
Actor selection.....	63
Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures	65
Appendix: Tables with Raw Data	72
Explanation to the tables with raw data	72
References	151

Minorities, the European Polity and a nascent European Public Sphere & Nationalizing spaces

Jan H. van de Beek, Floris Vermeulen, Mikko Lagerspetz

1 Introduction

The essence of any form of representative democracy is that a demos rules a political entity indirectly by elected representatives. In order for this demos to exert its will, this will has to be formed in a public sphere and communicated to the representatives via elections, the media or otherwise. Hence, in any modern democracy a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the government is the existence of an accessible, inclusive and independent public sphere and media landscape.

In an ideal-typical situation (not ideal, and not very realistic either, a point we will elaborate shortly), the political entity is a (nation)state which comprises one, undivided demos sharing a common language, culture and identity. All members of this demos are able and willing to enter the public sphere and engage in rational deliberation on society, hence shaping the will of the demos, which then is communicated via free and open elections and independent media to the representatives. Those representatives translate this into concrete policy programs. Subsequently, those policy programs are assessed in the public sphere and the feedback this generates is mediated by the media and absorbed by the representatives. In this way, the representatives stay in touch with the will of the demos and maintain their legitimacy.

The process of European integration led to the development of the European Polity, which can be described a post-national, multi-level, power-dispersing conglomerate of political institutions. This European Polity has a known problem with its legitimacy, often described as the democratic deficit. There are several basic causes for this lack of legitimacy. Firstly, there is no such thing a undivided European demos. Instead, there is a wide variety of overlapping and embedded identities among EU-citizens, with people identifying themselves with entities as diverse as the EU, nation-states, (autonomic) regions, ethnic, cultural or religious groups, national or linguistic minorities, etcetera. This diversity we refer to as 'ethno-national diversity'. As a consequence of this ethno-national diversity, a common

European language, culture and identity lacks, and hence pan-European media are virtually non existing. Finally, for all those reasons, there is no such a thing as an undivided European Public Sphere. That makes it difficult for the European Polity to gain legitimacy.

So, do we have to ‘despair’ about the degree in which ethno-national diversity impedes the future legitimacy of the European Polity and the development of an European Public Sphere? That would be too strong. Indeed, the first generation of EPS scholars were quick to point out that a fully fledged EPS does not exist or even cannot exist. Among the main reasons supplied to substantiate such claims are a lack of a shared European language, a weak European identity and the fact that pan-European media hardly exist (De Vreese 2007). However, in the last decade or so, a substantial body of literature came into existence that tries to refute the non-existence or impossibility of an EPS. This literature speaks of a process of ‘Europeanisation’ of national public spheres (Esmark 2007). Often, a starting point is a critical re-examination of Habermas’ original concept of a ‘public sphere’.

This brings us back to the ‘ideal-typical situation’ sketched before, because it is exactly that; in no real-world (nation-)state an undivided demos or monolithic public sphere exists. Instead, the public sphere of any country can be interpreted as a set of partly overlapping and embedded sub-spheres each including societal factions (in any conceivable dimension of diversity) and excluding others. In this sense, the differences between the nascent EPS and the public spheres in the member states is not categorical but rather gradual. Nevertheless, the challenges are immense, simply because the degree of ethno-national diversity is so much larger within the EU, with all the differences between member states and as a logical consequence of the fact that the EU also inherits all the diversity within member states.

In this Task Group Report – which is the result of the work done in Work Package 6.1 of the Eurosphere Project (www.eurosphere.uib.no) - we look into the interaction between ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere (for overviews see: Bärenreuter et al. 2009; Kutay 2008; Koopmans 2007). More specifically, the focus of this research is on ‘ethnic public sub-spheres’, within the EPS. With this, we mean networks of actors that explicitly affiliate themselves with ethnic groups. Those networks are primarily approached at the level of the organisations studied in the Eurosphere project, such as political parties, think tanks and social movements.¹ Hence, the unit of analysis is an ‘organisation’ affiliated with a certain group rather than ‘country’ or ‘individual’. The research is structured by the following questions:

¹ We excluded media actors, because their more direct involvement in the (European) public sphere in combination with their small numbers in our selection may give rise to bias.

- A) *Which discursive frames and activities regarding ethno-national diversity, the European Polity, and the EPS can be distinguished?*
- B) *To what extent are those activities a result of the discursive frames?*
- C) *What are the structural consequences of ethno-national diversity for the European Polity and EPS?*

Question A) is answered in a two-way approach. Firstly, we look at the discursive frames that are deployed by the organisations studied. Those frames are classified and clustered. Secondly, we also investigate what the organisations studied do. In particular, we look at the European networks they form and the ways they try to influence the political processes within the European Polity and the nation state. This is operationalized with help of a variant of Fishers (1995) multi-layered model of policy analysis, a point elaborated in the Methodological chapter. With question B) we assess to what extent the actual activities of (clusters of) organisations can be explained from the discursive frame(s) they use. Finally, with question C) we try to find out what long-term development of the EPS can be expected, reasoning from the insights gained in answering questions A) and B).

Another Work Package (6.2) within the project made an effort at analysing the ways in which the possible development of EU policies and their implementation in the fields of minority policies and minority protection are discussed in “National Spaces”, or the domestic debate in each country.² The latter was understood as being largely defined by those organizations that belong to the national “mainstream” of their respective countries. For analysis within Work Package 6.2, the selection of interviews comprised those political parties considered most important in the politics of each country; those social movement organizations addressing primarily the domestic publics and focusing primarily domestic issues; and those think-tanks that have a record of cooperative relations with the government. However, the considerable variation that – despite common efforts – characterizes the samples of organizations in each country results in that our samples of “mainstream” organizations from different countries show a varying balance between organizations of different types; i.e., the numbers of respondents from political parties, social movement organizations, and think tanks vary from one country to another. For this reason, the mainstream is in this report systematically represented by mainstream political parties alone (analysed by the task group of Work Package 6.1). Results from the other analysis of national spaces will be referred to only casually.

² The analyses in Work Package 6.2 were conducted by Mikko Lagerspetz and Liisi Keedus.

2 Actor selection and a priori categorization

2.1 Introduction: three categories of ethnic groups

We focus our analyses on organisations affiliated with three different categories of ethnic groups: national minorities, ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. Those three ethnic groups are defined as follows: (1) ‘national minority’³ refers to a group that obtained its minority position through the process of (nation)state formation; (2) ‘ethnic minority’ refers to a group of people that obtained its minority position through immigration (Compare Kymlicka 1995: 10-11) and (3) ‘majorities’ are those groups that were actively involved in the process of state formation.⁴ Concretely, this means that we study (1) organisations of national minorities like the Catalans in Spain, (2) organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities like the Turks in Germany and (3) organisation that ethnicise majorities, in general (extreme) nationalist organisations like Fronte Nazionale in Italy.

Obviously, there are some grey areas here. First of all, one may argue that some national minorities, like the Sami in Finland, were a people long before the modern nation-state was ‘invented’ while other national minorities, like the Swedes in Finland, only were defined as (part of) a people after the Swedish and Finnish nation-states were formed. Also, an organisation like Voorpost which is active in the Netherlands and Belgium claims to represent the ‘ethnic Dutch’, which is the majority in the Netherlands, but can be seen as a national minority in Belgium. Finally, in a country like Switzerland ‘the majority’ consists of four different ethnic linguistic groups - German, French, Italian and Retro-Roman - and Retro-Roman ‘majority group’ only consists of 1% of the total population, in other words: can hardly be seen as a majority. For that reason, this tri-partition must be seen as a continuum, rather than clear-cut categories. Nevertheless, this tri-partition helps to understand why and how ethno-national groups relate to the nation-state, the European Polity and the EPS.

³ The term ‘national minority’ is a rather vague term. The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* speaks of “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” without further specification. Also the *European Convention on Human Rights* uses the term ‘national minority’ without specifying it. More importantly, even the *Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities* does *not* define the term ‘national minority’; this is left to participating states.

⁴ This category is included because certain organizations clearly ‘ethnicize’ majorities.

Figure 2.1 Categories and types of organizations

<i>category “(ETHNIC) MAJORITIES”</i>	
type “state-nationalist” identifies with an existing nation-state, its people, territory and state	type “peoples-nationalist” identifies with a people/territory that coincides neither with a nation-state nor a national minority
<i>category “NATIONAL MINORITIES”</i>	
type “regional national minority” national minority group that identifies with region(s) in existing nation-state(s)	type “non-regional national minority” Jews & Roma: two non-regional and trans-national national minority groups
<i>category “ETHNIC MINORITIES”</i>	
type “pro-immigrant/anti-racist” members have no immigrant background and citizenship by birth <i>or</i> mixed backgrounds	type “immigrants” members have predominantly immigrant background, no citizenship or acquired citizenship

We selected 53 organisations that are affiliated with the three different categories of ethnic groups, majorities, national minorities, ethnic minorities (see Appendix 7). For each of those three main categories of ethno-national groups, we distinguish two types of organizations. This further distinction mainly relates to the position of the organization/group vis-à-vis the nation-state. This makes for six different types of organizations (see Figure 2.1).

Each of the three main categories is treated in a separate paragraph below. Those paragraphs are structured as follows. a) In those paragraphs we first define the two types distinguished within the main category. b) Then, we discuss what differences we expect between the types with regard to attitudes towards ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere. With regard to the European Polity we classify according to preferences in two dimensions: Firstly, a centralized versus a federalized European Polity, and secondly, more or less autonomy for the member states. Furthermore, our classification of attitudes to the European Public Sphere is derived from this classification. We assume that ‘centralist types’ are most geared towards participating in an EPS, and that ‘federalist types’ are least inclined to participate. Because ‘purely nationalist types’ would not have any federalist or centralist preferences, they take a middle position. This is done because we think that most respondents aiming for a centralized European Polity

(implicitly) presuppose that a monolithic EPS is needed (in a nation-state like fashion) in order to gain legitimacy. Likewise, we think that most respondents aiming for a federalized European Polity prefer all political decisions to be made at the lowest possible level, hence having a more limited interest in the development of an EPS. c) Finally, we assess to what extent we expect the three main categories to be a continuum. As we will see, the peoples nationalist type and the regional national minority type share their identification with regions that do not coincide with nation-state(s). Likewise, the non-regional national minority type and the immigrant type share the fact that they are ‘diffusely spread’ over nation-state(s). Below, we will express our expectations to what extent these shared characteristics link the three main categories.

Finally, we use a selection of 30 mainstream political parties as a control group. This selection is a subset of the selection of mainstream organizations used in Eurosphere Task Group 6.2. From this selection we selected the political parties (i.e. not the think tanks, media organizations, etc.) that do not have clear affiliations with regions of minority groups.⁵ Furthermore, we excluded all small (in share of votes), extremist and maverick parties, maintaining only the larger parties in of around the center of the political spectrum. We expect this aggregate of European main stream parties to have moderate, and indeed mainstream visions on the European Polity, the European Public Sphere and ethno-national diversity. Hence, comparing the visions of the leading figures in each of the six types of organizations with the mainstream political parties gives us a good estimate to what extent their opinions deviate from consensus.

2.2 Organisations affiliated with majorities

We distinguish two types of organizations that identify with majorities, namely, **state-nationalists** and **peoples nationalists**. Both state-nationalists and peoples nationalists are nationalistic, but there is a crucial difference. State-nationalists (like the FPÖ in Austria) identify with an existing nation-state, its demos, territory and state. Peoples nationalists (like the Lega Nord in Italy) on the other hand identify with a people and territory (in the case of Lega Nord the imagined country and people of Padania) that does not coincide with an existing nation-state, but at the same time also not with any officially recognized or clearly recognizable regional national minority. Hence, peoples nationalists do not so much seek

⁵ For that reason we excluded for example the Belgian selection of political parties, because they only selected political parties from *Wallonie*.

recognition from the nation-state as a minority, but rather strive for a new-to-form nation-state.⁶

The distinction between state-nationalists and peoples nationalists is made, because we expect them to have differing attitudes towards ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere. The nationalism of peoples nationalists in combination with their unwillingness to fully accept the current political map of Europe, make for some similarities and differences with state-nationalists. On one hand, we expect them both to have a homogenising notion of ethno-national diversity, which stems from their aspiration to build or maintain a nation-state. Unifying, homogenizing, and standardizing have been standard actions in the nation-building repertoire, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth century. On the other hand, we also expect both groups of nationalists to differ in certain respects, foremost in their attitude vis-à-vis the European Polity. Because state-nationalists identify with a particular EU member state, we expect them to strive for more or even full autonomy of member-states within the EU. Peoples nationalists identify with one or more sub-state territories, so we expect them either to strive for more or full autonomy of a new to form nation-state they envision, or for a position that is autonomous from both member-states and the European Polity in a federalized EU. Finally, we expect the nationalists to be focussed on the national public sphere, though peoples nationalists might have something to gain from the European Polity, and for that reason, we expect them to be somewhat more geared towards forming European networks and participating in a European Public Sphere.

2.3 Organisations affiliated with national minorities

Likewise, we distinguish two types of organizations identifying with national minorities, namely those who identify with *regional* minorities (like the Catalans in Spain), and those who identify with *non-regional* minorities (like the Jews in Europe). **Regional national minorities** are minorities that are territorially concentrated in one or more nation-states, while **non-regional national minorities** are ‘spread diffusely’ over the territory of one or more nation-states. In the latter case, we limit ourselves to Jews and Roma, two trans-national groups that live in many EU-countries.

The distinction between regional and non-regional national minorities is important, because we expect that both groups differ in their attitudes towards ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere. First of all, we expect both groups to

⁶ Note that there is a thin line with the regional national minorities here, because in general many regional national political parties had a phase in their history in which they strove for independence from their nation-state, rather than for (more) recognition or autonomy (Hepburn 2007; Boos 2005)

have inclusive attitudes towards ethno-national diversity, simply because they can be seen as groups with ‘proven resistance’ against the process of nation building, and hence as ‘sources’ of ethno-diversity. Partially, this is a matter of classification, because those regional national minorities that have less inclusive notions of diversity and want redo the nation-building process by homogenize their territory, are categorized as ‘peoples nationalists’. However, in their attitude towards the European Polity, we expect being regional or non-regional to make a big difference. Like peoples nationalists, regional national minorities may have something to gain from a federalized European Polity, simply because this will diminish the power of EU member states and hence, increase the autonomy of the regional national minorities. On the other hand, we expect that non-regional national minorities (in casu Jews and Roma) might expect something to gain from the European Polity because it thus far has a better historical record when it comes to the protection of minority rights than many member-states, which might lead to an inclination to aim for a strong centralized European Polity. Since we expect both types of national minorities to have expectations from the EU, we expect them both to be oriented on forming European networks and participating in a European Public Sphere, though we expect this tendency to be much stronger among the more centralist non-regional national minorities.

Finally, notice that regional national minorities share some characteristics with peoples nationalist, in the sense that both strongly identify with regions that do not coincide with existing nation-state(s). From this fact we deduced our expectations regarding federalist preferences. On the other hand, we expect the notions of diversity to differ fundamentally, partly as an effect of our classification.

2.4 Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities

Furthermore, among the organizations affiliated with ethnic minorities we distinguish two different types as well. Firstly, we look at the organizations of the **immigrants** proper (like an organization of Turks in Germany). Those are organizations for and by immigrants. Secondly, we look at **pro-immigrant, pro-diversity and anti-racist organizations** (like No Borders UK) which identify with immigrants and ethnic minorities in general (and not in particular with national minorities), though some may focus on specific groups, like refugees and migrant workers. It is worth mentioning that this time - much more than was the case with the distinction made between the two types of nationalists and national minorities respectively - the distinction is of an ontological nature, in the sense that it has to do with *being* immigrants versus *identifying* with immigrants.

Once more, the distinction between the two types identifying with ethnic minorities is made because we expect immigrant organisations and pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations to have different attitudes towards ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere. First of all, we expect the respondents of pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations in general to be people – often not having an immigrant-background - that are well-educated and politically engaged, and with a cosmopolitan worldview that leads to a very inclusive vision on ethno-national diversity, that can be seen as antithetical to nationalist notions of diversity. On the other hand, we expect respondents from immigrant organisations in general to have a immigrant-background, which may be very diverse; for example varying from elite migration to rural migration, and from people with a cosmopolitan worldview to people with a local perspective or coming from countries with a strong ‘nationalistic culture’. However, we expect that the process of immigration and trans-nationalisation widens the worldview of immigrants in general, increasing room for inclusive notions of diversity, but less so than is the case with their pro-immigrant/anti-racist counterparts.

Because immigration in practice is still largely and usually restrictively regulated by member-states, one would expect the immigrants and pro-immigrant/anti-racists to be geared towards giving the EU more centralized power vis-à-vis the member-states, especially in the realms of immigration, citizenship, etcetera. In this sense, we expect them to be most centralist (and least nationalist), and hence also most geared towards forming European networks and participating in an European Public Sphere. Again, we expect this tendency to be a bit stronger among the pro-immigrant/anti-racist type.

Finally, notice that immigrants share some characteristics with non-regional national minorities in the sense that generally speaking both types are ‘diffusely spread’ over the nation-state(s) they live in, and do not have any territorial claims on that nation-state. Obviously, the difference in relation to the nation/state is that non-regional national minorities (in casu Jews & Roma) are ‘already in’ and predominantly have citizenship of at least one EU member state while immigrants are ‘just in’ and often do not have EU citizenship. Furthermore, the pro-immigrant/anti-racist type also may have a relative strong focus on potential immigrants, and therefore a somewhat stronger focus on the right (and praxis) of the nation-state to limit access of individuals to its territory. This may lead to a difference in perspective on the European polity, with non-regional national minorities (i.e. Jews and Roma) more focussing on ‘managing ethno-national diversity’ and those affiliating with immigrants more focussing on the admission of immigrants and the rights of immigrants.

3 Methodological issues

3.1 Data & Method

The Eurosphere Knowledgebase⁷ contains both qualitative and quantitative data. In this Task Group Report, we mainly use data from two sources, the qualitative descriptions of the selected organisations in the Eurosphere Country Reports and the quantitative data from a selection of questions from the Eurosphere Interview Database with numerical answers. Most of those questions allowed answers in more than one, sometimes overlapping categories. This brings limitations with regard to the deployment of statistical methods. Therefore, we made use of the numerical data to get insight in the differences and similarities between the six types of organisations and the control group, but we predominantly applied *qualitative* methods to the numerical data. In some cases (mainly in Chapter 5) we computed correlations to support our qualitative analyses, but due to small sample size (N=7) statistical power is often limited at conventional levels of statistical significance. For that reason we report β -values with all small-N correlations (see Table 8.6).

To this end, we first selected 32 variables from the Eurosphere Interview Database. For each variable, cross tabulations were made with the six types of organisations. The cells in those tables contain the aggregated preferences of the respondents within each type of organisations. Those tables with raw data are included in Appendix 9 for further research. In those tables, exceptionally strong or weak (relative to the control group ‘mainstream political parties’) preferences are marked with colours (for more details see §9.1). With help of the tables with raw data we qualitatively describe an ideal typical profile for each type of organisation (Chapter 4). In those profiles, we focus on the aggregated preferences for each of the three main concepts in the research, being ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere. This is done in order to identify for each type of organisation the dominant discursive frame and the activities most fitting this frame. Subsequently, in Chapter 5 we visually summarize the raw data from Appendix 9 in a number of figures (Figure 5.1-5.13). Those figures - which are all but one bar charts – are then used to analyse the differences and similarities between the different types of organisations.

For the following step in the analysis, we leave the aggregate level, and look more bottom-up from the level of the individual organisations. This is done with help of the Eurosphere Country Reports. Within each of the organisation types we select one ‘typical’ organization in order to assess how well it fits in the ideal-typical profiles. Then, the selected

⁷ See: <http://www.eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/>, approached dd. 11 October 2010.

organization is compared to one or more other organisations of the same type and/or other types. In order to analyse and compare the discursive frames and the activities (lobbying, network-formation) of the respective actors we use a version of Fishers multi layered model for policy analysis, further explained in the next paragraph.

We need to make some remarks on our use of the data. As said, the tables in the appendices and the figures in Chapter 5 are meant for qualitative comparisons among the six types of organisations and the control group. However, one should be careful with interpretations. In the first place, the length of the bars in many of the figures in Chapter 5 partly depends on the number of (overlapping) answer categories. For example, it makes a big difference whether the respondent can only choose ‘European Polity’ or has multiple possible answer categories, one for each institution comprising the European Polity as is the case with question V5.10 (see Table 9.31 & Figure 5.11). Also, in those cases where (many) overlapping answer categories are aggregated, the bars may be rather long, which might give the false impression that no answer category was mentioned often; with a high number of answer categories even a 100% score may cover a relative small part of a bar.

Furthermore, the answers to certain questions⁸ - which should only be asked when a previous question was answered in a specific way – are seemingly inconsistent in some cases. For example, question V5.2 “If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?” should only be asked if question V5.1 “Is there one common European communication space today” was answered affirmatively. However, many respondents behaved inconsistently with regard to such questions, for example denying the existence of an EPS and at the same time commenting on an EPS, the way the EPS excludes certain participants, et cetera. For that reason, many Eurosphere researchers entered such seemingly inconsistent data in the Eurosphere database⁹ and we felt that excluding such answers implied throwing away valuable information unnecessarily. Hence, we included all answers to such questions in our analysis.

⁸ Most notably questions V2.3-V2.6, V3.5 and V5.2.

⁹ This is a possible draw-back of the Eurosphere research design in which the interviews were meant to be expert interviews, but where at the same time also meant to be guided by a rather extensive and detailed questionnaire. In some cases where time constraints or unwillingness of the interviewee to go along with this set-up played a role, this design might have forced Eurosphere researchers to (partly) interpret the answers of the interviewees in order to feed them into the online NSD registration tool to fill the Eurosphere Database. Often, the data might have allowed for inconsistent, but at the same time defensible interpretations.

Table 3.1 Average length of interviews

Type of organization	Average non-response* (%)	Length of interview (minutes)		
		Mean	N	Std. Deviation
State nationalist	30,5%	82,3	54	32,0
Peoples nationalist	31,1%	65,3	8	49,8
Regional national minority	35,2%	76,8	40	29,8
Jews & Roma	31,5%	83,6	20	34,2
Immigrant	35,5%	102,6	29	27,5
Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	34,6%	96,6	21	36,4
Main stream political party	33,4%	79,0	178	31,3
Total / average	33,1%	82,2	350	32,6

* Average score for the category "Question not answered", average over all tables in Appendix 9.

Furthermore, it is not in all cases clear whether a question is not answered because the respondent did not have an answer or because the particular question was not asked. The most likely cause of the latter would be time constraints during the interview.¹⁰ This might cause systematic bias between the types of organizations, if for example, respondents from political parties have considerable less time available for the interview due to their busy agenda's. For the six types of organizations with ethnic affiliations, this risk seems limited, because they are more or less evenly distributed over Eurosphere partner countries and types of organizations (i.e. political parties, think tanks, etc.). With the control group 'mainstream political party' the situation is a bit different because they are (by definition) all of the same type: (large) political parties. This, however, doesn't seem to pose large problems; the average length of the interviews (79 minutes) is just below the average length overall (82 minutes). More in general, we do not find any evidence for a negative correlation between the length of the interviews and the percentage of Question Not Answered (QNA) (see Tables 8.5). All in all, the risk for systematic bias due to differences between types of organization with regard to interview length or QNA seems limited.

However, there is one exception here; the respondents of the type 'peoples nationalist' are spread over only two countries: the Netherlands (with one long interview) and Italy (with seven shorter interviews in one organization). Furthermore, the average length of the interviews (65 minutes) is well below the average length overall and the standard deviation (50 minutes) is relatively high. This increases the relative likelihood that time pressure during

¹⁰ Indeed, this was reported by several Eurosphere partners, on the Eurosphere conferences in Osnabrück (13-15 November 2009) and Amsterdam (28-29 June 2010).

the interview is the main cause of respondents not answering questions. Furthermore the number of respondents (8 respondents) is rather low for this type. Nonetheless, we deemed the type ‘peoples nationalist’ - which actually ‘emerged’ from the data – too important to exclude from our analyses, but the reader should keep in mind that further research on this type is actually needed.

3.2 Fishers model

In the original model, Fisher (1995) distinguishes two orders of analysis, and within each order he distinguishes two levels, so four levels in total. The first order pertains to specific policy programs and the second order pertains to the underlying general policy goals and ideological views. As Fisher (1995: 18) summarizes it:

“FIRST ORDER

Technical-analytic discourse, program verification (Outcomes)

Organizing Question: does the program empirically fulfil its stated objective(s)?

Contextual discourse: situation validation (Objectives)

Organizing Question: is the program objective(s) relevant to the problem situation?

SECOND ORDER

Systems discourse: societal vindication (Goals)

Organizing Question: does the policy goal have instrumental or contributive value for the society as a whole?

Ideological discourse: social choice (Values)

Organizing Question: do the fundamental ideals (or ideology) that organize the accepted social order provide basis for a legitimate resolution of conflicting judgments?”

In general terms, this can be interpreted as follows. Second order is about prioritisation of basic values (e.g. ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’) and general political goals (e.g. ‘do we want a ‘free’ or a ‘fair’ society?’). First order is about whether a concrete policy program fits into second order goals (e.g. ‘does mixing middle class and underprivileged children in school help to create a fair society?’) and whether the policy program has the intended outcomes (e.g. ‘does mixing middle class and underprivileged children in school raise the educational attainment of the latter?’).

This model can be adapted for any analysis of situations (other than politics) in which several logics or levels of reasoning play a role. A more general interpretation of Fishers

scheme of analysis would be the following. The essential ingredients are: 1) a problem, 2) a set of problem definitions, 3) a set of problem solutions. The crucial point is that the way an actor defines a problem and assesses possible solutions depends on the actors second order moral preferences and empirical axiom's. In other words, a problem definition is an assessment of how the situation 'is' and how it 'should be', and a problem solution is a action that narrows the gap between 'is' and 'should be' (or *sein* and *sollen* for that matter), and obviously such judgments depend on the moral views and preferences of the actor. So, when analysing how different actors solve (or rather: strive for solutions) for a particular problem, one can describe their respective problem definitions and the underlying moral preferences and empirical axiom's and consequently look at what they really do to solve the problem. In this way one can find internal inconsistencies in the reasoning and acting of one single actor, and also differences/similarities between different actors tackling the same problem.

What we want to do concretely in our analysis is de following:

- Summarize the views of the organisations on diversity, the European polity, the EPS, etcetera, with help of the country reports and our explorative quantitative assessment of the interview data in the Eurosphere Knowledgebase;
- Make a distinction between second order (general ideology, general policy objectives) and first order (specific policy goals, what are the concrete actions of those organisation to fulfil their objectives);
- SECOND ORDER describe preferences on the social choice level, like: what are their preferences with regard to ethno-national diversity, the relation between individual and community, personal freedom, equality and fairness, etc. Then, describe the general objectives of the organisation, what do they want with regard to diversity in society, autonomy of regions/states, future development of the European Polity (federalisation/centralisation), etcetera;
- FIRST ORDER describe what specific goals the organisations have and how they pursue them. This has more focus on the concrete actions of the organisations like forming international networks, lobbying in Brussels, etcetera.

In this way one has a tool to look simultaneously at (i) the discourses and general goals of the organisations, including their underlying fundamental normative and empirical assumptions, and (2) the concrete networks and actions following from pursuing those goals. It also enables us to make clear the differences and similarities between (clusters of) organisations, but also the inconsistencies within the reasoning and acting of individual organisations. This answers research question B) and C).

4 Typology of the organizations

In this chapter we will describe the position of the six categories described in Figure 2.1 on ethno-national diversity, the European polity and the European Public Sphere. In chapter 5 we will compare the positions more explicitly.

4.1 State-nationalist

4.1.1 Ethno-national diversity

Many state-nationalist respondents¹¹ see ethnic and religious groups and national belonging as most relevant for defining a diverse society today. They tend to see diversity as a disadvantage for society, mainly because it makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion, solidarity and national identity. Quite a large group feels it is difficult to achieve women's rights and gender equality as a disadvantage of diversity.

In general, regarding group rights, around half the respondents think that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and that only individuals should have rights and not groups. However, a somewhat larger group is in favour of group-specific rights (mainly for national minorities) and support-measures for groups (often in the category 'groups not specified'). A majority is not in favour of ethno national minority groups having their own political institutions.

A vast majority of the state nationalists oppose the idea to adapt public institutions in order to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities. In line with this, a majority thinks that immigrants have to adapt to the national 'way of live', especially to the language, the political system and to other economic norms and cultural practices of the host country. Many feel that the state should intervene in 'minority cultural practices' of immigrants when they are 'not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country's ways of live'.

In general, the respondents feel that their views on those issues are in line with the public opinion and will meet more support than resistance when uttered publicly.

With regard to immigration, the respondents of this type of organisation tend to have a preference for either no further immigration, or for immigration of (highly qualified) labour migrants. Many prefer immigrants to be co-ethnic or culturally and religiously similar people. A quarter also wants to admit asylum seekers and refugees, but a group comparable in size thinks that the government is already admitting too many of them and want restrictions for

¹¹ For linguistic simplicity, we reify the six types of organisations here.

‘problematic’ refugees and ‘asylum seeker groups with known inability to integrate/adapt’ in the country.

A vast majority thinks that it should be the state’s discretion to grant citizenship and half the respondents of this type thinks that the state should require renouncement of previous citizenships from all foreigners who apply for acquisition of citizenship.

4.1.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, by and large, respondents of state nationalist organisations want more autonomy for the member states. Somewhat contradictory, one-third sees further European integration as weakening the nation state, while a somewhat smaller group sees it as strengthening the nation state. They want for autonomy is also expressed by the fact that two-thirds do not want the EU to have the power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States. Roughly two-thirds of the respondents oppose free movement of Third Country Nationals or the idea of granting them EU citizenship without the requirement that they should have citizenship of a EU member state first. In general, they do not want non-nationals to have any political rights before they acquire the citizenship of the country, though some make an exception for local voting rights for EU-citizens.

4.1.3 European Public Sphere

More than half the respondents do not believe that a common European communications space exists, though smaller groups of about a fifth each point at the existence of elite spaces like those of politicians and experts. About one-third of the respondents believe that if a common European communications space exists, it is an elite space, excluding normal citizens. Half the respondents think there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication and collaboration. Answers on preferences regarding how to organize this trans-European communication space seem rather diffuse, but about a fifth shows a preference for a multilevel organization. In general, with their actions, these organizations want to address citizens in general, (families) of political parties and the European parliament, other actors are not mentioned often. The channels they choose to address their audience are national media and the internet.

4.2 Peoples nationalist

4.2.1 Ethno-national diversity

The vast majority of the respondents of peoples nationalist organisations see both ethnic groups and (non-European) migrant groups as most defining for a diverse society today, and

half of them also mention territorial belonging. Also half the respondents does not attribute any normative or ontological status to ethno-national diversity but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of social life. Almost all see diversity as a disadvantage for society, mainly because it makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion, and sizable groups also mention difficulty to achieve solidarity, political unity or national identity as well.

Regarding group rights, almost all think that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and treat all citizens equal before the law, irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. A vast majority is not in favour of ethno national minority groups having their own political institutions.

All oppose the idea to adapt public institutions in order to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities. In line with this, a majority thinks that immigrants have to adapt to the national ‘way of live’, especially to the language, the political system and all kinds of economic norms and cultural practices of the host country. About one-third also demands adaptation with regard to religion. Half of the respondents of this type of organisation feel that the state should intervene in all ‘minority cultural practices’ of immigrants in case they are ‘not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country’s ways of live’.

Most respondents feel that their views on ethno-national diversity are in line with the public opinion and that they will get much support when they voice them publicly.

With regard to immigration, peoples nationalists tend to have a preference for either no further immigration (half), or for immigration of labour migrants. Many prefer immigrants to be co-ethnic or culturally similar people. A vast majority thinks that the government is admitting too many asylum seekers and refugees.

A vast majority thinks that it should be the state’s discretion to grant citizenship, but this is contradicted by the fact that one-third (3 persons) thinks that ‘all immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically be become citizens no matter which country they come from’. About two-thirds think that the state should require renouncement of previous citizenships from all foreigners who apply for acquisition of citizenship.

4.2.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, more than half of the peoples nationalist respondents want more autonomy for the member states, often only in some field. A quarter wants more federalisation. About one-third thinks that further European integration will weaken the nation state. All correspondents oppose the idea that the EU would have the

power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States. Two-thirds of the respondents oppose free movement of Third Country Nationals. A group of about the same size explicitly mentions the need for restrictions for movement of Roma people. None of them support the idea of granting EU citizenship to Third Country Nationals without the requirement that they should first have citizenship of a EU member state. None of them want non-nationals to have any political rights before they acquire the citizenship of the country, but many want to give such rights to EU-citizens.

4.2.3 European Public Sphere

More than two-thirds of the respondents do not believe that a common European communications space exists. About three-quarters of the respondents believe that if a common European communications space exists, it is an elite space, excluding normal citizens. Two-thirds did not answer the question whether or not there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication and collaboration, one-third answered 'yes'. A vast majority also did not answer the question on preferences regarding how to organize this trans-European communication space. In general, with their actions, the respondents of these organizations say they want to address the European parliament, but also mention other actors like political parties, the European commission and citizens in general. The channels they choose to address their audience are mainly national (print)media and a quarter states that no media whatsoever are important for their organisation.

4.3 Regional national minority

4.3.1 Ethno-national diversity

The respondents belonging to organizations of regional national minorities have a very inclusive way of defining diversity, and mention all kinds of minority groups (disabled, gender, sexuality, religion, etc) and score relatively high on mentioning the 'cosmopolitan' identifications (transnational, European and global). At the same time, 'ethnic group' is most often mentioned. A third sees ethno-national diversity as a desirable goal in itself, but in general respondents are not outspokenly positive or negative about it.

Regarding group rights, half think that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and treat all citizens equal before the law, irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. A majority is in favour of group specific rights, state support and political rights for minority groups, and many of them want to apply this to all minority

groups including immigrants, hence not favouring (regional) national minorities. The respondents of this type show similar support for the idea to grant territorially concentrated minorities the right to have their own parliaments.

Ideas on whether or not public institutions have to be adapted in order to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities are mixed. A third thinks that immigrants have to adapt to the national ‘way of live’, especially to the language, the political system and cultural practices of the host country. About a fifth feels that the state in some cases should intervene in ‘minority cultural practices’ of immigrants in case they are ‘not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country’s ways of live’.

Only a few respondents belonging to organisations of regional national minorities feel that their views on those issues are in line with the public opinion and that they will get much support when they voice them publicly, and most did not answer those question.

With regard to further immigration, no one states that no further immigration should take place. Respondents are relatively lenient towards family migration, but also mention labour migration and asylum as admittance categories. One fifth thinks that no immigration restrictions should apply and a third thinks that the government is granting too few asylum applications.

Regarding citizenship, a third thinks that ‘all immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically be become citizens no matter which country they come from’. None deem it necessary that the state requires renouncement of previous citizenships from foreigners who apply for citizenship.

4.3.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, one third of the respondents want more federalisation, while there is little support for more autonomy for the member states. Two fifths think that further European integration will strengthen diversity within the member states with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity. In general, respondents seem to support the idea that the EU has power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States, for example regarding stricter anti-discrimination regulations and interference with public funding of the development of minority cultures and languages. Roughly half of the respondents think that legal Third Country Nationals should have free movement within the EU. A considerable group advocates the idea that EU citizenship could be granted to Third Country Nationals without the requirement that they should have citizenship of a EU

member state first. Roughly two-thirds of them think that political rights should be extended to non-nationals.

4.3.3 European Public Sphere

One-fifth of the respondents do not believe that a common European communications space exists, and a quarter did not answer the question or did not have information on the subject. Others mentioned the existence of sub spaces of politicians, experts, etcetera, but never more than a third. In general, respondents had no clear ideas about the common European communications space, its future development and the excluded actors. Half did not answer the question whether or not there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication, but two-fifth answered 'yes'. A vast majority also did not answers the question on preferences regarding how to organize this trans-European communication space. Also there is a high non-response (half of the respondents) on the question which actors on all levels these organisations want to address with their activities, mentioning only occasionally the EC or the EP. The respondents seem to have little focus on the media, with more than half non-responding to the questions about which media are relevant to their work, which are predominantly national media.

4.4 Jews & Roma, (non-regional national minority)

4.4.1 Ethno-national diversity

The respondents belonging to organisations of non-regional national minorities (in casu Jews & Roma) almost all mention ethnic groups as important for defining a diverse society, though also national belonging (a third) and class (a fifth) are mentioned. About three-fifth sees ethno-national diversity as a desirable goal in it self, which is the highest score. In the same vein, they score highest (three-fifths) when it comes to denying that diversity is a disadvantage for society or in mentioning advantages of diversity.

Regarding group rights, the majority thinks that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and treat all citizens equal before the law, irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. Two thirds is in favour of group specific rights, state support and political rights for minority groups, in many cases only for national or native minorities.

Many respondents hold rather strong views on the adaptation of public institutions to the needs of ethno-national minorities, pleading for multi-cultural education for public service functionaries, making public institutions multi-lingual in order to communicate with all

minorities, and the adoption of a “substantial” political representation system based on group belonging. Demands on adaptation of immigrants to the national ‘way of live’ focus on the political system and economic life (a third) and other cultural practices (almost half) of the host country. No one demands adaptation in the realm of religion. Not many respondents directly opt for state intervention in ‘minority cultural practices’ of immigrants in case they are ‘not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country’s ways of live’, though two-thirds took the effort to describe other reactions of the state in such occasions, which is a very high score. One fifth opposes any state intervention in minority cultural practices, which also is the highest score.

In general, respondents belonging to organisations of non-regional national minorities often feel that their views on those issues are at most only partly in line with the public opinion and that in general their views will meet more resistance than support should they voice them publicly.

With regard to further immigration, no one states that no further immigration should take place, and about one-third that no restriction should apply. Respondents are relatively lenient towards family migration, but also mention labour migration (with preference for the high skilled) and asylum as admittance categories, a quarter stating that the government is granting too few asylum applications.

Three fifth of the respondents think that granting citizenship rights should be state discretion. At the same time about one-third thinks that ‘all immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time and all children born in the country should automatically be become citizens. Half the respondents declares that the state should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship.

4.4.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, a quarter did not answer the question, which is the highest score. Furthermore, the opinions are divided among more autonomy for the member states (a third), or more federalisation (a quarter). A fifth thinks that European integration has no effects on ethno-national diversity. On the opposite, groups the same size think that further European integration will strengthen diversity within the member states with regard to ethno-national diversity or that it will strengthen the nation-states and their national culture and identity. Strengthening diversity within the Member States (with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity)

Relatively spoken, respondents are very positive about giving the EU the power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States, scoring high on all possible answers. One-thirds of the respondents thinks that all (both legal and those long residing) Third Country Nationals should have free movement within the EU. Two third of the respondents state that EU citizenship should only be granted to citizens of member states. One third of the respondents think that political rights should be extended to non-nationals, but almost half hold the opposite position.

4.4.3 European Public Sphere

One-third of the respondents do not believe that a common European communications space exists, and one fifth did not answer the question or did not have information. Others mentioned the existence of sub spaces of politicians, experts, etcetera, but never more than one-sixth either. In general, respondents had no clear ideas about the common European communications space, its future development and the excluded actors. If this space exists, approximately a fifth believe it excludes normal, non-wealthy citizens. Three-quarters did favour the idea of more possibilities for trans-European communication. One-third did not answer the question on preferences regarding how to organize this trans-European communication space, and relative many (one-sixth) prefer a single communication space. This is in line with the conviction of two-fifths that their particular way of organizing the trans-European communication space is related to better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system of the EU, which is a very high score. They also score high(est) when it comes to the believe that this trans-European communication space would give better opportunities for the empowerment of groups, such as ethno-national minorities or gender groups. In that sense, Jews and Roma have the highest expectations from the development of a European Public Sphere. There is a remarkable high response to the question which actors on all levels these organisations want to address with their activities, scoring high in all possible categories. Also, the respondents seem to have a very strong focus on the media, with highest scores in all sorts of media, including European media, international media and the internet.

4.5 Immigrant

4.5.1 Ethno-national diversity

The respondents belonging to immigrant organisations deem ethnicity, national identity, religion, but also sexuality groups defining for a diverse society. One third sees ethno-national diversity as a desirable goal in it self, a somewhat larger group sees it as ‘a fact of live’. In

general respondents have rather positive views on diversity, a quarter thinks it leads to a more dynamic society, one sixth states that diversity makes it easy to create a self-reflective national identity, though a quarter thinks that diversity also makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion.

Regarding group rights, half thinks that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and treat all citizens equal before the law, irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. Relatively few (less than half) respondents are in favour of group specific rights, and more than half did not answer the question. Roughly half is in favour of special support measures for minority groups. Similarly, they score relatively low on the question about state support for political organisations of minorities, with the vast majority not answering the question. More in general, they score relatively high in not answering question about political rights for minority groups.

Many respondents hold rather strong views on the adaptation of public institutions to the needs of ethno-national minorities, pleading for multi-cultural education for public service functionaries, making public institutions multi-lingual in order to communicate with all minorities, and possibilities for founding separate hospitals and elderly houses for ethno-national minorities. At the same time, more than a third feels that immigrants should adapt to the language and one third to the political system of the host country, while no respondent pleads for adaptation to religion. In general, respondents are not in favour of state intervention in ‘minority cultural practices’ in case immigrants are not willing to adapt, though still one-fifth feels this may be necessary in case those cultural practices restrict individual liberty.

Two-fifths of the respondents belonging to immigrant organisations think that their views are (partly) in line with the public opinion. A third expects that their views will meet more support than resistance should they voice them publicly

With regard to further immigration, no one states that no further immigration should take place or that the country is admitting too many asylum seekers. A third thinks that no restrictions should apply and two-fifth thinks that the government is granting too few asylum applications. Roughly a quarter mentions as admittance categories highly qualified (labour) migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and spouses and family members of resident migrants (extended family notions).

Two fifth of the respondents think that granting citizenship should be conditional and a state discretion, but a third thinks that ‘all immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically become’ citizens and a quarter want leniency towards children born in the host country. Few deem it necessary that the state requires

renouncement of previous citizenships from foreigners who apply for citizenship, and three-quarter think the state should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship.

4.5.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, one third of the respondents belonging to immigrant organisations wants more centralisation - often only in certain policy fields - though there is also some support for more autonomy for the member states. One-fifth thinks that further European integration will strengthen both ‘nation-states’, ‘national culture’ and ‘national identity’, but a quarter thinks that it will also strengthen diversity within the member states with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity. Relative many respondents (one-eight) believe that it will also lead to strengthening ethnic/national minorities spread over several member states like Turkish migrants and Roma. In general, respondents do not have a clear vision on whether the EU should have the power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States. a majority did not answer those questions and none of the possible answers stands out. Two-fifths of the respondents advocate the idea that EU citizenship could be granted to Third Country Nationals without the requirement that they should have citizenship of a EU member state first, which is a high score. Relatively many (more than a third) respondents feel that all persons from non-EU countries with valid entry visas should have the same rights to free mobility as citizens from other EU countries. This group also scores relatively high (three-quarters) with a positive attitude towards extending political rights to non-nationals.

4.5.3 European Public Sphere

Two-fifths of the respondents do not believe that a common European communications space exists. On the other hand, sizable groups (up to a quarter) point at the existence of European sub-spaces of political parties and social movements like anti-racism groups. Roughly a third thinks that the European public sphere is elitist and excludes ordinary citizens. Three-quarters are in favour of increasing the possibilities for European communication, though less than half have a clear idea about the future development of the common European communications space. Relatively often respondents (but still only one-seventh) fear this space to be inclusive towards ‘member state representatives,’ excluding ‘minority representatives’, which is the highest score. The actors their organisations want to address with their activities are mainly the EC and E P, citizens in general and political parties. The respondents have below average

focus on the media, with over half non-responding to the questions about which media are relevant to their work, which are predominantly national media and the internet.

4.6 Pro-immigrant / Anti racist

4.6.1 Ethno-national diversity

The respondents of organisations of the pro-immigrant/anti-racist type have a rather inclusive notion of diversity, having relatively high scores for many different dimensions of diversity; with, ethnicity, lesbian/gay, religion, migrant leading the pack. Also, respondents relatively often mention disability and gender as a dimension (which probably has to do with their emancipationist approach). Half of them see ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of social life, while two-fifths see it as a desirable goal in it self. Few see diversity as a disadvantage for society. Sizable groups (up to two-fifths) believe that diversity makes it easy to achieve a more free or mobile society with less rigid identity ascriptions or a society that is more dynamic or economically more successful.

Regarding group rights, the majority thinks that the state should be neutral with regard to ethno-national affiliations and treat all citizens equal before the law, irrespective of their ethno-national affiliations. A majority is in favour of group specific rights, state support and political rights for minority groups, slightly more often only for national native minorities than for all minority groups.

Many respondents hold rather strong views on the adaptation of public institutions to the needs of ethno-national minorities, pleading for multi-cultural education for public service functionaries, making public institutions multi-lingual in order to communicate with all minorities. On the other hand, few are advocating adaptation in the political realm. Demands on adaptation of immigrants to the national ‘way of live’ focus on language and the political system (both about half). About two-third of the respondents did not answer the question whether or not the state should refrain from intervention in ‘minority cultural practices’. However, one-third sees it as an option in case cultural practices restrict individual liberty.

In general, respondents of pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations often feel that their views are minority standpoints and none of them believe that their views correspond largely with public opinion. Often they feel their vision will only receive partial support from the general public.

With regard to further immigration, respondents are very permissive, with a majority pleading to lift all restrictions on immigration, some even pleading to allow illegal immigrants

(NB: a category that does not exist if all restrictions on immigrations are lifted). A majority also believes that their country admits too few asylums seekers.

A third thinks that all immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically become citizens no matter which country they come from. More than half the respondents declares that the state should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship.

4.6.2 European Polity

Regarding the future development of the EU, about a fifth did not answer the question, and a strong vision lacks, though there is a slight preference for centralisation. One third thinks that further European integration will strengthen diversity within the member states with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity, other effects are not often mentioned. In general, respondents are not enthusiastic about giving the EU the power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States, though they score relatively high on the possibility that the EU grants irrevocable rights to immigrants. One-thirds of the respondents thinks that all (both legal and those long residing) Third Country Nationals should have free movement within the EU. Two-fifth of the respondents state that EU citizenship could be granted to foreigners without the demand that they first become citizens of a member states, which is the highest score. Furthermore, almost all believe that political rights should be extended to non-nationals.

4.6.3 European Public Sphere

Two-fifth of the respondents of pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations do not believe that a common European communications space exists. A group the same size acknowledges the existence of a common European communication space of social movements (like ATTAC and ENAR), smaller groups mention spaces of experts and political parties. Almost half of the respondents believe that - if this common space exists - it is elitist, excluding normal citizens. A vast majority favours the idea of more possibilities for trans-European communication, though a group the same size does not answer questions how to organize this trans-European communication space. There is a remarkably low response to the question which actors on all levels these organisations want to address with their activities. Also, the respondents have a below average focus on the media.

5 Comparisons between the types of organisations

5.1 Diversity

With regard to diversity, there are significant differences between the types of organisations. We can look at this at two ways. Firstly, we can look at the total number of organizations mentioned significantly often by the respondents, which gives a measure for the inclusiveness of their notion of diversity. This is done in Figure 5.1 which gives the total number of organisations mentioned by more than 10% of the respondents, in three different categories. Here we see a clear distinction between on one hand the State-nationalists, Peoples nationalists and Jews and Roma, who have a rather restricted notion of diversity and on the other hand the other four categories of organisations. Especially the Regional National Minorities have a very inclusive notion of diversity, followed by the Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist groups.

Figure 5.1 Answers to question V1.1: Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society?; number of diversity categories mentioned by respondents, with their percentages (i.e. percentage of respondents within each category of organisations mentioning a particular category of diversity) divided in three categories, 10%-20%, 20%-30% and >30%.






Figure 5.2 Answers to question V1.1: Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society? All categories aggregated.



Another way of looking at the notion of diversity is simply aggregating all the answers given by the respondents, as is done in Figure 5.2. This - in a different way - also reveals some interesting differences and similarities between the six types. First of all, not unexpected, both the Peoples nationalists and the Regional national minorities score relatively high on mentioning territorial belonging. At the other hand, when it comes to the inclusiveness of their notion of diversity, the two types are opposites. The peoples nationalists focus very much on territorial belonging, (non-European) immigrants and ethnicity. The regional national minorities are (as said before) very inclusive, and remarkably, are also the group that most often mention 'European belonging' as a dimension of diversity. Besides that, the patterns of regional national minorities bears a close resemblance to the patterns shown by the pro-immigrant/anti-racist and the immigrant type of organization. Lastly, the pattern of Jews & Roma is almost identical to that of state-nationalist.

Figure 5.3 Answers to questions 2.2a and 2.2b: *Is diversity a (dis)advantage for society?* answers indicating that diversity is an advantage are counted as positive (green shades); answers indicating that diversity is a disadvantage are counted as negative (red shades); the total length of the bars gives an indication of non-response; long bars mean low non-response



Regarding the pro's and con's of diversity, there is a marked difference between on one hand State-nationalists and Peoples nationalists and on the other hand the remaining four categories. As shown in Figure 5.3 the nationalists have difficulty in seeing advantages of diversity, but score high in mentioning disadvantages. First of all, many nationalists (of both types) relatively often think that diversity jeopardizes solidarity, probably indicating that respondents fear that immigrants may (ab)use welfare. More importantly, many nationalists fear that diversity makes it more difficult to reach national identity, political unity and social cohesion.

In this respect, the two nationalist types are the opposites of the other four (non-nationalist) types who often deem diversity an *advantage, exactly because* it makes it easy to avoid homogenising social cohesion and rigid (national) identity prescriptions. Other advantages the four non-nationalist groups often mention are the expectation that diversity makes for a more dynamic and economically more successful society, which is better adapted to globalisation. Lastly, it is striking how often women's rights and gender are mentioned, both in a positive or negative sense. The latter is especially done by state nationalists, and one


might speculate that this has to do with the fact that many oppose Muslim immigration and that Muslim values on women rights is often used as an argument.

The mainstream political parties' relatively favourable assessment of diversity was also confirmed by the analysis of a larger group of mainstream organizations conducted within Work Package 6.2. Also in this larger sample, diversity's contribution in creating a more dynamic society was the single most frequently mentioned reason.

5.2 Group rights for national minorities and immigrants

Combining all answers about equal treatment of groups and granting group rights or state subsidies to minority groups gives some insight in the differentiations made between national minorities and immigrants. Such a summary is given in Figure 5.4, which has some noteworthy features. Firstly, national minorities can count on considerable goodwill from all categories of organisations. In many cases, respondents (of all organisation-types) state they want to grant certain group rights, subsidies, etcetera, exclusively to national minorities, and when it comes to denying such rights, national minorities are hardly ever mentioned (it is even hardly visible in Figure 5.4). Note that Regional national minorities score highest when it comes to granting rights exclusively to national minorities, while Jews and Roma score much lower. Finally, peoples nationalists (which in certain aspects could be seen as a kind of national minorities and have a strong territorial orientation) score very low in this respect.

Figure 5.4 Answers to questions V2.3, V2.4a&b regarding group rights, equal/neutral treatment and state subsidies for three categories of minorities, cumulated percentages, retrieved from Tables 9.6, 9.7 & 9.1, using Sub-Questions SQ9.1.1, SQ9.1.2, SQ9.1.4, SQ9.1.5, SQ9.1.6, SQ9.2.1, SQ9.2.2, SQ9.2.3, SQ9.3.1, SQ9.3.2, SQ9.3.3, SQ9.3.4 (answers to positive questions, in green-shades) and SQ9.1.3, SQ9.2.4, SQ9.3.5 (answers to negative questions in red-shades).



The mainstream political parties' and other organizations' views on minority policies and minority representation are here of special interest, as they will obviously be in a key position when deciding about the introduction of any policy measures or institutions. A more concrete picture of their views is available through a secondary analysis of the sixteen country reports delivered by the national research teams. However, two reports (on Belgium and the Czech Republic) discussed the organizations' views mainly on the basis of other sources (e.g., their public statements) than the interviews, and will below be referred to only occasionally. What continues to interest us here is, firstly, which minority groups were discussed by the respondents; their views on possible policy measures; and the institutional solutions proposed or rejected.

First, it is striking that the respondents clearly associated diversity policies mostly in connection with ethno-cultural groups, rarely mentioning any need of policies targeting other types of diversity. Besides policies of ethno-national diversity, gender policies were mentioned in several, but not in all country reports – most notably in the Danish report. A need to divide between immigrant and traditional, or “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” minorities was mentioned in Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary and Norway (whereby two

Hungarian organizations explicitly questioned the tendency to treat the two kinds on minorities differently). Here we can state, that this division seems to become relevant in those countries, which possess both old, often territorially based ethno-national minorities already enjoying some kind of official minority status, and significant numbers of more recent immigrants.

The policy measures discussed included employment quotas and other measures of positive discrimination targeting specific disadvantaged groups. Such measures were mentioned by every single country report (with the exception of the report from the UK). There were, however, some interesting differences in the tone of discussion. In France, quotas and policy programs targeting any specific ethno-national group were rejected by all organizations, or accepted only conditionally as temporary measures. The report from the Netherlands referred to an ongoing discussion, in which former policies focusing on ethno-national minorities has become to be seen as outmoded. Similar arguments could be found at least in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary and Norway: specific treatment of any ethno-national group might lead to “an artificially created multicultural society” that in fact discriminates the majority (the Czech Republic), endeavouring “social cohesion” (Norway) and possibly counterproductive while “preserving the differences” that foster discrimination (Hungary). These arguments referred to the practical consequences of policies targeted on minority groups. However, there was even a powerful argument against acknowledging any group rights as such: All citizens should be treated equally irrespective of their group belonging: Thus, granting group rights could be seen as detrimental to the principle of an equality of individuals. This argumentation was referred to in most country reports.

The difficulty of the task to find a balance between policies supporting disadvantaged minorities, and those leading to their ghettoization and isolation from the mainstream society, became apparent also in what the country teams report on discussions about institutional forms of minority representation. Again, the main objection to the organized representation of the interests of minorities is that such structures would be likely to cement differences and foster undue ethnic conflict. However, there is a clear difference as to what kinds of institutions are discussed. Eleven country reports (every report except those from Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands and the UK) mention voluntary cultural associations as an important form of minority representation. These types of organizations are generally seen in positive terms and as part and parcel of a democratic society with freedom of association. Only one respondent from a political party in Turkey is reported to have explicitly warned against even this type of ethnic organising.

However, the prevailing attitude towards ethnic political parties is totally different. The discussions on ethnic parties mentioned by ten reports (others except Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) univocally depict them as something that should be avoided, or that, at least, have little perspective of achieving any real advantages for their constituencies. The main concern here is that they can discourage the minorities' participation in more established parties, which is seen as the best option. The clearest exception mentioned was the Danish party in Schleswig-Holstein, which was accepted by German respondents as a geographically limited phenomenon. (Obviously and maybe astonishingly, the Swedish People's Party in Finland did not consider itself as an ethno-national minority party, but on the contrary doubted the viability of such parties).

In seven reports (Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Spain and Turkey), one discussed the possibilities different kinds of government structures created for the representation of ethno-national minorities. They included minority parliaments and representative councils, and minority quotas in national parliaments. While respondents in other countries basically rejected such institutions, a positive attitude was displayed by organizations in three countries – Finland, Hungary and Norway. In all of them, the respondents referred to already existing structures: in Finland, the positive examples were the protection of the Sámi minority and the autonomy of the Åland Islands; likewise, the Norwegian respondents referred to the Sámi Assembly. In Hungary, the respondents mentioned the minorities' constitutionally guaranteed right to political representation. Even in Estonia, an existing law allowing the formation of cultural boards representing the minorities was frequently mentioned as a positive example; however, the fact that the law is functioning poorly in practice gained little attention, and efforts of creating such a board for the Russian minority was even discussed as potentially dangerous. In short, the mainstream organizations in our sample were genuinely mainstream even in this respect: they took pride in the real or putative achievements of their country in allowing a political representation of its minorities, but were rather negative about any new initiatives on this field.

5.3 Adaptation of society to minorities and vice versa

Adaptation can be seen as a two-way process: the (host)society may adapt to ethno-national minorities and vice versa. When it comes to adaptation of public institutions to the requirements of ethno-national minorities, there are once more striking differences between the nationalists on one hand and the other four types on the other. The nationalists are not

much inclined to adaptation, to say the least, especially the peoples nationalists who answer with a categorical ‘no’. On the other hand, the Jews & Roma seem to be most permissive in this respect, with notably high scores (relative to the others) when it comes to adaptation in the political realm. This is shown in Figure 5.5, where the orange shades cover the adaptations in the cultural realm and the green shades cover the adaptations in the political realm.

Figure 5.6 summarizes preferences regarding the adaptation of immigrants to the host society. We would expect that this correlates negatively with the willingness to adapt the host society itself, as depicted in Figure 5.5. Indeed, the correlation¹² is very strong (-0.944; $p < 0.01$, one-tailed, see Table 8.1).¹³ Furthermore, we would also expect that the inclusiveness of the notion of diversity (Figure 5.1 & 5.2) would correlate positively with the adaptation of society towards minorities (Figure 5.5) and would correlate negatively with demands in immigrants to adapt to society (Figure 5.6). As can be seen in Table 8.1, this is the case, though the correlations are not significant. To summarize this: the inclusiveness of the notion of diversity is related to demands regarding the adaptation of the host society to ethno-national minorities and permissiveness regarding the adaptation of immigrants to the host society.

¹² As said in §3.1 we only compute correlations in Chapter 5 to support our qualitative observations; due to small sample size ($N=7$) statistical power is limited at conventional levels of statistical significant. In this case $\beta=0.6511$, see Table 8.6. However, small N does not automatically mean that regression computations are meaningless. In order to assess whether or not the null-hypothesis should be rejected, we make use of Table 14.1 on page 507 of R. M. Sirkin (2006) *Statistics for the Social Sciences* (Third Edition) SAGE: Thousand Oaks. In this table, Sirkin gives critical values for correlations such that at given N and given levels of significance, one cannot reject the null hypothesis for correlations lower than this value. For $N=7$ ($df=5$) this critical value is 0.669 for level of significance 0.05 (one-tailed) and 0.833 for level of significance 0.01 (one-tailed). Sirkin does not give critical values for level of significance 0.1 (one-tailed), but using his formula, computation is straightforward and yields a value of 0.551. So in this case (that is the computation this particular note refers to), the (absolute) correlation is 0.944 with level of significance 0.01 (one-tailed) and that is larger than the critical level of 0.833, so we can safely reject the null-hypothesis. Likewise, all other correlations given in the report have an (absolute) value larger than the critical value at the reported level of significance and hence, in all cases the null-hypothesis can safely be rejected.

¹³ Because I derive a directionality for the correlations on theoretical grounds, we use one-tailed significance.

Figure 5.5 Answers to question V2.5: Should public institutions be adapted to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities? Answers cumulated





Figure 5.6 shows (like Figure 5.5) marked differences between the nationalist types and the other four organization types when it comes to adaptation of immigrants to the host society, with nationalists demanding much more adaptation (as one would expect considering the strong correlation between the two questions). Furthermore, those differences are especially large when it comes to language adaptation, and in case of the peoples-nationalists also in adaptation in the realm of religion.

Looking deeper into Figure 5.6 reveals another, more subtle difference. Firstly, three types - both nationalist types and the non-regional minorities (Jews & Roma) - stand out with regard to demands in the economic realm which pertains to employment, welfare, etcetera. Since welfare and labour market policy in general are national affairs, a possible explanation may be found in the degree of identification and focus on the national polity. Preferences regarding the (autonomy) of member states vis-à-vis the EU may give a proxy for this. As we can see in Figure 5.9, the state-nationalists and to a lesser extent also the peoples nationalists

and the Jews & Roma tend to prefer member state autonomy. Indeed, as shown in Table 8.2, the correlation is rather strong, though statistical power and significance are limited (0.589; $p < 0.1$, one-tailed).¹⁴ A further substantiation of this claim may be the fact that also the number of respondents in each category that thinks that diversity makes it “difficult to create solidarity” (see Figure 5.3 & Table 9.5) correlates strongly with the degree of nationalistic preferences (0.795, $p < 0.05$, one-tailed, see Table 8.2).¹⁵ More in general, as one would expect, the degree of nationalistic preferences correlates negative (-0.767, $p < 0.05$, one-tailed)¹⁶ with the willingness to adapt public institutions and positive (0.720, $p < 0.05$, one-tailed)¹⁷ with the demands for adaptation made towards immigrants in general (see Table 8.2).

Figure 5.6 Degree of adaptation demanded from immigrants: V2.6a *Are there certain aspects of..(e.g. Danish) way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to*



5.4 Correspondence of vision with dominant national discourse

Figures 5.7 and 5.8 depict assessments of the respondents of popular support for their vision on ethno-national diversity, group rights, (mutual) adaptation as treated in §5.2-5.4. Here we see once more marked differences between the nationalists - who are rather confident in this respect - and the other four categories. Remarkable is also the high non-response for regional national minorities, a point we will elaborate in §5.7.

¹⁴ $\beta > 0.5526$, see Table 8.6.

¹⁵ $\beta > 0.5678$, see Table 8.6.

¹⁶ $\beta > 0.5681$, see Table 8.6.

¹⁷ $\beta > 0.5654$, see Table 8.6.

Figure 5.7 Answers to V2.7a: How do your views on these questions correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?





Figure 5.8 Answers to V2.7b: Do you feel that your views on these questions face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly




?

5.5 European Polity

To give some insight into the preferences of the different categories of organisations with regard to the future development of the European Polity, Figure 5.9 was created. In this figure the horizontal axis gives a measure for the degree of nationalist preferences.¹⁸ The vertical axis gives a measure for the degree of centralist and federalist preferences.¹⁹ Obviously the two scales overlap, because centralisation within the EU implies less autonomy for the member states. Still, two dimensions are needed, because federalisation may also imply less autonomy for the member states (in case it brings more autonomy for the regions).

Figure 5.9 Centralist/federalist and nationalist preferences; combined answers to question V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future?



There are some marked differences between the categories of organisations. State nationalists are (as expected) most in favour of more autonomy for the member state. The regional national minorities on the other hand also refrain from nationalist preferences, and have strong federalist preferences with regard to the future development of the European Polity. This may be explained by the fact that they believe that a federalized European Polity and weakened nation-states will bring the regions (and in relation to this the regional minorities) more autonomy. The peoples nationalists are in between; they mix ‘nationalist’ with


¹⁸ In which the value is given by the sum of ‘More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields’ and two times ‘More autonomy for the member states’ in Table 9.14.

¹⁹ In which the value is given by the sum of ‘More centralisation, but in certain policy fields’ and two times ‘More centralisation’ minus two times ‘More federalisation at large’.

‘federalist’ preferences. This is possibly explained by the fact that they have double feelings about the nation-state; on one hand they envision a new-to-form nation-state comprising the people and territory they identify with and in that sense they are nationalistic, but on the other hand, in order to reach this goal, they need to dismantle the existing nation-state(s) and European federalism is one way to do that.

Interesting is also that immigrants and especially pro-immigrant/anti racists choose for centralisation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, this may be explained by their alleged expectations that a centralised European Polity may improve the protection of minority rights. In that sense, the Jews & Roma (non-regional national minorities) do not fulfil our expectations, voiced in Chapter 2, because they are more nationalistic and less centralistic than expected. This, however, may be explained by the fact that many respondents belonging to those two groups are individuals living in their home countries for centuries, and for that reason simply identify with the(ir) nation-state. As we pointed out in §5.4, the (relative) focus on adaptation of immigrants in the economic realm also substantiates this explanation.

Figure 5.10 Answers to question V3.5a *To which groups should the EU have power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States?* answers aggregated



Finally, when it comes to giving the EU the power to grant irrevocable minority rights (see Figure 5.10) we see a tri-partition, with nationalists opposing the idea of giving the EU such powers, while the Jews & Roma seem to be advocates of EU-competences in this field. The other three types do not have such strong preferences. Naturally, one would explain the


clear ‘no’ of the nationalists from their preferences for member state autonomy vis-à-vis the EU. In the same spirit, the fact that regional national minorities are not enthusiast about shifting such competences to the EU-level may be explained from their strong federal preferences. Less easy to explain are the positive attitude of the Jews & Roma and the indifference of immigrants and pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations, because they seem to contradict there respective degrees of EU-centralism depicted in Figure 5.10. One way to explain this, is that the Jews & Roma have a exceptionally strong preference for EU competences regarding minority rights relative to the others, because of their historical experiences. As said (Chapter 2) both groups have bad historical experiences with the protection of minority rights by nation states. In addition, the Roma are in a weak position in many member states today, and may expect protection from the EU, which is pro-active in this respect. More in general, the EU is able to pursue the fulfilment of existing (human) rights or introduce new (group) rights without too much worries about the costs (for example costs for multilingual education or costs stemming from conflicts with vested interests) which may be very problematic for member states. To put it simple: the inclination to shift power over (the protection of) minority rights to the EU-level might be induced by the fact that thus far, the EU has more possibilities than the average member state to grant new rights and also a better track-record in respecting existing rights. Jews & Roma now that by experience, more than any other group does.

5.6 European Public Sphere

When it comes to the position of the organisations with regard to a European Public Sphere, two questions are of basic interest: which actors do they want to address with their actions and by which means do they (want to) reach them? The answers to the first question is summarized in Figure 5.11 and the second question in Figure 5.12. The similarities between the length of the bars between both figures are striking and indeed there is a strong correlation (0.740 , $p < 0.05$, one-tailed, QNA excluded, see Table 8.3)²⁰ between the two. In other words: there is a strong relationship between the willingness to reach other actors and the importance attached to the media for the work of one’s organisation.

²⁰ $\beta > 0.5694$, see Table 8.6.

Figure 5.11 Answers to question V5.10: Which actors on all levels do you want to address with your activities?
Answers aggregated and categories combined




Another indication for this conjecture comes from the comparison between Figure 5.8 (regarding the respondents assessment of public support for his/her vision) and Figure 5.12 - particularly when we exclude the non-response. As shown in Table 8.3, there is a remarkably strong correlation ($0.708, p < 0.05$, one-tailed)²¹ between on one hand the share of respondents in each type of organisation that is able to assess public support (whether positive or negative) for its vision and on the other hand the orientation of the respondents on the media. More in general, there are striking correspondences between on one hand Figures 5.7 & 5.8 and on the other hand Figures 5.11 & 5.12 (see the remaining three correlations in Table 8.3). In other words: one may speculate that some actors (like the regional national minorities) are unable to assess public support for their vision simply because they are not so much interested in other actors and/or public opinion (and/or vice versa), while others (like the Jews & Roma) are well able to assess support because they are quite oriented on other actors and public opinion (and/or vice versa).

From this perspective, the organisations of non-regional national minorities are most 'outward-looking' and the organisations of regional national minorities are least 'outward-looking'. Looking for an explanation of this difference, a few things should be noticed. First of all, respondents belonging to organisations of non-regional national minorities combine a strong interest in influencing the European Polity with a relative high interest in European and

²¹ $\beta > 0.5605$, see Table 8.6.

international media. This may stem from the genuine interest this group has in a strong European Polity protecting the rights of ethno-national minorities, as explained in §5.6. Furthermore, the respondents are members of the Roma and Jewish Diaspora, which both have a long history as truly trans-European and trans-national communities. On the other hand, regional national minorities, might often be involved in (influencing) local or regional politics, which is in the end a more confined activity. They may also have a hard time attracting the attention of even the national media, and their participation may often be largely confined to ‘regional public sub-spheres’.


Figure 5.12 Answers to question V5.17: Which (European, national, regional) media are of relevance for your work? answers aggregated, categories combined



Looking at Figures 5.11 & 5.12 in more detail, reveals some other differences and similarities. Like Jews & Roma, peoples nationalists are also interested in the European Polity – in particular the EP – but they are rather nationally oriented when it comes to media. Furthermore, nationalists in general take a middle position when it comes the media, which may partly be explained by the fact that it is much easier those days for (maverick) nationalist organisations to gain media attention than for e.g. organisation of regional national minorities. Finally, organisations of ethnic minorities (immigrants) are the only ones with a somewhat substantial interest in gender and religious organisations and networks. This may be explained by the fact that many of those organisations are religious (often Islamic) representing minorities for whom (in)congruencies in gender-views with society at large may be an issue.

Lastly, looking at Figure 5.13 shows that there are big differences in motivation for organising a European Public Sphere in a particular way. A few things are of particular interest in relation to this figure. Firstly, Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 are quite similar when we look at the total length of the bars, and indeed there is a strong correlation (0.746, $p < 0.05$, one-tailed, ‘question not answered’ excluded, see Table 8.3).²² An interpretation of this might be that the more important one deems the media for the work of the organisation in general, the higher the interest in a (well-functioning) EPS.

Figure 5.13 Answers to question V5.4: Why should the trans-European communication be organized in the way you mentioned?



Furthermore, the non-regional national minorities (Jews & Roma) appear to be the group with the highest interest in a well-functioning European Polity in the sense that they relatively often give the motivation ‘because it would give better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system of the EU’. We must be careful not to interpret this as centralistic, because a well-functioning European Polity could very well be federalist. Also remarkable is the fact that Jews & Roma are best able to motivate their choices, which can largely be explained from a their great interest in the influencing other actors and the media.

Finally, we investigate to what extent there are a correlations between the degree of nationalist and centralist/federalist preferences on one hand and the preferences with regard to the development of an European Public Sphere (see Table 8.4). This however does not

²² $\beta > 0.5665$, see Table 8.6.

give a clear picture. None of the correlations are significant, and even more puzzling, the signs are sometimes rather counter-intuitive. For example, it turns out that the degree of centralist preferences is negatively correlated with the hope that an EPS will lead to a better functioning European Polity.

5.7 Summary of the findings

We will now summarize the findings in Chapter 5 and relate them to our a-priori expectations in Chapter 2. Furthermore, we will assess to what extent the arguments hold that we used to legitimise the distinction of two types within each of our three main categories (i.e. organisations affiliating with majorities, national minorities and ethnic minorities). This will be done for each of the three main categories separately. We will also argue that the relationship with the nation-state of each of the six types is very essential to understanding the differences and similarities between them.

5.7.1 Organisations affiliated with majorities

Most of our expectations regarding the nationalist types were confirmed. They both have rather restricted notions of diversity. Also, they tend to see ethno-national diversity as disadvantageous, mainly because (increasing) ethno-national diversity is a force opposing nation building because it undermines national identity, political unity, solidarity and social cohesion. In the same vein, they want to restrict immigration, often preferring ethnically or culturally similar immigrants. Also, they demand a high degree of adaptation from immigrants and are not much inclined to adapt society to the wants and needs of ethno-national minorities. They also share the idea that their visions are by and large supported by public opinion. In all those aspects, the peoples nationalists are take things a bit more to the extreme than nationalists (which also may partly be a consequence of the fact that this is the smallest group; two organisations, eight respondents).

Also regarding their differences, findings are more or less as expected. State-nationalists indeed do have a nationalistic vision on the European Polity and refrain from centralist or federalist preferences. Peoples nationalists on the other hand, deem territorial belonging very important and mix nationalist and federalist preferences, which is largely explained by their ambiguous relation with the nation-state. With regard to an EPS, we indeed see that they are both largely focussed on national media, but they differ strongly when it comes to the actors they want to reach with their actions. Peoples nationalists have a rather strong focus on reaching actors in the European Polity - especially the EP. On the other hand, peoples

nationalists are show a remarkable disinterest in developing or participating (in) an EPS. In this respect, they resemble the regional national minorities.

5.7.2 Organisations affiliated with national minorities

Some of our a-priori expectations were confirmed, some not. First of all, we expected both groups to have inclusive attitudes towards ethno-national diversity. For regional national minorities this is true, and they even score highest in this respect, which is rather surprising because they seem to be less 'trans-national' (or more provincial to utter a blunt prejudice). The organization of Jews and Roma on the other hand did not fulfil our expectations; they have a rather limited notion of diversity and in this respect bear close resemblance to state-nationalist. However, when it comes to mentioning advantages of diversity, adapting society (culturally or politically) to the requirements of ethno-national minorities, or granting them group rights, we see a reversed pattern with the non-regional minorities scoring higher (and actually often scoring highest of all).

Regarding their differences, as expected the regional national minorities are very (actually most) federalist with regard to the future development of the European Polity and at the same time least nationalist. As said before, this can largely be explained from the fact that EU-federalism may be a means to gain more autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-state.

However, Jews & Roma (non-regional national minorities) are by far not as centralist as expected, actually, do lean towards federalism, and furthermore, are also more nationalism than expected. This seeming paradox can (once more) be explained by the relationship of Jews and Roma with the(ir) nation-state. Jews and Roma have along history as trans-national and trans-European communities, and also al long history of persecution. On one hand, many of the respondents have been citizens of their country for centuries, hence identifying with the national level. This is also expressed by the fact they demand relative much adaptation of immigrants in the economic realm, which concerns national affairs like the labour market and the welfare state. In this respect, they somewhat resemble the nationalist types. On the other hand, concerning minority rights non-regional national minorities seem to have much more confidence in the EU than in member states, and in that respect show centralist tendencies. For example, they score highest when it comes to such things as giving the EU the power to grant irrevocable group-rights and expectations that a well-organised EPS could make for a better-functioning European Polity and increase empowerment of (ethno-national) groups.

This last point brings as to the (European) Public Sphere where the differences are even larger. When it comes to the media, influencing actors and visions on a EPS, the regional

national minorities can be described as most inward-looking of all types and the non-regional national minorities as most outward-looking.

We actually expected the both types of national minority to have expectations from the EU, and hence to be oriented on forming European networks and participating in a European Public Sphere, though we expected this tendency to be much stronger among Jews & Roma, because of their centralism. It turns out that centralism cannot be seen as the driving force behind the interest of the Jews & Roma in an EPS, but rather their hopes and expectations about the protection of group rights by the European Polity.

Finally, we assess to what extent the similarities between peoples-nationalists and regional national minorities bridge the two categories they belong to. Like with peoples nationalist, the regionalism and federalism of the regional national minorities, must be seen as cause of their disinterest in an EPS. On one hand, the regional national minorities adopt very inclusive notions of diversity, in which multiple and embedded (i.e. Barcelonan, Catalan, Spanish, European) identities are possible. In that sense they differ greatly from peoples nationalists who strive for homogeneity. On the other hand they predominantly are preoccupied by, and get attention from, actors and media of the regional level. In that sense, peoples nationalists are a bit more outward looking than the regional national minorities.

5.7.3 Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities

With regard to ethno-national diversity, our expectations are by and large fulfilled. Both immigrant and pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations have rather positive views on the advantages of diversity and a lenient vision on the admittance of immigrants and the mutual adaptation of immigrants and host-society. As expected, the pro-immigrant/anti-racist type had a somewhat stronger profile in this respect, though they expect a bit more adaptation from immigrant than the immigrant type does.

Because of the central role of nation-states in the regulation of immigration, we expected the immigrants and pro-immigrant/anti-racists to be geared towards giving the EU more centralized power vis-à-vis the member-states, especially in the realms of immigration, citizenship, etcetera. Therefore, we expected them to be most centralist (and non-nationalist), and hence also most geared towards forming European networks and participating in an European Public Sphere. Finally, we expected all those tendencies to be a bit stronger among the pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations, than among their immigrant counterparts. Here, our expectations only partly came true. Indeed, both types show centralist characteristics, and refrain from nationalist preferences. On the other hand only the immigrant type shows above

average expectations about the beneficence of the further development of an EPS on the empowerment of (ethno-national) groups. Also, both types are not much inclined to give the EU the power to grant irrevocable group rights. Lastly, their orientation on (international) media and (European) actors does not really exceed average levels.

This brings us to our assessment of the degree to which shared characteristics of immigrants and Jews and Roma (non-regional national minorities) bridge the gap between the respective main categories they belong to. As said before, the latter turned out to be less centralistic, but much more positive about the beneficence of the European Polity and the EPS on ethno-national diversity. To some extent, both types kind of ‘swapped’ expected and actual positions. This can by and large be explained by the fact that Jews and Roma (non-regional national minorities) somewhat paradoxically identify with the nation-state, and at the same time have high expectations of the willingness and possibilities of the EU to be a guardian of minority rights (and seemingly distrust the nation-state in this respect). In that sense, our expectation that Jews and Roma deem the European Polity important for ‘managing ethno-national diversity’ has come true, but we can hardly say that the organisations affiliating with immigrants see a very large role for the EU in managing immigration.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

Recall that we want to answer the following research questions:

- A) *Which discursive frames and activities regarding ethno-national diversity, the European Polity, and the EPS can be distinguished?*
- B) *To what extent are those activities a result of the discursive frames?*
- C) *What are the structural consequences of ethno-national diversity for the European Polity and EPS?*

We will combine the answers on questions A) and B), followed by a concise answer to question C) in the last paragraph of this chapter.

The first two questions are answered per type of organization in a three-step approach. (i) In order to make things tangible, we start with the analyses of one particular organisation which can be regarded as more or less exemplary for the type of organization in question. After a short description of the organization, we analyse the organization according to the adapted Fisher scheme given in §3.2, which boils down to the following: (a) an analysis of the

second order moral convictions and empirical assumptions of the organizations, which form the backbone of their discursive frames, and (b) a description of the first order goals that are derived from the second order level and the specific activities deployed by the organization to pursue those goals. (ii) Then a generalizing step follows in which we briefly compare the selected organization with other organizations of the same type and of other types. Those first two steps are based on information in the Eurosphere Country Reports. Finally, with help of the analysis of the Eurosphere database in Chapters 4 and 5, we generalize to describe the discursive frames and activities of type of organization that is under investigation. When this is done for all six types, we give a concise taxonomy of the discursive frames regarding ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and the European Public Sphere encountered in the Eurosphere research.

There are some limitations to this analysis. In general, it seems that Eurosphere data contains more information on question A) than on question B) and more information on the discursive frames than on concrete activities of the organizations. Hence, the answer to question B) cannot be too detailed. Furthermore, in few of the discursive frames found in the study, an encompassing European Public Sphere plays an explicit role, so the analyses focuses on ethno-national diversity and the European Polity.

6.2 Organisations affiliated with majorities

6.2.1 State-nationalist – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) – Austria²³

The *Austrian Freedom Party* (FPÖ) can be described as an typical state-nationalist political party. The FPÖ was founded in 1956 mainly by former members of the National-Socialist Party and belongs to nationalist right wing. Under the leadership of Jörg Haider (1986-2000) the FPÖ became one of the most successful European extreme right parties in recent decades. The FPÖ portrays itself in the party programme as representative of the interests and needs of ‘the Austrians’. Hence they tend to privilege the claims of the ‘ethnic Austrian majority’, and to some extent also those of autochthonous national minorities.

Typically, the FPÖ has the basic second order conviction that a rather large degree of ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity is a prerequisite for the survival of the Austrian nation-state and the preservation of the identity of the ethnic Austrians. Many of their first order policies about ethno-national diversity, the European Polity and an EPS are derived from this assumption. Overall, the FPÖ has a rather negative vision on ethno-national

²³ This paragraph is based on: Monika Mokre (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Austria EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS, Online Country Report No. 2, 2010 <http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm> ISSN 1890-5986

diversity stemming from immigration, which they see as economically disadvantageous, an impediment to reaching social cohesion and a threat to Austrian identity, culture and population. Hence, they tend to demand full adaptation from minorities, are sceptical about the adaptation of Austrian institutions or granting group rights, though some respondents make (to some extent) exceptions for autochthonous national minorities. In the same vein, they in general oppose further immigration, which should be made dependent on the ability of the person to (fully) integrate or limited to persons that are culturally and religiously similar. Regarding the European Polity, the FPÖ wants competences to be re-transferred to the national and regional level, but not to a point that they want to leave the EU or demand its abolition. Furthermore, they aim at a ‘Europe of nation states’, with specific rights for autochthonous minorities. This should be a loose confederation rather than a federal state, which only deals with super-ordinate issues. They also oppose the idea to strive for an European identity and fear a ‘standardized citizen and maybe even language’. For that reason, they are also sceptical about forming an EPS – other than for correcting wrong EU politics. FPÖ sees no necessity at all for a European level of communication, and deems national communication much more important. National communication spaces should be permeable and blend into each other, but cultural borders should not blur. The development of EU-wide spoken broken English endangers (the German) language and culture.

When we compare the FPÖ with organisations of the same type, we see that they quite closely resemble many other organisations of this type like for example Perussuomalaiset (The True Finns, Finland). Some organisations take things a bit more to the extreme. For example, the Estonian Independence Party (EIP, Estonia) promotes a doctrine of ‘Estonia as a neo-autarkic geopolitical space’, and has suggested Estonia’s withdrawal from the EU. On the other hand, their concerns about the nation’s cultural survival and their claim that increasing European identity undermines Estonian identity resembles the FPÖ discourse on the European Polity and the homogenizing threat of an European Public Sphere.

The discursive frame of the FPÖ and other state-nationalist organizations can be summarized as follows. Ethno-national diversity is a disadvantage for the nation-state, in particular because it threatens social cohesion and national identity. For example, FPÖ-thinking is steered by fear for a loss of the German language, and weakening of the national culture and identity. This also applies to state-nationalists’ vision on the European Polity, which in general is seen as an hindrance to the autonomy of the nation-state, though some state-nationalist organization also see a role for the EU as a means to enhance the power of the nation-state in the world. The FPÖ for example, admits that the EU-confederation they

envision takes care for the truly trans-national issues. In the same spirit the FPÖ experiences an EPS as a threat to the culture, language and identity of member states, but not all state-nationalist are that outspoken on the EPS, so it is difficult to generalize. The activities (i.e. policies) of the FPÖ are consistently deduced from their basic second order ideas about ethno-national diversity and the nation state, a nation state that should give some room and rights to autochthonous national minorities, but should preserve its own people, culture and language, by restricting immigration, enforcing integration and keeping the EU at bay. Considering the profile sketched in Chapters 4 and 5 this seems to be the general stance of state-nationalist organizations.

6.2.2 Peoples-nationalist – Voorpost Nederland – The Netherlands²⁴

Voorpost Nederland (VN) can be described as a typical peoples nationalist organisation. VN is the Dutch branch of the *Voorpost* organisation that originates in Flanders, Belgium, and can be seen as part of the so-called ‘Flanders Movement’ that aims at the independence of Flanders. VN wants the abolishment of the Belgium state, and wants to unite the Dutch speaking people of the Netherlands and Belgium (and parts of Germany and France) in a new-to-form nation-state, which they call ‘Whole-Netherlands’. *Voorpost* has two faces; it is both a highly ideological organization - reflecting much on its ideology in its magazine *Revolte* - and at the same time it is very much focussed on concrete actions.

The second order convictions of VN can be summarized as follows. VN believes that the individual flourishes in its own cultural community and that there is, or should be, a strong natural relation between culture, religion, people and territory, and hence that within the territory there should be cultural homogeneity. Therefore, they in general oppose immigration and are in favour if remigration. As said, their main goal is to unite the Dutch. In line with this, their more general vision on the European Polity is to create a ‘Europe of the Peoples’, that is, they want to create a new set of homogeneous nation-states within Europe, each comprising one people, like the Catalans, the Bretons, the Scots, etc. They like the idea of cultural diversity within Europe *among* the new to form nation-state, as long as the different units remain their ‘natural’ homogeneity. For that reason, they oppose Americanisation and Islamisation which they perceive as unnatural homogenizing forces that take away the spirit, culture and identity of a people. The central first order goal VN pursues is to make ethnic Dutch people aware of the fact that their identity and culture are threatened by immigration,

²⁴ This paragraph is based on: Jan H. van de Beek, Saskia A. van de Mortel, Suzanne van Hees (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of the Netherlands EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS, Online Country Report No. 3, 2010 <http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm> ISSN 1890-5986

diversity, Americanisation and Islamisation. Since they deem direct participation in representative democracy ineffective, they follow the logic ‘meta-politics’, that is, they aim at changing the ideas of people. This is done by all kinds of concrete actions against Americanisation, Islamization and the multicultural ideology. An example of their activities is handing out flyers against fast-food and Americanisation in front of a McDonalds restaurant. Another example concerns repeatedly (stealthy) removing frozen (Islamic) Halal-meat²⁵ from the freezers in supermarkets, until the economic damage inflicted mount to a level that it forces the supermarket to stop selling it. Regarding the realisation of the ‘Europe of the People’ they envision, their actions are limited to sporadic contacts with like-minded organisation elsewhere in Europe. Summarizing the characteristics of VN, we must say that the organisation fits very well in the picture of the peoples nationalist type described in Chapters 4 and 5.

Comparisons with organisations of the same type. Clearly, Lega Nord (LN) in Italy resembles VN in many ways. However, there are some marked differences either, mainly stemming from differences in national context. LN clearly benefits from the existence of a north-south differential in Italy regarding to socio-economic success, good governance, corruption levels and the like. This guarantees a minimum electoral success for LN in Northern Italy. In order to understand VN, especially their choice for meta-politics - one must appreciate the fact that in the Netherlands for a long time nationalistic politics was hardly possible and rather unsuccessful due to a combination of *cordon-sanitaire* and depolitisation of the immigration-issue by mainstream politics and violent counteractions of so-called ‘antifascist’. This contrasts with the situation in Italy where Lega Nord has been part of the ruling coalition several times. This also touches on another difference between LN and VN; both initially wanted to dissolve the nation-states (Italy & Belgium, the Netherlands) that overlapped with their ‘new-to-form’ nation-state (Padania & Whole-Netherlands). However, seduced by the possibility of real power, LN diluted its ideology and abandoned its separatist policy.

Comparison with other types, such as the state-nationalists (for comparison with regional national minority see §6.3.1) reveals some marked differences and similarities. Peoples nationalist resemble the state-nationalist type in certain ways, most notably in their vision on ethno-national diversity. However, because of their regionalist orientation, they

²⁵ Meat from animals that are slaughtered according to Islamic rituals.

have a completely different relation with existing nation-states, and stemming from that, a different vision on the European Polity.

Clearly, the discursive frame of peoples nationalists is based on the moral assumption that ethno-national *homogeneity* is positive and natural and that state, demos and territory should be historically connected. Hence, peoples nationalist have an aversion to ethno-national diversity stemming from immigration, but also a dislike of ethno-national diversity caused by ‘sharing a state with other nations’. Their dissatisfaction with existing nation-states and regional perspective makes for another sub-frame; they tend to see a federalized European Polity as a means to gain more regional autonomy vis-à-vis existing nation-states. For example, VN has a clear vision of a ‘Europe of the People’, consisting of ethno-nationally homogenised nation-states.

6.3 Organizations affiliated with national minorities

6.3.1 Regional national minority – Federació Convergència i Unió (CIU) – Spain²⁶

The Federació Convergència i Unió can be described as a nationalist-Catalanist political party of the centre-right, and a typical example of an organization of the regional national minority type. The party is the result of a merger (in 1978) of two parties: Union Democràtica de Catalunya and Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. It was founded in Catalonia. CIU governed Catalonia for more than 20 years, between 1980 to 2003. Nowadays it is the third political party in the Spanish Congress.

The basic second order convictions of CIU can be summarized as follows. Diversity is primarily understood as the cultural diversity stemming from the diversity of nations and languages that existed before the process of nation building took place, and to a much lesser extent as ethnic diversity stemming from immigration. Furthermore, Catalonia is understood as a nation within the Spanish state which is predominantly defined by the Catalan language. However, the Spanish state erroneously presents itself as mononational and monolingual, though in fact Spain is a plurinational and plurilingual country. The Spanish state should acknowledge this fact, establish a plurinational and plurilingual state and hence create room for the existing linguistic and national diversity in Spain - in particular for the Catalan nation.

Many of the first order goals and policies of CIU can be derived from those second order convictions. In general, CIU focuses very much on language and culture policies. In

²⁶ This paragraph is based on: Aurora Álvarez, Alberto Arribas, Nayra García, Sandra Gil, Begoña de la Fuente (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Spain EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS Online Country Report No. 11, 2010 <http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm> ISSN 1890-5986

relation to immigration, the Catalan language is seen as an instrument of enhancing immigrant integration and national cohesion in Catalonia. This is also applied to Spanish speaking immigrants from Latin America. Cultural diversity brought by immigration is seen as positive because it brings new visions and questions old ones. On the other hand, in the absence of integration, immigration-related diversity may also cause problems like ghettos, marginalization of immigrants and diminishing social and national cohesion. Hence, there should be considerable pressure on immigrants to integrate, though Catalonia should keep balance between respecting immigrant cultural identity and maintaining Catalan national identity. The CIU defines Catalonia not so much as a region, but as a European Nation. With regarding to the European Polity, CIU's main area of interest is EU cultural policies as well. CIU wants Catalonia to have an official say in those policies through representation. For the CIU, European cultural policy should recognize and reinforce the cultural differences in Europe. Therefore, the party claims recognition of Catalan as an official EU language, which should for example be used in the Tribunal of Justice. CIU thinks the EU does not enhance cultural diversity – nor the recognition of the particularities of Catalonia - because the State is the key interlocutor at the EU level, and in the Spanish case this situation prevents the recognition of Spanish national, cultural and linguistic plurality. In general, CIU has a tendency to favour decentralization and federalization and increase the role of the local and regional levels within the EU. In particular Catalonia, should have its own voice in the EU because of its linguistic and cultural particularities. More in general, they claim that regional governments should participate in the development of EU policies along with national and European institutions. CIU is pro-Europe as long as the development of the European polity brings Catalonia more influence. Lastly CIU tends to acknowledge the existence of an European communication space, but also deems it elitist, because proficiency in English seems to be a prerequisite for access to this space. To sum up their concrete activities: CIU strives for the establishment of a plurinational and plurilingual Spanish state, lobbies for structural and official influence on European culture and language policy and aims its policies at the protection of Catalan national identity by a firm, but respectful immigrant integration policy.

When comparing CIU with organizations of the same type, there are strong parallels with for example the Frisian National Party (FNP) in the Netherlands; both have an inclusive notion of diversity, but demand adaptation from immigrants, have a strong focus on language (FNP for example strives for lingual assimilation of Dutch citizens who settle in the province), combine regional nationalism with a vision of plurinational state, and envision a

decentralized and federal ‘Europe of the Peoples’. A regional party like the Swedish People’s Party (SPP) in Finland shares the focus on language, but is not as regionalist as FNP and CIU. CIU, on the other hand is atypical in the sense that it is very proactive in influencing the European polity, much more than the average regional national minority organization (see Chapter 5). In comparison with organizations of other types we see among peoples nationalists a regionalist focus accompanied by a vision of a federalized ‘Europe of the Peoples’ that strengthens the positions of regions vis-à-vis the nation-states that is also typical for many (not all) organization of regional national minorities. However there are some fundamental second order differences, most notably in their respective notions of ethno-national diversity which is very inclusive among regional national minorities, contrasting sharply with the homogenizing ideology of peoples nationalist.

With regard to ethno-national diversity it is difficult to pinpoint CIU on a particular discursive frame, simply because CIU differentiates strongly between national and ethnic diversity and sees the last both as an asset and a threat to Catalan national identity. This seems to be typical for many regional national minorities. On one hand they have the most inclusive notion of ethno-national diversity, on the other hand they are most outspoken in granting rights exclusively to national minorities (see Chapter 5). With respect to the European Polity, CIU, FNP and many other organizations of this type clearly see the development of a (federalized) European Polity as a means to gain more regional autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-state. However, not all regional minority organizations are fully in this frame; for example the SPP is hesitant to be outspoken on the federalist ideal. Furthermore, regional national minorities see a role for the EU in managing ethno-national diversity and tend to give the EU power to grant minority rights (Chapter 5). At the same time, they are not as enthusiastic as Jews and Roma in this respect; for example CIU does not expect too much from the EU when it comes to the protection of regional national minority rights vis-à-vis the nation-state, because the latter functions as the interlocutor in the interaction with national minorities.

6.3.2 Jews & Roma – OJB Shalom – Bulgaria²⁷

OJB Shalom could be described as an umbrella organization that represents many Jewish regional branches and organizations in Bulgaria. As such it plays an important role in the coordination of Jewish life in the country. OJB Shalom was registered in 1990 as the

²⁷ This paragraph is based on: Yolanda Zografova, Diana Bakalova, Tatyana Kotzeva, Stanislava Stoyanova, Bistra Mizova, Ekaterina Dimitrova (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Bulgaria EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS, Online Country Report No. 12, 2010 <http://euosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm>, ISSN 1890-5986

successor of a much older organization.²⁸ Since 2007, OJB *Shalom* is a member of the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnical and Demographic Issues. In this role, it contributes to the development and preservation of harmonic relationships between the different ethnic groups in Bulgaria. OJB Shalom has a focus on the preservation and development of Jewish language and culture in the broadest sense. Besides, it is active against racism, fascism, anti-Semitism and the like.

The second order convictions of OJB Shalom can be summarized as follows. OJB sees ethno-national diversity as an advantage, and sees religious, ethnic and social class groups as most defining (resembling the nationalist types in this respect). However, though ethno-national diversity should be preserved and valued, it also is subordinate to the well-functioning of the nation-state. Also, the nation-state should have an autonomous position within and vis-à-vis the European Polity. The first order goals and activities are much in line with this. The state should regulate ethno-national diversity in order to guarantee minority group rights and equal treatment, and for example convince orthodox religious people in a non-forceful way to give women equal access to education. Immigrants should adapt to the host country and for example learn the official language and adapt to the values in the receiving country. OJB Shalom also opposes the possibility of ethno-national groups to have their own political parties and institutions. On the other hand, they hold rather liberal views on the right of free movement for all immigrants, including TCN. Furthermore, they are active in fighting racism and discrimination and work together with the state in order to manage ethno-national diversity. Regarding the EU, the development of the European Polity should be balanced between autonomy of the member states and centralization, though some respondents observe a tendency of federalization in which member-states keep their cultural autonomy. Some legislation could take place on EU level and in general positive (welfare) effects are expected from the EU. Also, OJB Shalom is much inclined to give the EU the power to grant minority rights. Regarding the EPS, there should be many European communication spaces. The existing EPS somewhat excludes ordinary people, but they see a crucial role for citizens' associations and NGOs. OJB Shalom itself actively contributes to the articulation of a European Public Sphere by cooperating with (non)governmental partner organizations at the local, national, European and global level.

When comparing to organizations of the same type OJB Shalom resembles CIDI and to a lesser extent EAJG – two Jewish organizations in the Netherlands, especially when it comes

²⁸ The Consistory and the Public Cultural and Educational Organization of the Jews in Bulgaria, founded in 1922/1944.

to (international) cooperation, influencing the media and other actors, fighting racism and discrimination and a vision on the management and containment of ethno-national diversity from a state-perspective. However, the latter have a very strong focus on influencing national and European foreign policies on Israel. Important activities of those organizations are lobbying and networking (inter)nationally and fighting discrimination and unequal treatment.

The discursive frame of OJB Shalom can be summarized as follows. Ethno-national diversity is something valuable, worth to be preserved and protected. At the same time, ethno-national diversity need also to be managed and contained by the nation-state, in order to maintain social cohesion. Besides, the EU can have a role as a protector of ethno-national group-rights vis-à-vis the nation-state. Therefore, the European Polity is a power-dispersing entity worth influencing and participating in an EPS is crucial. More in general, it is worth to be proactive in the media and to influence all (inter)national actors relevant to the goals of the organisation. Considering the profile sketched in Chapters 4 and 5, this is the general frame for most organization of this type.

6.4 Organisations affiliated with ethnic minorities

6.4.1 Immigrant organisations - Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland – Germany²⁹

The Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD – Turkish Community Germany) can be described as a typical immigrant organization. It is the largest umbrella organisation representing the Turkish immigrant community in Germany. Furthermore, TGD is one of the most publicly articulated immigrant organizations in Germany, which is often involved in public debates on equal treatment, discrimination, even when in concerns other immigrant groups.

A basic second order conviction is that immigrant integration should be effectuated in such way that the cultural identity of the immigrants can be preserved and developed. This is combined with the belief that ethno-national diversity is an unquestionable fact and an asset for society; society should open up itself to diversity. This is combined with a very strong focus on the equality of immigrants and other groups in German society. The first order goals and activities are easily derived from those basic ideas. The basic goal is to represent the interest of Turks in Germany, especially by fighting discrimination and other forms of unequal treatment. Also TGD tries to create a more optimistic attitude towards immigration

²⁹ This paragraph is based on: Karin Mackevics (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Germany EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS Online Country Report No. 8, 2010 <http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm> ISSN 1890-5986

by pointing at the advantages. Probably not unexpected, TGD is quite lenient towards the adaptation of immigrants, granting political rights to immigrants, acquirement of (EU)citizenship and other immigration-related policies. Regarding the development of the European Polity, there are no official standpoints, but TGD leans towards centralism. It also is much in favour of the accession of Turkey. Likewise, TGD does not have a fully fledged vision on an EPS, but is actively involved in shaping it through cooperation with other organizations in Germany, Europe and Turkey. In this respect, TGD's primary focus is on collaboration with other immigrant organizations at the European level.

When comparing to the organizations of same type, we see many of this kind of umbrella organisations, though not all do represent just one ethnic group, with similar ideas about diversity, the EP and the EPS. When comparing to the organizations of other type there is an interesting similarity with Dutch Jewish organisations that also try to influence national and European policy towards the 'home country' via transnational networks. On the other hand a marked difference with Jewish organisations is the lack of a clear international orientation among these umbrella organisations.

The discursive frame of TGD revolves around two basic assumptions. Firstly, ethno-national diversity is an advantage to the German nation state and the interests of the German Turks can be furthered by enhancing the general acceptance of this idea. Secondly, they believe that immigrants have the right to integrate in Germany with preservation of their own culture. The concrete activities are to a large part confined to representing the interest of German Turks by influencing the government and by actively participating in debates in the national public sphere on integration, equal treatment, discrimination. It is not easy to generalize the discursive frame of TGD to all organizations of this type, due to differences in the character of the organisations (religious, secular, ideology, etc.). In general, immigrant organizations tend to lobby especially for equal treatment, but for example Ni Putes, Ni Soumises in France not only demands equal treatment from the French state, but also demands the French state to enforce equal treatment of Muslim women by co-ethnics.

6.4.2 Pro-immigrant/anti-racist organisations – Free Mobility Network (FMN) - Finland³⁰

The Finish Free Mobility Network (FMN) is associated with the European NoBorder network which was formed as a reaction on the European summit on immigration held in 1999 in

³⁰ This paragraph is based on: Peter A. Kraus, Karin Creutz-Kämppi, Marjukka Weide (2010) Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Finland EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS Online Country Report No. 6, 2010 <http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm> ISSN 1890-5986

Tampere, Finland. FMN strives for a more inclusive EU immigration and asylum policy. FMN is a social movement without any formal structure and comprises of some four hundred activists.

The basic second order convictions of FMN can be summarized as follows. All people are equal and should be treated equal. In particular, citizens and non-citizens should have exactly the same (political) rights. Moreover, all people should be free. In particular everyone should be free to live where he wants to live. The first order goals and activities of FMN can be readily derived from this position. They hold very inclusive views on diversity. Also, they strive for a world without borders in general, and want the Finish authorities to be lenient towards immigrants in particular. Furthermore, they help marginalized groups like rejected asylum seekers and Roma beggars. They also do not demand much adaptation of newcomers, other than respecting other people's rights, having a basic understanding of the host country, and practical matter like school attendance of children. On the European level, they oppose the formation of a "Fortress Europe". FMN prefers the EU to be strong and just. They think that an EPS consists of many overlapping spheres and prefer a development of an EPS bottom up, by facilitating it rather than imposing it top down.

Comparing them with organizations of the same type, FMN is for example quite similar to No Borders UK. Other organizations, like The Anti-Racist Center in Norway, are probably less activist and more focused on combating racism and discrimination and helping (minority members) with practical matters like job applications. Comparing to other type the Pro-immigrant / anti-racist types share the focus on equal treatment that is typical for a lot of immigrant organizations.

The dominant discursive frame is that ethno-national diversity is a natural and positive outcome of the freedom of individuals to live the live they want to live, wherever they want to live it. All concrete goals and activities (often in the form of activism) can be derived from this vision.

6.5 Taxonomy of discursive frames

The analysis in the preceding paragraphs gives a good general idea of the discursive frames that dominate within each of the six types of organization. Also, we assessed the scope and variation in discursive frames by making comparisons with organisation of the same and/or other type. Now, we take things a step further and try to give an taxonomy of the discursive frames. This is done by decomposing the actual discursive frames of organisations into one or

more basic sub-frames. Those basic sub-frames form the building blocks from which the discursive frame of each organisation is constructed. The basic sub-frames are:

Pertaining to the European Polity:

- E1. The EU as means to gain more regional autonomy vis-à-vis the nation state
- E2. The EU as a hindrance to the autonomy of the nation-state
- E3. The EU as a means to enhance the power of the nation-state in the world
- E4. The EU as a power-dispersing entity worth influencing to further the actors interest
- E5. The EU as a protector of ethno-national group-rights vis-à-vis the nation-state

Pertaining to ethno-national diversity:

- D1. Ethno-national diversity as a threat to the political entity the actor identifies with
- D2. Ethno-national diversity as an advantage to the political entity the actor identifies with
- D3. Ethno-national diversity as something that has to be managed and contained by the political entity the actor identifies with
- D4. Ethno-national diversity as something valuable, worth to be preserved and protected
- D5. Ethno-national diversity as a concept that fails to differentiate between cultural diversity stemming from migration after state-formation and cultural diversity that existed before nation-state formation (i.e. pertaining to national minorities).
- D6. Ethno-national diversity as a natural and positive outcome of the freedom of individuals to live the live they want to live, wherever they want to live it.

Pertaining to the European Public Sphere:

- C1. An EPS as a threat to the culture, language and identity of member states
- C2. An EPS as a prerequisite for the development of a well-functioning European Polity and/or the protection of ethno-national minority rights
- C3. An EPS as an elitist (set of) sphere(s) excluding certain groups
- C4. An EPS as non-existent or hardly existent
- C5. An EPS as a means to communicate ones message and achieve ones goals at the European level

It is noteworthy that on average the distribution of the different sub frames over the organizations has much to do with the way that the organizations relate to the nation-state and the elements it comprises: state, demos and territory. For example, those identifying with sub state regions tend to see the European Polity as a means to gain autonomy vis-à-vis the

nation-state. Furthermore, despite their different views on ethno-national diversity, those organizations identifying with a(n) (imagined) nation (Austria, Padania, Catalonia) tend to see ethno-national diversity as something that should be managed and contained in order to preserve national identity and cohesion. This even applies to some extent to many Jewish and Roma organizations who both identify with the(ir) nation-state and distrust nation-states, for that reason preferring the EU as a protector of ethno-national minority rights. And a last example: those organizations identifying with immigrants tend to have centralistic preferences on the future development of the European Polity. On the other hand some other sub frames are diffusely distributed over the types of organizations regardless of their relation with the nation-state; most notably, many respondents of all types think that a fully fledged monolithical EPS does not exist and that at most there are overlapping elite sub-spheres excluding normal citizens.

As to the mainstream organizations, some general observations can be made that seem to concern the sample as a whole. Firstly, it is the ethno-national minorities that are considered the most important in defining a diverse society. Other groups, such as religious minorities, received surprisingly little attention. Gender issues were mentioned mainly by respondents in the Nordic countries, and in Turkey. Religious groups are mentioned mainly in Turkey, Bulgaria and Denmark (where the issue of Islam has recently received much attention). Accordingly, it is the command of the national language that is seen as the main component in the ethno-national minorities' integration in society. The political system and other cultural aspects are mentioned less frequently in this context; there is little attention on the minorities' need to be integrated to the economic or religious life of the majorities. Voluntary cultural associations are in most countries regarded important and largely uncontroversial actors in the integration process. In contrast, ethnic parties are not welcomed by the mainstream organizations: They are seen as possibly fostering undue ethnic conflict, and in any case as impeding the minorities' participation in the political party system of the majority. The latter would, according to our respondents, offer a more realistic avenue for the minorities to advance their position in society. Specific forms of institutionalized political representation of ethno-national minorities are supported only in a few cases, where the minorities and their institutions already are well established.

Secondly, the respondents do usually not support that the EU should have a possibility of granting minority rights irrespective of the member states' own policies; even in more general, they are rather for federalization (meaning more decentralization in decision making) than for centralization of the EU. Even if the European integration often is depicted as an elite

project, the mainstream elites in the sixteen countries participating in the study are not enthusiastic supporters of centralization. However, it is still possible that there, despite lack of overt support for centralised decision making on minority rights on the EU level, are some unifying tendencies visible in the discourses of the mainstream elites. They are the ones referred to above: Emphasis on language as the key for integration, and a wish to avoid the institutionalization of political expressions of ethno-national minorities' identities and interests.

6.6 The structural consequences of ethno-national diversity

Question C) regarding the structural consequences of ethno-national diversity for the European Polity and EPS links those three core concepts at a somewhat higher level of abstraction. In the first place, ethno-national diversity is a huge impediment for the development of an fully fledged and integrated EPS. Obviously, as mentioned in the introduction, a basic problem is linguistic diversity. The many different languages in the EU makes it difficult for an EPS to develop, simply because it frustrates the development of pan-European media. This makes for a natural tendency for the development of elite sub sphere(s) for which proficiency in English is a prerequisite. This problem could be overcome by translation, but here we encounter another dimension of ethno-national diversity, namely cultural diversity. Translation is costly and increases rapidly with the number of languages (as is very well known in Brussels). Hence, pan-European media must have a lot of readers and/or spectators to reach breakeven, but due to the enormous variety of cultures items that are of interest to the average European are not easy to find. There is one obvious potential source of such items and that is European Polity. For example, a situation where EU-citizens are able to vote for truly European parties which form an European government on basis of electoral support, and led by a prime-minister or elected president would almost automatically give rise to the development of an European Public Sphere, simply because there would be so much at stake for all European citizens and they also would (intuitively) have the idea that the will of an European demos would be formed in and communicated by the EPS. Right now, due to the democratic deficit, this is not the case. Actually, the results of this report shows that national minorities – say roughly 10% of the EU-population – are the most important group that has some incentives to be interested in the European Polity because it may further their goals (like regional autonomy) and may enhance the protection of ethno-national minority rights. Obviously, European policies have a massive influence on the daily lives of the other 90% of European citizens, but as long as they have the idea that the influence is top down, the

development of an truly pan-European public sphere will be slow, and mainly through the a gradual process of Europeanization of national public spheres and national media.

Appendix: Selected organizations


Actor selection

Organization	Country	Category	No. Interviews
FPÖ	Austria	State-nationalist	6
Moschee ade	Austria	State-nationalist	5
ATAKA	Bulgaria	State-nationalist	4
BNA	Bulgaria	State-nationalist	6
Vlastenecka Fronta	Czech Republic	State-nationalist	3
Danish Association	Denmark	State-nationalist	4
Dansk Folkeparti	Denmark	State-nationalist	5
Estonian Independence Party	Estonia	State-nationalist	4
Association of Finnish Culture and Identity	Finland	State-nationalist	3
Perussuomalaiset	Finland	State-nationalist	5
Bürgerbewegung pro Köln	Germany	State-nationalist	3
FN	Italy	State-nationalist	3
FRP	Norway	State-nationalist	3
Lega Nord	Italy	Peoples nationalist	7
Voorpost	The Netherlands	Peoples nationalist	1
MRF	Bulgaria	Regional national minority	4
Saami Association of Finland	Finland	Regional national minority	2
SFP	Finland	Regional national minority	4
Corsican Regionalist Party	France	Regional national minority	6
Convergencia i Unió	Spain	Regional national minority	7
FNP	The Netherlands	Regional national minority	1
DTP	Turkey	Regional national minority	6
Anti-Poverty Network	UK	Regional national minority	4
Plaid Cymru	UK	Regional national minority	6
OJB "Shalom"	Bulgaria	Jews & Roma	6
Romské muzeum v Brn?	Czech Republic	Jews & Roma	4
Fintiko Romano Forum	Finland	Jews & Roma	2
MCF	Hungary	Jews & Roma	5
CIDI	The Netherlands	Jews & Roma	1
Een Ander Joods Geluid	The Netherlands	Jews & Roma	1
Stichting Roma Emancipatie	The Netherlands	Jews & Roma	1
Ehe Ohne Grenzen	Austria	Immigrant	5
Democratic Muslims	Denmark	Immigrant	4
Ni Putes, Ni Soumises	France	Immigrant	5
Türkische Gemeinde	Germany	Immigrant	5
Zentralrat der Muslime	Germany	Immigrant	3
REDI	Spain	Immigrant	5
ARGAN	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
Diyanet	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
FION	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
Hindoeraad Nederland	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
IOT/Hak.Der	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
Museum Maluku	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1
UMMAO	The Netherlands	Immigrant	1


ENAR Finland	Finland	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	2
Free Mobility Network	Finland	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	2
FASTI	France	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	3
PRIO	Norway	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	3
The Antiracist Centre	Norway	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	5
FORUM	The Netherlands	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	1
Stichting VluchtelingenWerk	The Netherlands	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	1
VON	The Netherlands	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	1
No Borders UK	UK	Pro-immigrant/Anti-racist	5
SPÖ	Austria	Mainstream political party	5
BSP	Bulgaria	Mainstream political party	6
GERB	Bulgaria	Mainstream political party	5
CSSD	Czech Republic	Mainstream political party	4
ODS	Czech Republic	Mainstream political party	5
Socialdemokraterne	Denmark	Mainstream political party	5
Venstre	Denmark	Mainstream political party	5
Estonian Reform Party	Estonia	Mainstream political party	9
Social Democratic Party	Estonia	Mainstream political party	7
Keskusta	Finland	Mainstream political party	7
SDP	Finland	Mainstream political party	6
PS	France	Mainstream political party	12
UMP	France	Mainstream political party	6
CDU/CSU	Germany	Mainstream political party	5
SPD	Germany	Mainstream political party	7
FIDESZ	Hungary	Mainstream political party	6
MSZP	Hungary	Mainstream political party	7
PD	Italy	Mainstream political party	7
Popolo della Libertà	Italy	Mainstream political party	7
DNA	Norway	Mainstream political party	4
Høyre	Norway	Mainstream political party	4
PP	Spain	Mainstream political party	6
PSOE	Spain	Mainstream political party	7
CDA	The Netherlands	Mainstream political party	5
PvDA	The Netherlands	Mainstream political party	6
VVD	The Netherlands	Mainstream political party	7
AKP	Turkey	Mainstream political party	7
CHP	Turkey	Mainstream political party	6
Conservatives	UK	Mainstream political party	7
Labour	UK	Mainstream political party	3

Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures

Answers to V2.6b Should the state react to immigrants that are not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country's ways of life?



Answers to question V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies



Correlations between the answers of variables 2.7a, 2.7b and 5.10, 5.17; cumulated; questions not answered excluded

		Summary of question V2.5 Should public institutions be adapted to requirements of ethno-national minorities; all categories aggregated; preferences for NOT adapting counted as negative	Summary of question V2.6a Are there aspects of national way of life and institutions immigrants have to adapt to; all categories aggregated	Summary of question V1.1; categories of diversity mentioned by respondents, all categories aggregated	Summary of Figure 5.1; number of categories of diversity mentioned by respondents; categories mentioned by <10% of respondents count as 0; 10%-20% count as 1; 20%-30% count as 2; >30% count as 3
Summary of question V2.5 Should public institutions be adapted to requirements of ethno-national minorities; all categories aggregated; preferences for NOT adapting counted as negative	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 7	-,944* 7	,437 7	,444 7
Summary of question V2.6a Are there aspects of national way of life and institutions immigrants have to adapt to; all categories aggregated	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-,944** 7	1 7	-,449 7	-,472 7
Summary of question V1.1; categories of diversity mentioned by respondents, all categories aggregated	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	,437 7	-,449 7	1 7	,987** 7
Summary of Figure 5.1; number of categories of diversity mentioned by respondents; categories mentioned by <10% of respondents count as 0; 10%-20% count as 1; 20%-30% count as 2; >30% count as 3	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	,444 7	-,472 7	,987** 7	1 7

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between certain answer categories in question V2.6a+b and V3.1

		Summary of question V2.5 Should public institutions be adapted to requirements of ethno-national minorities; all categories aggregated; preferences for NOT adapting counted as negative	Summary of question V2.6a Are there aspects of national way of life and institutions immigrants have to adapt to; all categories aggregated	Answers to question V2.6a: Are there certain aspects of..(e.g. Danish) way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to; only the answers to the category "economic life (employment, welfare, etc)"	Answers to question V2.2b: Is ethno-national diversity a disadvantage for society? only the answers to the category "Diversity makes it difficult to create solidarity"	Answers to question V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future? only the answers to the categories "More autonomy for the member states" & "More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields"; answers aggregated, the first answer counts as 2, the second answer counts as 1
Summary of question V2.5 Should public institutions be adapted to requirements of ethno-national minorities; all categories aggregated; preferences for NOT adapting counted as negative	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	1 7	-,944** ,001 7	-,356 ,217 7	-,927** ,001 7	-,767* ,022 7
Summary of question V2.6a Are there aspects of national way of life and institutions immigrants have to adapt to; all categories aggregated	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	-,944** ,001 7	1 7	,560 ,095 7	,866** ,006 7	,720* ,034 7
Answers to question V2.6a: Are there certain aspects of..(e.g. Danish) way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to; only the answers to the category "economic life (employment, welfare, etc)"	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	-,356 ,217 7	,560 ,095 7	1 7	,440 ,162 7	,589 ,082 7
Answers to question V2.2b: Is ethno-national diversity a disadvantage for society? only the answers to the category "Diversity makes it difficult to create solidarity"	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	,927** ,001 7	-,866** ,006 7	-,440 ,162 7	1 7	-,795* ,016 7
Answers to question V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future? only the answers to the categories "More autonomy for the member states" & "More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields"; answers aggregated, the first answer counts as 2, the second answer counts as 1	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	-,767* ,022 7	,720* ,034 7	,589 ,082 7	,795* ,016 7	1 7
** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).						
* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).						

Correlations between certain answer categories in question V2.7a+b,V5.10 & V5.17

	Summary of question V5.10; percentage of respondents mentioning a specific type actor they want to reach with their actions; all categories aggregated.	Summary of question V5.17; percentage of respondents mentioning a specific type of media important to the work of their organisation; all categories aggregated.	Answers to question V5.4a Why should the trans-European communication be organized in the way you mentioned? Answers aggregated, "question not answered" excluded	Total percentage of answered questions (i.e. question not answered excluded) to question V2.7a; How do your views on these questions correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?	Total percentage of answered questions (i.e. question not answered excluded) to question V2.7b; Do you feel that your views on these questions face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly?
Summary of question V5.10; percentage of respondents mentioning a specific type actor they want to reach with their actions; all categories aggregated.	1 Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	,740 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,524 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,363 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,548 Sig. (1-tailed) N
Summary of question V5.17; percentage of respondents mentioning a specific type of media important to the work of their organisation; all categories aggregated.	,740 Sig. (1-tailed) N	1 Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	,746 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,521 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,708 Sig. (1-tailed) N
Answers to question V5.4a Why should the trans-European communication be organized in the way you mentioned? Answers aggregated, "question not answered" excluded	,524 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,746 Sig. (1-tailed) N	1 Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	,152 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,270 Sig. (1-tailed) N
Total percentage of answered questions (i.e. question not answered excluded) to question V2.7a; How do your views on these questions correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?	,363 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,521 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,152 Sig. (1-tailed) N	1 Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N	,957 Sig. (1-tailed) N
Total percentage of answered questions (i.e. question not answered excluded) to question V2.7b; Do you feel that your views on these questions face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly?	,548 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,708 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,270 Sig. (1-tailed) N	,957 Sig. (1-tailed) N	1 Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Correlations between certain answer categories in question V3.1 & V5.4a

		Answers to question V5.4a Why should the trans-European communication be organized in the way you mentioned?		
		Answers aggregated, "question not answered" excluded	Because it would give better opportunities for the empowerment of groups, such as ethno-national minorities, gender groups, transnational groups, or individual citizen	Because it would give better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system of the EU
Answers to question V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future? only the answers to the categories "More autonomy for the member states" & "More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields"; answers aggregated, the first answer counts as 2, the second answer counts as 1	Pearson Correlation	,344	-,124	,086
	Sig. (1-tailed)	,225	,395	,427
	N	7	7	7
Answers to question V3.1: V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future? only the answers to the categories "More centralisation", "More centralisation, but in certain policy fields" & "More federalisation at large"; answers aggregated in which the first answer counts as 2, the second as 1, the third as -2.	Pearson Correlation	-,189	,302	-,454
	Sig. (1-tailed)	,343	,255	,153
	N	7	7	7

Correlations between length of interview and percentage QNA

Correlations between length of interview and percentage QNA per type of organization.

		Percentage of "Question not answered", average per type of organization, average over all tables in Appendix 9	Length of interview in minutes, average per type of organization, average over all tables in Appendix 9
Percentage of "Question not answered", average per type of organization, average over all tables in Appendix 9	Pearson Correlation	1	0,57
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,181
	N	7	7
Length of interview in minutes, average per type of organization, average over all tables in Appendix 9	Pearson Correlation	0,57	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,181	
	N	7	7

Correlations between length of interview and percentage QNA, all respondents

		Duration of Interview	Total incidence of QNA
Duration of Interview	Pearson Correlation	1	0,003
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,96
	N	362	362
Total incidence of QNA	Pearson Correlation	0,003	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,96	
	N	362	362

Power of correlations

Power Calculation (Spreadsheet) One Correlation, t-Test H0: $\rho \leq 0$ / $\rho \geq 0$								
Group Sample Size (N)	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000	7,0000
Null Hypothesized Correlation (ρ_0)	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000	0,0000
Population Correlation (ρ)	-0,9440	0,5890	0,7950	-0,7670	0,7200	0,7400	0,7080	0,7460
Type I Error Rate (Alpha)	0,0010	0,0820	0,0160	0,0220	0,0340	0,0290	0,0370	0,0270
Power (Exact)	0,6511	0,5526	0,5678	0,5681	0,5645	0,5694	0,5605	0,5665

Appendix: Tables with Raw Data

Explanation to the tables with raw data

For the analysis we selected 32 variables from the Eurosphere Interview Database, namely V1.1, V1.2a, V2.1, V2.2a, V2.2b, V2.3, V2.4a, V2.4b, V2.5, V2.6a, V2.6b, V2.7a, V2.7b, V3.1, V3.2, V3.5a, V3.5b, V4.1a, V4.2, V4.4, V4.3, V4.5a, V4.5b, V4.7, V4.9, V5.1, V5.2, V5.3a, V5.3b, V5.4a, V5.10 and V5.17. For each variable, cross tabulations were made with the six categories of organisations. Those tables with raw data are given below.

In order to discover patterns in those tables, we marked significantly higher and lower outcomes for every possible answer category, by comparing them to the outcomes for the control group ‘mainstream political parties’. More concrete, we did the following. One of the answer categories to question V1.1 is ‘Social Class’ (see Table 8.1). The percentage in the column ‘Regional national minority’ gives the number of times the answer was mentioned by respondents belonging to organisations identifying with regional national minorities. This percentage is $11/40=27.5\%$ in this example. This percentage consequently was divided by the percentage (17.5%) of respondents in the control group for which the answer was checked. This gives a fraction of $27.5/17.5=11/7=1.57$. Fractions below 0.5 were then marked with light blue, fractions between 1.5 and 2.0 in light orange and fractions higher than 2.0 in dark orange. This gives a visual indication of deviation of average outcomes.

Furthermore, in order to assess to what extent deviations are contingent, we computed Chi-Square values. Those values are meant to gain additional insight, and the outcomes are not used in our analysis. For those tests, the number of cells with expected outcomes below 5 is given because a high percentage of such cells decreases the validity of the test. The computation of Chi-Square values is done in two ways, because we have to deal with two types of questions and two types of tables. For those questions with mutually exclusive answer categories (like Table SQ 9.6.1) it is rather straightforward. We simply computed Chi-Square in order to test independence of variables. For those cases we almost always find a high degree of statistical significance, as is for example the case for almost all tables starting with SQ in Appendix 9 (in which SQ stands for ‘Sub Question’). For those questions with overlapping answer categories (like Table 9.1) the situation is much more complicated, because it is meaningless to compute Chi-Square for the entire table. Despite this limitation, we wanted to give an impression to what degree the answers per type of organization deviate from the expected values. This gives an indication of the contingency of the answers, which may be interpreted as the degree of consensus or disagreement between the types of organization. We did this by computing Chi-Square values per answer category in a ‘goodness of fit like fashion’. In those cases where p-values are relatively small, differences between the types of organizations must be contributed with high likeliness to differences in opinion. In those cases where p-values are relatively large, the differences between types may be small due to the fact that most respondents in all types of organization more or less agree on the subject the particular answer category pertains to, for example because there is a large degree of consensus. However, in other cases, differences between the types of organizations must be contributed to other causes, like contingency or a very low number of people tagged for that particular answer category by the Eurosphere interviewer. Hence, for the questions with overlapping answer categories, the situation may be rather diffuse. Often we see in one table a number of answer categories with high p-values (which may point at consensus among organization types) and also a number of answer categories with low p-values (which may point at disagreement between organization types).

V1.1 Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society?

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared	
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	11,1%	12,5%	17,5%	15,0%	14,7%	21,7%	15,3%	15,2%	(p)	0,947
	(abs)	6	1	7	3	5	5	28	55	(X ²)	1,682a
Question not answered	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,22.										
	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	27,5%	20,0%	17,6%	26,1%	17,5%	19,1%	(p)	0,566
Social Class (e.g. workers, employers, farmers, rich, poor, etc)	(abs)	10	0	11	4	6	6	32	69	(X ²)	4,826a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,52.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	17,5%	10,0%	11,8%	34,8%	14,2%	13,8%	(p)	0,033 *
Disability groups (people with physical and mental disadvantages)	(abs)	3	0	7	2	4	8	26	50	(X ²)	13,716a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,10.										
	(%)	13,0%	0,0%	30,0%	0,0%	14,7%	39,1%	25,7%	22,1%	(p)	0,005 **
Gender groups (men/women)	(abs)	7	0	12	0	5	9	47	80	(X ²)	18,332a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,77.										
	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	22,5%	0,0%	14,7%	26,1%	19,1%	16,9%	(p)	0,123
Generation (e.g., youth/elderly)	(abs)	6	0	9	0	5	6	35	61	(X ²)	10,043a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,35.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	12,5%	5,0%	2,9%	8,7%	3,3%	4,4%	(p)	0,166
Global belonging groups (identification with humanity)	(abs)	1	0	5	1	1	2	6	16	(X ²)	9,146a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,35.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	12,5%	0,0%	2,9%	8,7%	3,8%	4,1%	(p)	0,063 \$
European belonging (groups identifying with the EU)	(abs)	0	0	5	0	1	2	7	15	(X ²)	11,947a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,33.										
	(%)	40,7%	75,0%	52,5%	75,0%	35,3%	39,1%	49,7%	48,6%	(p)	0,048 *
Ethnic groups (people identifying with a specific ethnic group)	(abs)	22	6	21	15	12	9	91	176	(X ²)	12,719a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,89.										

	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	15,0%	15,0%	14,7%	13,0%	10,9%	11,6%	(p)	0,873
Ideological groups (people identifying with a specific ideology)	(abs)	5	0	6	3	5	3	20	42	(X ²)	2,461a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,93.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	15,0%	5,0%	2,9%	13,0%	7,7%	7,5%	(p)	0,296
Life-style groups (people identifying with different sorts of life-styles)	(abs)	2	0	6	1	1	3	14	27	(X ²)	7,273a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,60.										
	(%)	5,6%	87,5%	27,5%	5,0%	26,5%	30,4%	15,8%	18,5%	(p)	0,000 ***
Migrant groups (people coming from non-European countries)	(abs)	3	7	11	1	9	7	29	67	(X ²)	40,275a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,48.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	15,0%	0,0%	14,7%	13,0%	4,4%	6,1%	(p)	0,006 **
Multiple/mixed belongings (people identifying with more than one group)	(abs)	0	0	6	0	5	3	8	22	(X ²)	18,208a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.										
	(%)	38,9%	25,0%	35,0%	30,0%	32,4%	13,0%	23,0%	27,3%	(p)	0,149
National belonging (people identifying with a specific nation)	(abs)	21	2	14	6	11	3	42	99	(X ²)	9,470a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,19.										
	(%)	24,1%	12,5%	42,5%	15,0%	32,4%	39,1%	32,8%	31,5%	(p)	0,220
Religious groups (people identifying with a specific religion)	(abs)	13	1	17	3	11	9	60	114	(X ²)	8,259a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,52.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	35,0%	10,0%	20,6%	39,1%	23,5%	22,1%	(p)	0,009 **
Sexuality groups (e.g., gays, lesbians, transsexuals, homosexuals, etc)	(abs)	5	0	14	2	7	9	43	80	(X ²)	17,136a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,77.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	10,0%	0,0%	5,9%	8,7%	2,7%	3,6%	(p)	0,107
Shifting belongings (people whose belongings are under a process of change)	(abs)	0	0	4	0	2	2	5	13	(X ²)	10,436a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,29.										
	(%)	5,6%	50,0%	17,5%	0,0%	5,9%	13,0%	9,8%	10,2%	(p)	0,002 **
Territorial belonging (groups identifying with a specific region in a country)	(abs)	3	4	7	0	2	3	18	37	(X ²)	20,589a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,82.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	7,5%	0,0%	5,9%	4,3%	3,3%	3,6%	(p)	0,692
Transnational belonging (groups that are identifying with more than one country)	(abs)	1	0	3	0	2	1	6	13	(X ²)	3,885a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,29.										
	(%)	37,0%	12,5%	20,0%	30,0%	52,9%	26,1%	25,1%	29,0%	(p)	0,019 *
Others	(abs)	20	1	8	6	18	6	46	105	(X ²)	15,220a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,32.										

V1.2a Which groups` claims are more important than others` according to this respondent?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V1.2a Which groups` claims are more important than others` according to this respondent?	Question not answered	5	2	11	3	10	5	43	35
		9,4%	25,0%	33,3%	15,0%	33,3%	23,8%	26,9%	23,2%
	Respondent believes group-specific claims should NOT be give	20	2	4	8	4	1	42	34
		37,7%	25,0%	12,1%	40,0%	13,3%	4,8%	26,3%	22,5%
	Respondent believes all groups` claims should be given equal	2	0	4	3	4	3	24	14
	3,8%	,0%	12,1%	15,0%	13,3%	14,3%	15,0%	9,3%	
Respondent specified some groups whose claims should be give	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	4	4
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	6,7%	9,5%	1,3%	2,6%	
Specify below the respondent`s priority groups:	26	4	14	6	10	10	49	64	
	49,1%	50,0%	42,4%	30,0%	33,3%	47,6%	30,6%	42,4%	
Total	53	8	33	20	30	21	160	151	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared	(χ^2) 44,419a (p) ,007 **								
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 17 cells (48,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.								

V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies?

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	12,5%	5,0%	14,7%	0,0%	6,6%	7,7%	(p)	0,328
	(abs)	5	0	5	1	5	0	12	28	(X ²)	6,928a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.										
	(%)	20,4%	0,0%	35,0%	60,0%	32,4%	39,1%	32,8%	32,3%	(p)	0,020 *
The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as desirable goal to achieve	(abs)	11	0	14	12	11	9	60	117	(X ²)	14,988a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,59.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	12,5%	30,0%	17,6%	17,4%	11,5%	13,0%	(p)	0,210
The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as an ontological matter without which society's and/or individual's existence would not be possible (as a condition for the society's and	(abs)	5	0	5	6	6	4	21	47	(X ²)	8,409a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,04.										
	(%)	27,8%	50,0%	25,0%	15,0%	41,2%	52,2%	39,3%	35,9%	(p)	0,060 \$
The respondent does not attribute any normative or ontological status to ethno-national diversity but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of the social life which everybody h	(abs)	15	4	10	3	14	12	72	130	(X ²)	12,101a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,87.										
	(%)	20,4%	12,5%	15,0%	0,0%	8,8%	0,0%	11,5%	11,6%	(p)	0,109
The respondent sees ethno-national diversity as means to achieve some other goals and not as a goal in itself	(abs)	11	1	6	0	3	0	21	42	(X ²)	10,407a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,93.										

V2.2a Is ethno-national diversity an advantage for society

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
	54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	12,5%	5,0%	14,7%	13,0%	9,3%	8,8%	(p)	0,313
	(abs)	1	0	5	1	5	3	17	32	(X ²)	7,081a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,71.										
	(%)	46,3%	87,5%	2,5%	20,0%	2,9%	4,3%	6,6%	14,1%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity is not an advantage for the society	(abs)	25	7	1	4	1	1	12	51	(X ²)	100,787a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,13.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	27,5%	20,0%	14,7%	8,7%	9,8%	11,3%	(p)	0,005 **
Diversity makes it easy to avoid a homogenising social cohesion	(abs)	1	0	11	4	5	2	18	41	(X ²)	18,715a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,91.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,3%	0,5%	1,9%	(p)	0,008 **
Diversity makes it easy to avoid a centralizing political unity	(abs)	1	0	4	0	0	1	1	7	(X ²)	17,513a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	17,6%	8,7%	6,6%	7,2%	(p)	0,246
Diversity makes it easy to create a self-reflective national identity	(abs)	2	0	2	2	6	2	12	26	(X ²)	7,895a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,57.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	8,8%	4,3%	7,7%	6,4%	(p)	0,450
Diversity makes it easy to create new types of solidarity	(abs)	0	0	3	2	3	1	14	23	(X ²)	5,763a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,51.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	5,9%	4,3%	3,3%	3,3%	(p)	0,933
Diversity makes it easy to achieve individual autonomy	(abs)	2	0	1	0	2	1	6	12	(X ²)	1,845a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	12,5%	5,0%	0,0%	13,0%	1,6%	3,3%	(p)	0,001 **
Diversity makes it easy to achieve equality of citizens before the law	(abs)	0	0	5	1	0	3	3	12	(X ²)	22,393a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.										
Diversity makes it easy to achieve women's rights and gender equality	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	10,0%	30,0%	14,7%	4,3%	5,5%	8,6%	(p)	0,009 **
	(abs)	5	0	4	6	5	1	10	31	(X ²)	17,030a

	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	2,9%	17,4%	8,2%	7,2%	(p)	0,241	
Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more mobile society	(abs)	1	0	3	2	1	4	15	26	(X ²)	7,961a	
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,57.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	2,9%	17,4%	8,2%	8,6%	(p)	0,001 ^{***}	
Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more free society	(abs)	1	0	10	0	1	4	15	31	(X ²)	23,223a	
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.											
	(%)	16,7%	0,0%	20,0%	20,0%	26,5%	43,5%	28,4%	25,4%	(p)	0,099 ^{\$}	
Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more dynamic society	(abs)	9	0	8	4	9	10	52	92	(X ²)	10,683a	
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,03.											
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	22,5%	15,0%	11,8%	30,4%	16,9%	14,9%	(p)	0,006 ^{**}	
Diversity makes it easy to create a society with less rigid identity ascriptions	(abs)	0	0	9	3	4	7	31	54	(X ²)	17,902a	
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.											
	(%)	5,6%	12,5%	15,0%	10,0%	11,8%	21,7%	20,2%	16,0%	(p)	0,207	
Diversity makes it easy to achieve an economically more successful society	(abs)	3	1	6	2	4	5	37	58	(X ²)	8,452a	
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,28.											
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	12,5%	0,0%	8,8%	4,3%	15,3%	10,2%	(p)	0,016 [*]	
Diversity makes it easy to sustain a society better adapted to globalisation	(abs)	0	0	5	0	3	1	28	37	(X ²)	15,644a	
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,82.											
Diversity makes it easy to create a more just society (especially with regard to questions of gender, ethnicity and other diversity groups (see I.1)	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	27,5%	10,0%	17,6%	8,7%	6,6%	9,4%	(p)	0,000 ^{***}	
	(abs)	1	0	11	2	6	2	12	34	(X ²)	24,321a	
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,75.											
	(%)	31,5%	12,5%	35,0%	35,0%	41,2%	21,7%	26,8%	29,6%	(p)	0,466	
Other	(abs)	17	1	14	7	14	5	49	107	(X ²)	5,627a	
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,36.											

V2.2b Is ethno-national diversity a disadvantage for society

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	15,0%	15,0%	17,6%	34,8%	10,9%	12,4%	(p)	0,009 **
	(abs)	2	0	6	3	6	8	20	45	(X ²)	17,063a
Question not answered	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,99.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	40,0%	60,0%	29,4%	34,8%	26,2%	27,3%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity is not a disadvantage for society	(abs)	5	0	16	12	10	8	48	99	(X ²)	26,687a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,19.										
	(%)	66,7%	75,0%	22,5%	10,0%	26,5%	0,0%	36,1%	35,4%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion	(abs)	36	6	9	2	9	0	66	128	(X ²)	50,975a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,83.										
	(%)	5,6%	25,0%	2,5%	10,0%	8,8%	0,0%	10,9%	8,6%	(p)	0,186
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve political unity	(abs)	3	2	1	2	3	0	20	31	(X ²)	8,780a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.										
	(%)	22,2%	37,5%	2,5%	5,0%	0,0%	0,0%	3,3%	6,4%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity makes it difficult to create a national identity	(abs)	12	3	1	1	0	0	6	23	(X ²)	43,733a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,51.										
	(%)	18,5%	25,0%	0,0%	5,0%	8,8%	0,0%	9,3%	9,1%	(p)	0,021 *
Diversity makes it difficult to create solidarity	(abs)	10	2	0	1	3	0	17	33	(X ²)	14,937a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,73.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	0,8%	(p)	0,748
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve individual autonomy	(abs)	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	(X ²)	3,472a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,07.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,3%	1,6%	1,9%	(p)	0,366
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve equality of citizens before the law	(abs)	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	7	(X ²)	6,537a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.										

	(%)	35,2%	12,5%	7,5%	15,0%	14,7%	0,0%	11,5%	14,4%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve women's rights and gender equality	(abs)	19	1	3	3	5	0	21	52	(X ²)	25,694a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,15.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity makes it difficult to create a more mobile society	(abs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(X ²)	0,000
	0										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	5,9%	8,7%	2,7%	3,0%	(p)	0,457
Diversity makes it difficult to create a more free society	(abs)	2	0	0	0	2	2	5	11	(X ²)	5,702a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,24.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	0,6%	(p)	0,631
Diversity makes it difficult to create a more dynamic society	(abs)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	(X ²)	4,337a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,04.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	5,9%	0,0%	2,2%	1,7%	(p)	0,372
Diversity makes it difficult to create a society with less rigid identity ascriptions	(abs)	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	6	(X ²)	6,480a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,13.										
	(%)	9,3%	12,5%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,5%	1,9%	(p)	0,000 ***
Diversity makes it difficult to achieve an economically more successful society	(abs)	5	1	0	0	0	0	1	7	(X ²)	24,156a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,5%	0,6%	(p)	0,884
Diversity makes it difficult to fight globalisation	(abs)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	(X ²)	2,354a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,04.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	2,9%	4,3%	3,8%	5,0%	(p)	0,621
Diversity makes it difficult to create a more just society (with regard to questions of gender, ethnicity and other diversity groups (see I.1))	(abs)	5	0	2	2	1	1	7	18	(X ²)	4,414a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,40.										
	(%)	35,2%	50,0%	25,0%	10,0%	14,7%	13,0%	25,7%	24,9%	(p)	0,066 \$
Other	(abs)	19	4	10	2	5	3	47	90	(X ²)	11,815a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,99.										

V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state?

The state should be neutral with regard to ethno-nationally diverse groups

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 1. The state should be neutral with regard to ethno-nationally diverse groups	Question not answered	12 40,0%	0 ,0%	10 43,5%	2 15,4%	15 60,0%	6 42,9%	45 43,3%	90 41,9%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	2 6,7%	2 33,3%	0 ,0%	3 23,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	7 3,3%
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	2 6,7%	0 ,0%	4 17,4%	3 23,1%	1 4,0%	3 21,4%	9 8,7%	22 10,2%
	Groups not specified	14 46,7%	4 66,7%	9 39,1%	5 38,5%	9 36,0%	5 35,7%	50 48,1%	96 44,7%
Total		30 100,0%	6 100,0%	23 100,0%	13 100,0%	25 100,0%	14 100,0%	104 100,0%	215 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ² 54,623a (p) ,000 ***							
* < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001		a. 15 cells (53,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.							

2. The state should treat all individual citizens equally before law irrespectively of their ethno-national affiliations

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 2. The state should treat all individual citizens equally before law irrespectively of their ethno-national affiliations	Question not answered	17	0	8	2	13	4	30	74
		37,8%	,0%	36,4%	12,5%	39,4%	23,5%	24,0%	28,0%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	5	1	0	2	0	0	2	10
		11,1%	16,7%	,0%	12,5%	,0%	,0%	1,6%	3,8%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	0,4%	
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	7	0	4	8	4	6	27	56
		15,6%	,0%	18,2%	50,0%	12,1%	35,3%	21,6%	21,2%
	Groups not specified	16	5	10	4	16	7	65	123
		35,6%	83,3%	45,5%	25,0%	48,5%	41,2%	52,0%	46,6%
Total		45	6	22	16	33	17	125	264
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ² 41,741a (p) ,014*							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 22 cells (62,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,02.							

3. ONLY individuals can have rights, and ethno-national groups need NOT have specific group rights

	Cat. of Organizations							Total
	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Mainstream political party	
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? :	14	2	12	4	13	7	51	103
3. ONLY individuals can have rights, and ethno-national groups need NOT have specific group rights	41,2%	50,0%	57,1%	26,7%	56,5%	43,8%	49,5%	47,7%
ONLY (native) national minorities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	0,5%
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	8	0	3	2	0	2	14	29
	23,5%	,0%	14,3%	13,3%	,0%	12,5%	13,6%	13,4%
Groups not specified	12	2	6	9	10	7	37	83
	35,3%	50,0%	28,6%	60,0%	43,5%	43,8%	35,9%	38,4%
Total	34	4	21	15	23	16	103	216
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ²) 12,935a (p) ,795							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 15 cells (53,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,02.							

4. Ethno-national groups should have group-specific rights

	Cat. of Organizations							Total
	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Mainstream political party	
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? :	13	2	4	3	13	5	45	85
4. Ethno-national groups should have group-specific rights	36,1%	100,0%	13,8%	21,4%	54,2%	31,3%	44,6%	38,3%
ONLY (native) national minorities	14	0	2	2	2	2	20	42
	38,9%	,0%	6,9%	14,3%	8,3%	12,5%	19,8%	18,9%
ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	0,5%
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	6	4	3	4	14	32
	2,8%	,0%	20,7%	28,6%	12,5%	25,0%	13,9%	14,4%
Groups not specified	8	0	17	5	6	5	21	62
	22,2%	,0%	58,6%	35,7%	25,0%	31,3%	20,8%	27,9%
Total	36	2	29	14	24	16	101	222
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ² 44,570a (p) ,007 **							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 20 cells (57,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

5. There should be exemptions from the law for ethno-national minorities

	Cat. of Organizations							Total
	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Mainstream political party	
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? :	14	2	10	6	15	6	63	116
5. There should be exemptions from the law for ethno-national minorities	58,3%	66,7%	50,0%	46,2%	75,0%	50,0%	75,9%	66,3%
ONLY (native) national minorities	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
	8,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,0%	,0%	,0%	1,7%
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	9
	4,2%	,0%	5,0%	15,4%	,0%	16,7%	3,6%	5,1%
Groups not specified	7	1	9	5	4	4	17	47
	29,2%	33,3%	45,0%	38,5%	20,0%	33,3%	20,5%	26,9%
Total	24	3	20	13	20	12	83	175
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared	(x ²) 25,677a (p) ,107							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 18 cells (64,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,05.							

6. There should be special support measures for ethno-national minorities, e.g. subsidies or positive action programmes

	Cat. of Organizations							Total
	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Mainstream political party	
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? :	9	2	4	3	12	6	38	74
6. There should be special support measures for ethno-national minorities, e.g. subsidies or positive action programmes	25,0%	100,0%	14,8%	18,8%	44,4%	31,6%	31,1%	29,7%
ONLY (native) national minorities	6	0	2	5	0	0	5	18
ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	16,7%	,0%	7,4%	31,3%	,0%	,0%	4,1%	7,2%
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
Groups not specified	2,8%	,0%	,0%	6,3%	,0%	,0%	,8%	1,2%
	4	0	7	4	3	6	22	46
	11,1%	,0%	25,9%	25,0%	11,1%	31,6%	18,0%	18,5%
	16	0	14	3	12	7	56	108
	44,4%	,0%	51,9%	18,8%	44,4%	36,8%	45,9%	43,4%
Total	36	2	27	16	27	19	122	249
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ²) 44,954a (p) ,006**							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 21 cells (60,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,02.							

V2.4a Should all ethno-national groups within one political system have the right to have their respective own political institutions?

Groups and individuals within society should be allowed to organise according to their interests/identifications

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V2.4a Should all ethno-national groups within one political system have the right to have their respective own political institutions?: Groups and individuals within society should be allowed to organise according to their interests/identifications	Question not answered	13 29,5%	1 100,0%	5 15,2%	3 15,8%	9 29,0%	4 17,4%	33 23,9%	68 23,5%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	4 9,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 21,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 2,2%	11 3,8%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	1 2,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,7%	2 ,7%
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	8 18,2%	0 ,0%	10 30,3%	7 36,8%	6 19,4%	8 34,8%	30 21,7%	69 23,9%
	Groups not specified	18 40,9%	0 ,0%	18 54,5%	5 26,3%	16 51,6%	11 47,8%	71 51,4%	139 48,1%
Total		44 100,0%	1 100,0%	33 100,0%	19 100,0%	31 100,0%	23 100,0%	138 100,0%	289 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 38,065a (p) ,034*							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 18 cells (51,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

Political institutions of ethno-national groups should be subsidized by the state

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V2.4a Should all ethno-national groups within one political system have the right to have their respective own political institutions?: Political institutions of ethno-national groups should be subsidized by the state	Question not answered	16	1	9	3	22	9	66	126
		51,6%	100,0%	33,3%	23,1%	81,5%	47,4%	62,9%	56,5%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	3	0	0	3	0	1	5	12
		9,7%	,0%	,0%	23,1%	,0%	5,3%	4,8%	5,4%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	,4%	
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	3	4	3	5	11	27
		3,2%	,0%	11,1%	30,8%	11,1%	26,3%	10,5%	12,1%
	Groups not specified	11	0	15	3	2	4	22	57
		35,5%	,0%	55,6%	23,1%	7,4%	21,1%	21,0%	25,6%
Total		31	1	27	13	27	19	105	223
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 47,214a (p) ,003**							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 23 cells (65,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,00.							

The political system should guide these minority institutions to adapt to new developments of these ethno-national group

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4a Should all ethno-national groups within one political system have the right to have their respective own political institutions?: The political system should guide these minority institutions to adapt to new developments of these ethno-national group	Question not answered	17 65,4%	1 100,0%	13 50,0%	6 46,2%	20 76,9%	7 53,8%	71 71,0%	135 65,9%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 30,8%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 2,0%
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1 3,8%	0 ,0%	3 11,5%	3 23,1%	2 7,7%	1 7,7%	8 8,0%	18 8,8%
	Groups not specified	8 30,8%	0 ,0%	10 38,5%	0 ,0%	4 15,4%	5 38,5%	21 21,0%	48 23,4%
Total	26 100,0%	1 100,0%	26 100,0%	13 100,0%	26 100,0%	13 100,0%	100 100,0%	205 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		$(\chi^2) \quad 74,981a \quad (p) \quad ,000^{***}$							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 17 cells (60,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,02.							

Ethno-national diversity groups should NOT have rights to have their own institutions

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4a Should all ethno-national groups within one political system have the right to have their respective own political institutions?: Ethno-national diversity groups should NOT have rights to have their own institutions	Question not answered	10	1	13	5	12	6	48	95
		22,7%	14,3%	50,0%	35,7%	66,7%	46,2%	47,5%	42,6%
	ONLY (native) national minorities	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	4
		2,3%	,0%	,0%	7,1%	,0%	7,7%	1,0%	1,8%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
	,0%	,0%	3,8%	,0%	,0%	7,7%	,0%	,9%	
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	10	0	2	5	1	0	10	28
		22,7%	,0%	7,7%	35,7%	5,6%	,0%	9,9%	12,6%
	Groups not specified	23	6	10	3	5	5	42	94
		52,3%	85,7%	38,5%	21,4%	27,8%	38,5%	41,6%	42,2%
Total		44	7	26	14	18	13	101	223
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ² 46,441a (p) ,004**							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 21 cells (60,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,06.							

V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?

Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own collective interest associations (corporative-plural bodies)

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions? : Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own collective interest associations (corporative-plural bodies)	Question not answered	18 48,6%	1 100,0%	7 23,3%	5 31,3%	11 36,7%	3 15,8%	65 47,8%	110 40,9%
	ONLY minorities having the national citizenship	5 13,5%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 25,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	9 3,3%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,7%	1 ,4%
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	5 13,5%	0 ,0%	11 36,7%	5 31,3%	4 13,3%	7 36,8%	27 19,9%	59 21,9%
	Groups not specified	9 24,3%	0 ,0%	12 40,0%	2 12,5%	15 50,0%	9 47,4%	43 31,6%	90 33,5%
Total		37 100,0%	1 100,0%	30 100,0%	16 100,0%	30 100,0%	19 100,0%	136 100,0%	269 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ² 66,384a (p) ,000***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 19 cells (54,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,00.							

Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own political parties

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have their own political parties	Question not answered	10	1	7	4	13	4	68	107
	which institutions? : Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own political parties	30,3%	100,0%	29,2%	28,6%	50,0%	26,7%	57,6%	46,3%
	ONLY minorities having the national citizenship	6	0	0	4	1	0	3	14
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	5	2	2	5	9	24
Groups not specified	16	0	12	4	10	6	37	85	
		48,5%	,0%	50,0%	28,6%	38,5%	40,0%	31,4%	36,8%
Total		33	1	24	14	26	15	118	231
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,413a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 21 cells (60,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,00.							

Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own party groups in the national parliament

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have their own party groups in the national parliament	Question not answered	17 58,6%	1 100,0%	8 34,8%	4 28,6%	19 82,6%	4 30,8%	82 77,4%	135 64,6%
	ONLY minorities having the national citizenship	4 13,8%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 28,6%	0 ,0%	1 7,7%	5 4,7%	14 6,7%
	ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 17,4%	2 14,3%	2 8,7%	2 15,4%	2 1,9%	12 5,7%
	Groups not specified	8 27,6%	0 ,0%	11 47,8%	4 28,6%	2 8,7%	6 46,2%	17 16,0%	48 23,0%
	Total	29 100,0%	1 100,0%	23 100,0%	14 100,0%	23 100,0%	13 100,0%	106 100,0%	209 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		$(\chi^2) \quad 56,746a \quad (p) \quad ,000^{***}$							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 16 cells (57,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,06.							

Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own local, regional parliaments, if they are concentrated territorially

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions? : Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own political parties	Question not answered	10	1	7	4	13	4	68	107
		30,3%	100,0%	29,2%	28,6%	50,0%	26,7%	57,6%	46,3%
	ONLY minorities having the national citizenship	6	0	0	4	1	0	3	14
		18,2%	,0%	,0%	28,6%	3,8%	,0%	2,5%	6,1%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	,4%	
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	1	0	5	2	2	5	9	24	
	3,0%	,0%	20,8%	14,3%	7,7%	33,3%	7,6%	10,4%	
Groups not specified	16	0	12	4	10	6	37	85	
	48,5%	,0%	50,0%	28,6%	38,5%	40,0%	31,4%	36,8%	
Total	33	1	24	14	26	15	118	231	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,413a (p) ,001 ***							
* <0.05; ** <0.01; *** <0.001		a. 21 cells (60,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,00.							

Groups should NOT have their own institutions.

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions? : Groups should NOT have their own institutions.	Question not answered	7	1	14	6	11	6	60	105
		20,0%	12,5%	53,8%	42,9%	47,8%	46,2%	53,6%	45,5%
	ONLY minorities having the national citizenship	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
		2,9%	12,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,9%
	ONLY (native) national minorities and migrants who are EU ci	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	,0%	,0%	3,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	
ALL minority groups including also resident immigrants from	11	0	5	5	2	0	17	40	
	31,4%	,0%	19,2%	35,7%	8,7%	,0%	15,2%	17,3%	
Groups not specified	16	6	6	3	10	7	35	83	
	45,7%	75,0%	23,1%	21,4%	43,5%	53,8%	31,3%	35,9%	
Total	35	8	26	14	23	13	112	231	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(χ^2) 52,890a (p) ,001 ***							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 22 cells (62,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,03.							

V2.5 Should public institutions be adapted to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared
Question not answered	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	10,0%	5,0%	11,8%	4,3%	8,7%	7,5%	(p) 0,503
	(abs)	1	0	4	1	4	1	16	27	(X ²) 5,327a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,60.									
Public institutions should not be adapted to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities	(%)	79,6%	100,0%	10,0%	20,0%	8,8%	8,7%	18,6%	27,1%	(p) 0,000 ***
	(abs)	43	8	4	4	3	2	34	98	(X ²) 119,870a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,17.									
Public institutions should be made multi-lingual in order to communicate with all minorities - this concerns hos	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	32,5%	40,0%	35,3%	52,2%	27,9%	29,3%	(p) 0,027 *
	(abs)	10	0	13	8	12	12	51	106	(X ²) 14,234a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,34.									
There should be multi-cultural education for public service functionaries (to provide inter-cultural understandi	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	32,5%	55,0%	47,1%	39,1%	18,0%	22,9%	(p) 0,000 ***
	(abs)	1	0	13	11	16	9	33	83	(X ²) 46,772a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,83.									
Political parties should adopt new nomination procedures which obliges them to nominate a quota of minority/wome	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	8,8%	8,7%	4,4%	5,0%	(p) 0,346
	(abs)	0	0	3	2	3	2	8	18	(X ²) 6,737a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,40.									
"Substantial" political representation system, where representation is based on group belonging, should be adopt	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	7,5%	15,0%	2,9%	4,3%	4,4%	4,7%	(p) 0,312
	(abs)	1	0	3	3	1	1	8	17	(X ²) 7,101a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,38.									
There should be a possibility for founding separate hospitals and elderly houses for ethno-national minorities ((%)	11,1%	0,0%	5,0%	15,0%	14,7%	17,4%	4,9%	8,0%	(p) 0,108
	(abs)	6	0	2	3	5	4	9	29	(X ²) 10,408a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,64.									
There should be parallel political systems, like verzuiling in the Netherlands, with minorities having their own	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,5%	1,1%	(p) 0,009 **
	(abs)	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	4	(X ²) 17,045a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,09.									
Minorities should have their own sub-parliaments, representative bodies, and sub-governments.	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	12,5%	15,0%	0,0%	0,0%	6,0%	5,8%	(p) 0,094 \$
	(abs)	2	0	5	3	0	0	11	21	(X ²) 10,834a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,46.									
Other	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	27,5%	25,0%	32,4%	34,8%	35,0%	28,7%	(p) 0,008 **
	(abs)	5	0	11	5	11	8	64	104	(X ²) 17,501a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,30.									

V2.6a Are there certain aspects of..(e.g. Danish) way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	15,0%	5,0%	11,8%	4,3%	8,7%	7,7%	(p)	0,135
	(abs)	0	0	6	1	4	1	16	28	(X ²)	9,770a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.										
	(%)	18,5%	25,0%	7,5%	30,0%	5,9%	13,0%	16,4%	15,5%	(p)	0,190
Economic life (employment, welfare arrangements, etc)	(abs)	10	2	3	6	2	3	30	56	(X ²)	8,724a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,24.										
	(%)	53,7%	50,0%	32,5%	30,0%	35,3%	47,8%	43,7%	42,8%	(p)	0,326
Political system (political institutions, political values, rules of the democratic game)	(abs)	29	4	13	6	12	11	80	155	(X ²)	6,945a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,43.										
	(%)	61,1%	87,5%	35,0%	20,0%	38,2%	47,8%	39,9%	42,8%	(p)	0,002**
Language	(abs)	33	7	14	4	13	11	73	155	(X ²)	20,323a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,43.										
	(%)	13,0%	37,5%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,3%	8,7%	8,6%	(p)	0,016*
Religion	(abs)	7	3	4	0	0	1	16	31	(X ²)	15,582a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.										
	(%)	33,3%	37,5%	30,0%	45,0%	20,6%	17,4%	23,0%	26,2%	(p)	0,212
Other cultural aspects of life	(abs)	18	3	12	9	7	4	42	95	(X ²)	8,371a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,10.										
	(%)	40,7%	37,5%	25,0%	10,0%	35,3%	17,4%	26,8%	28,2%	(p)	0,110
Other aspects of life that immigrants should adapt to?	(abs)	22	3	10	2	12	4	49	102	(X ²)	10,371a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,25.										

V2.6b Should the state react to immigrants that are not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country's ways of lie?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.6b Should the state react to immigrants that are not willing to adapt to certain aspects of the host country's ways of lie? How?	Question not answered	15 29,4%	0 ,0%	19 61,3%	1 6,7%	14 45,2%	13 61,9%	84 53,2%	146 46,3%
	State should not intervene in any minority cultural practice	2 3,9%	1 12,5%	0 ,0%	3 20,0%	4 12,9%	0 ,0%	10 6,3%	20 6,3%
	State should intervene in minority cultural practices in the case they restrict individual liberties	6 11,8%	0 ,0%	5 16,1%	1 6,7%	6 19,4%	6 28,6%	31 19,6%	55 17,5%
	State should intervene in all minority cultural practices	4 7,8%	4 50,0%	0 ,0%	1 6,7%	1 3,2%	0 ,0%	5 3,2%	15 4,8%
	Please specify below the reactions/counter-actions mentioned	24 47,1%	3 37,5%	7 22,6%	9 60,0%	6 19,4%	2 9,5%	28 17,7%	79 25,1%
Total		51 100,0%	8 100,0%	31 100,0%	15 100,0%	31 100,0%	21 100,0%	158 100,0%	315 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		$(\chi^2) \quad 94,759a \quad (p) \quad ,000^{***}$							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 18 cells (51,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,38.							

V2.7a How do your views on these questions correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?

	Cat. of Organizations							Total
	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	
V2.7a How do your views on these questions correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?	7	0	18	3	11	8	56	103
Question not answered	13,7%	,0%	51,4%	16,7%	34,4%	36,4%	35,4%	31,8%
Respondent feels his/her views correspond largely	26	7	5	2	6	0	43	89
	51,0%	87,5%	14,3%	11,1%	18,8%	,0%	27,2%	27,5%
Respondent feels his/her views correspond partly	16	1	8	8	6	9	36	84
	31,4%	12,5%	22,9%	44,4%	18,8%	40,9%	22,8%	25,9%
Respondent feels his/her views do not correspond	2	0	4	5	9	5	23	48
	3,9%	,0%	11,4%	27,8%	28,1%	22,7%	14,6%	14,8%
Total	51	8	35	18	32	22	158	324
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ²) 64,990a (p) ,000***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 9 cells (32,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.							

V2.7b Do you feel that your views on these questions face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V2.7b Do you feel that your views on these questions face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly?	Question not answered	15 30,6%	1 12,5%	24 75,0%	3 17,6%	16 51,6%	11 52,4%	94 62,7%	164 53,2%
	Respondent feels his/her views gets much support	18 36,7%	6 75,0%	2 6,3%	2 11,8%	2 6,5%	0 ,0%	14 9,3%	44 14,3%
	Respondent feels his/her views gets more support than resistance	15 30,6%	0 ,0%	3 9,4%	1 5,9%	7 22,6%	5 23,8%	24 16,0%	55 17,9%
	Respondent feels his/her views gets more resistance than support	1 2,0%	1 12,5%	3 9,4%	9 52,9%	2 6,5%	4 19,0%	13 8,7%	33 10,7%
	Respondent feels his/her views gets much resistance	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 11,8%	4 12,9%	1 4,8%	5 3,3%	12 3,9%
	Total	49 100,0%	8 100,0%	32 100,0%	17 100,0%	31 100,0%	21 100,0%	150 100,0%	308 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 119,686a (p) ,000***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 20 cells (57,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,31.							

V3.1 In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	12,5%	25,0%	11,8%	21,7%	5,5%	8,3%	(p)	0,003 **
	(abs)	1	0	5	5	4	5	10	30	(X ²)	19,885a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,66.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	5,0%	8,8%	4,3%	7,7%	5,2%	(p)	0,192
	(abs)	0	0	0	1	3	1	14	19	(X ²)	8,686a
No change	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,42.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	2,5%	5,0%	17,6%	13,0%	8,2%	7,7%	(p)	0,158
	(abs)	2	0	1	1	6	3	15	28	(X ²)	9,290a
More centralisation	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.										
	(%)	11,1%	12,5%	15,0%	5,0%	14,7%	17,4%	25,1%	19,1%	(p)	0,114
More centralisation, but in certain policy fields	(abs)	6	1	6	1	5	4	46	69	(X ²)	10,264a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,52.										
	(%)	5,6%	25,0%	30,0%	25,0%	8,8%	8,7%	15,8%	15,5%	(p)	0,025 *
	(abs)	3	2	12	5	3	2	29	56	(X ²)	14,438a
More federalisation at large	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,24.										
	(%)	61,1%	25,0%	5,0%	25,0%	2,9%	4,3%	9,3%	16,9%	(p)	0,000 ***
	(abs)	33	2	2	5	1	1	17	61	(X ²)	95,564a
More autonomy for the member states	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,35.										
	(%)	13,0%	37,5%	5,0%	10,0%	14,7%	0,0%	14,8%	12,7%	(p)	0,092 \$
More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields	(abs)	7	3	2	2	5	0	27	46	(X ²)	10,872a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,02.										
	(%)	42,6%	12,5%	40,0%	25,0%	26,5%	30,4%	25,7%	29,8%	(p)	0,161
	(abs)	23	1	16	5	9	7	47	108	(X ²)	9,239a
Other forms of change	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,39.										

V3.2 What further positive or negative impact of European integration on ethno-national diversity

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	5,6%	25,0%	15,0%	20,0%	26,5%	26,1%	14,2%	15,5%	(p)	0,113
	(abs)	3	2	6	4	9	6	26	56	(X ²)	10,287a
Question not answered	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,24.										
	(%)	13,0%	0,0%	7,5%	20,0%	2,9%	0,0%	10,4%	9,4%	(p)	0,191
European integration has no effects on ethno-national diversity	(abs)	7	0	3	4	1	0	19	34	(X ²)	8,709a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,75.										
	(%)	37,0%	37,5%	7,5%	15,0%	11,8%	13,0%	12,0%	16,0%	(p)	0,000 ***
Weakening "nation-states" and "national culture" and "national identity"	(abs)	20	3	3	3	4	3	22	58	(X ²)	25,428a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,28.										
	(%)	14,8%	12,5%	10,0%	10,0%	2,9%	8,7%	3,3%	6,6%	(p)	0,071 \$
Weakening diversity within the Member States (with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity)	(abs)	8	1	4	2	1	2	6	24	(X ²)	11,616a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,53.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	1,9%	(p)	0,106
Weakening ethnic/national minorities spread over several member states, e.g. Turkish migrants, Roma/Sinti, Russ	(abs)	2	0	1	2	1	0	1	7	(X ²)	10,473a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.										
	(%)	27,8%	0,0%	7,5%	20,0%	20,6%	13,0%	13,7%	15,7%	(p)	0,087 \$
Strengthening "nation-states" and "national culture" and "national identity"	(abs)	15	0	3	4	7	3	25	57	(X ²)	11,038a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,26.										
	(%)	24,1%	0,0%	42,5%	20,0%	23,5%	34,8%	31,1%	29,6%	(p)	0,155
Strengthening diversity within the Member States (with regard to ethnic, regional and national diversity)	(abs)	13	0	17	4	8	8	57	107	(X ²)	9,349a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,36.										
	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	11,8%	8,7%	12,0%	10,2%	(p)	0,629
Strengthening ethnic/national minorities spread over several member states, e.g. Turkish migrants, Roma/Sinti,	(abs)	6	0	1	2	4	2	22	37	(X ²)	4,350a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,82.										
	(%)	29,6%	25,0%	15,0%	10,0%	23,5%	21,7%	24,6%	23,2%	(p)	0,549
Other	(abs)	16	2	6	2	8	5	45	84	(X ²)	4,960a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,86.										

V3.5a To which groups should the EU have power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States

	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi-squared
N	54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%) 16,7%	0,0%	27,5%	15,0%	52,9%	30,4%	24,0%	25,4%	(p)	0,003 **
	(abs) 9	0	11	3	18	7	44	92	(X ²)	20,220a
Question not answered	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,03.									
	(%) 63,0%	100,0%	5,0%	30,0%	2,9%	0,0%	33,9%	31,2%	(p)	0,000 ***
The EU should NOT have power to grant any minority rights to any groups	(abs) 34	8	2	6	1	0	62	113	(X ²)	79,495a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,50.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	1,9%	(p)	0,009 **
Socio-economic groups (workers, employers, farmers, rich, poor, etc)	(abs) 0	0	3	2	1	0	1	7	(X ²)	17,113a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.									
	(%) 1,9%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	2,2%	2,5%	(p)	0,465
Disability groups (people with physical and mental disadvantages)	(abs) 1	0	1	2	1	0	4	9	(X ²)	5,635a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.									
	(%) 1,9%	0,0%	12,5%	15,0%	2,9%	0,0%	4,9%	5,2%	(p)	0,076 \$
Gender groups (men/women)	(abs) 1	0	5	3	1	0	9	19	(X ²)	11,428a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,42.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	1,1%	1,7%	(p)	0,093 \$
Generational groups (e.g., youth/elderly)	(abs) 0	0	1	2	1	0	2	6	(X ²)	10,848a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,13.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	25,0%	45,0%	5,9%	13,0%	10,9%	12,2%	(p)	0,000 ***
Ethnic groups (people identifying with a specific ethnic group)	(abs) 0	0	10	9	2	3	20	44	(X ²)	36,495a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,97.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	1,4%	(p)	0,030 *
Life-style groups (people identifying with different sorts of life-styles)	(abs) 0	0	1	2	1	0	1	5	(X ²)	14,009a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,11.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	15,0%	5,9%	8,7%	3,3%	3,9%	(p)	0,078 \$
Migrant groups (people coming from non-European countries)	(abs) 0	0	1	3	2	2	6	14	(X ²)	11,347a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,31.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	12,5%	15,0%	2,9%	4,3%	7,7%	6,6%	(p)	0,119
National belonging (people identifying with a specific nation)	(abs) 0	0	5	3	1	1	14	24	(X ²)	10,141a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,53.									
	(%) 1,9%	0,0%	10,0%	15,0%	5,9%	0,0%	3,3%	4,4%	(p)	0,081 \$
Religious groups (people identifying with a specific religion)	(abs) 1	0	4	3	2	0	6	16	(X ²)	11,261a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,35.									
	(%) 0,0%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	5,9%	0,0%	2,2%	2,8%	(p)	0,202
Sexuality groups (e.g., gays, lesbians,										

transsexuals, homosexuals, etc)	(abs)	0	0	2	2	2	0	4	10	(χ^2)	8,519a	
	a.	6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,22.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	2,5%	(p)	0,075	\$
Territorial groups (groups identifying with a specific region in a country)	(abs)	3	0	2	2	1	0	1	9	(χ^2)	11,458a	
	a.	7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,5%	1,4%	(p)	0,030	*
Transnational groups (groups that are identifying with more than one country)	(abs)	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	5	(χ^2)	14,009a	
	a.	7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,11.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	22,5%	5,0%	23,5%	39,1%	13,1%	14,9%	(p)	0,001	**
	(abs)	3	0	9	1	8	9	24	54	(χ^2)	21,573a	
Others	a.	3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.										

V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States?

None

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : None	Question not answered	14 31,1%	3 42,9%	17 89,5%	10 66,7%	24 92,3%	15 93,8%	78 74,3%	161 69,1%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	18 40,0%	0 ,0%	1 5,3%	3 20,0%	1 3,8%	0 ,0%	8 7,6%	31 13,3%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 1,0%	1 ,4%
	Rights at EU and national levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 1,0%	1 ,4%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	13 28,9%	4 57,1%	1 5,3%	2 13,3%	1 3,8%	1 6,3%	17 16,2%	39 16,7%
Total		45 100,0%	7 100,0%	19 100,0%	15 100,0%	26 100,0%	16 100,0%	105 100,0%	233 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 66,470a (p) ,000 ***							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 25 cells (71,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,03.							

Stricter anti-discrimination measures

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Stricter anti-discrimination measures	Question not answered	15 68,2%	1 100,0%	16 59,3%	5 35,7%	21 77,8%	13 68,4%	80 80,8%	151 72,2%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 5,3%	5 5,1%	6 2,9%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,5%
	Rights at EU and national levels	5 22,7%	0 ,0%	3 11,1%	4 28,6%	3 11,1%	0 ,0%	3 3,0%	18 8,6%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,1%	0 ,0%	8 29,6%	4 28,6%	3 11,1%	5 26,3%	11 11,1%	33 15,8%
Total		22 100,0%	1 100,0%	27 100,0%	14 100,0%	27 100,0%	19 100,0%	99 100,0%	209 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 48,937a (p) ,002 **							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,00.							

Public funding the development of minority cultures and languages

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Public funding the development of minority cultures and languages	Question not answered	12 57,1%	1 100,0%	16 66,7%	4 26,7%	23 88,5%	17 94,4%	76 78,4%	149 73,8%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	7 7,2%	7 3,5%
	Rights at EU and local levels	1 4,8%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 6,7%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 1,0%
	Rights at EU and national levels	6 28,6%	0 ,0%	1 4,2%	4 26,7%	2 7,7%	0 ,0%	5 5,2%	18 8,9%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,5%	0 ,0%	7 29,2%	6 40,0%	1 3,8%	1 5,6%	9 9,3%	26 12,9%
Total		21 100,0%	1 100,0%	24 100,0%	15 100,0%	26 100,0%	18 100,0%	97 100,0%	202 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 60,258a (p) ,000 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

Voting/suffrage rights

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Voting/suffrage rights	Question not answered	16 72,7%	1 100,0%	15 65,2%	5 41,7%	25 92,6%	17 94,4%	86 91,5%	165 83,8%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 3,2%	3 1,5%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 8,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 1,1%	2 1,0%
	Rights at EU and national levels	4 18,2%	0 ,0%	2 8,7%	4 33,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 2,1%	12 6,1%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,1%	0 ,0%	6 26,1%	2 16,7%	2 7,4%	1 5,6%	2 2,1%	15 7,6%
Total		22 100,0%	1 100,0%	23 100,0%	12 100,0%	27 100,0%	18 100,0%	94 100,0%	197 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 56,483a (p) ,000 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

Representation rights (right to stand as candidate in elections)

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Representation rights (right to stand as candidate in elections)	Question not answered	16 72,7%	1 100,0%	15 65,2%	4 33,3%	25 92,6%	17 94,4%	83 88,3%	161 81,7%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 3,2%	3 1,5%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 4,3%	1 8,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 1,0%
	Rights at EU and national levels	4 18,2%	0 ,0%	2 8,7%	4 33,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	6 6,4%	16 8,1%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,1%	0 ,0%	5 21,7%	3 25,0%	2 7,4%	1 5,6%	2 2,1%	15 7,6%
Total		22 100,0%	1 100,0%	23 100,0%	12 100,0%	27 100,0%	18 100,0%	94 100,0%	197 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 50,461a (p) ,001 **							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

Mobility rights (right to move within and across the EU member countries)

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Mobility rights (right to move within and across the EU member countries)	Question not answered	16 72,7%	1 100,0%	19 82,6%	4 33,3%	24 92,3%	14 77,8%	88 89,8%	166 83,0%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 3,1%	3 1,5%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 8,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,5%
	Rights at EU and national levels	4 18,2%	0 ,0%	1 4,3%	4 33,3%	1 3,8%	0 ,0%	2 2,0%	12 6,0%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,1%	0 ,0%	3 13,0%	3 25,0%	1 3,8%	4 22,2%	5 5,1%	18 9,0%
Total	22 100,0%	1 100,0%	23 100,0%	12 100,0%	26 100,0%	18 100,0%	98 100,0%	200 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 57,775a (p) ,000***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

Other

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V3.5b Which minority rights should the EU have power to grant that cannot be revised by the Member States? : Other	Question not answered	16 72,7%	1 100,0%	18 81,8%	5 55,6%	22 91,7%	14 100,0%	82 83,7%	158 83,2%
	Rights ONLY at EU-level	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 2,0%	2 1,1%
	Rights at EU and local levels	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 22,2%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 1,1%
	Rights at EU and national levels	4 18,2%	0 ,0%	3 13,6%	2 22,2%	1 4,2%	0 ,0%	8 8,2%	18 9,5%
	Rights at local, national, and EU levels	2 9,1%	0 ,0%	1 4,5%	0 ,0%	1 4,2%	0 ,0%	6 6,1%	10 5,3%
Total		22 100,0%	1 100,0%	22 100,0%	9 100,0%	24 100,0%	14 100,0%	98 100,0%	190 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,050a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

V4.1a According to which criteria do you think that citizenship should be applied

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi- squared \$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	12,5%	10,0%	11,8%	13,0%	10,4%	9,1%	(p)	0,248
	(abs)	0	0	5	2	4	3	19	33	(X ²)	7,861a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,73.										
Acquisition of citizenship should not be automatic for any foreigners or their children; it should be at state discretion to grant citizenship based on the fulfilment of cer	(%)	85,2%	87,5%	15,0%	60,0%	38,2%	21,7%	34,4%	42,0%	(p)	0,000 **
	(abs)	46	7	6	12	13	5	63	152	(X ²)	71,159a *
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,36.										
Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if one of the child's parents is a naturalized citizen, even if that child is born outside the host co	(%)	22,2%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	8,8%	0,0%	19,1%	14,9%	(p)	0,022 *
	(abs)	12	0	2	2	3	0	35	54	(X ²)	14,735a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.										
Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if these children are born in this country, even if their parents are not citizens in this country (bi	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	27,5%	30,0%	23,5%	0,0%	26,2%	21,5%	(p)	0,008 **
	(abs)	5	0	11	6	8	0	48	78	(X ²)	17,474a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,72.										
All immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically be become citizens no matter which country they come from (long-term	(%)	11,1%	37,5%	37,5%	35,0%	32,4%	34,8%	29,0%	28,5%	(p)	0,087 \$
	(abs)	6	3	15	7	11	8	53	103	(X ²)	11,058a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,28.										
	(%)	20,4%	12,5%	50,0%	30,0%	23,5%	21,7%	23,5%	26,0%	(p)	0,023 *
	(abs)	11	1	20	6	8	5	43	94	(X ²)	14,721a
Other	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,08.										

V4.2 What is your opinion with regard to dual citizenship

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi- squared \$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		
	(%)	1,9%	37,5%	17,5%	5,0%	5,9%	13,0%	8,7%	9,1%	(p)	0,014 *
	(abs)	1	3	7	1	2	3	16	33	(X ²)	15,909a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,73.										
State should require renouncement of previous citizenships from all foreigners who apply for acquisition of citizenship	(%)	50,0%	62,5%	0,0%	20,0%	2,9%	4,3%	15,3%	18,2%	(p)	0,000 **
	(abs)	27	5	0	4	1	1	28	66	(X ²)	65,394a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,46.										
State should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship in this country	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	37,5%	50,0%	73,5%	52,2%	35,0%	36,5%	(p)	0,000 **
	(abs)	6	0	15	10	25	12	64	132	(X ²)	43,961a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,92.										
	(%)	31,5%	0,0%	32,5%	25,0%	23,5%	30,4%	26,8%	27,3%	(p)	0,615
	(abs)	17	0	13	5	8	7	49	99	(X ²)	4,456a
Other	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,19.										

V4.3 Should residents from Non-EU-countries have direct access to EU citizenship or should EU citizenship only be derived from national citizenship in one of the Member States?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.3 Should residents from Non-EU-countries have direct access to EU citizenship or should EU citizenship only be derived from national citizenship in one of the Member States?	Question not answered	3	0	11	2	7	2	20	45
		6,0%	,0%	29,7%	11,1%	21,9%	8,7%	12,7%	13,8%
	Only the citizens of member states should be EU-citizens	32	4	9	11	6	6	84	152
		64,0%	50,0%	24,3%	61,1%	18,8%	26,1%	53,5%	46,8%
	Foreigners should be allowed to become EU citizens without f	3	0	9	1	13	10	31	67
		6,0%	,0%	24,3%	5,6%	40,6%	43,5%	19,7%	20,6%
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	
	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,1%	,0%	1,3%	,9%	
Other, please specify:	12	4	8	4	5	5	20	58	
	24,0%	50,0%	21,6%	22,2%	15,6%	21,7%	12,7%	17,8%	
Total	50	8	37	18	32	23	157	325	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ²) 62,275a (p) ,000 ***								
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 18 cells (51,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,07.								

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis

	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared	
	54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362	\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	
	N									
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	10,0%	15,0%	17,6%	17,4%	10,9%	11,0%	(p) 0,486
	(abs)	3	0	4	3	6	4	20	40	(X ²) 5,464a
Question not answered	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,88.									
	(%)	61,1%	62,5%	7,5%	25,0%	5,9%	4,3%	21,9%	24,6%	(p) 0,000 ***
There should be restrictions of these rights for all non-EU citizens	(abs)	33	5	3	5	2	1	40	89	(X ²) 63,587a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,97.									
All persons from non-EU countries with valid entry visas should have the same rights to free mobility as citizens from other EU	(%)	20,4%	0,0%	45,0%	35,0%	32,4%	43,5%	29,5%	30,7%	(p) 0,057 \$
	(abs)	11	0	18	7	11	10	54	111	(X ²) 12,210a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,45.									
Citizens of non-EU countries with long-term residence in the EU should have the same rights to mobility as citizens from EU countries	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	25,0%	30,0%	14,7%	13,0%	19,7%	19,3%	(p) 0,508
	(abs)	10	0	10	6	5	3	36	70	(X ²) 5,286a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,55.									
There should be differentiations in the right to free movement (e.g. transition periods for new Member States with regard to free movement)	(%)	14,8%	25,0%	2,5%	5,0%	2,9%	0,0%	5,5%	6,4%	(p) 0,023 *
	(abs)	8	2	1	1	1	0	10	23	(X ²) 14,701a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,51.									
There should be restrictions of these rights (e.g. with regard to employment, or residence for more than three months, financial)	(%)	25,9%	12,5%	7,5%	0,0%	8,8%	0,0%	7,1%	9,4%	(p) 0,001 ***
	(abs)	14	1	3	0	3	0	13	34	(X ²) 23,201a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,75.									
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of Roma people coming from other EU countries to apply for	(%)	16,7%	62,5%	2,5%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	6,0%	7,7%	(p) 0,000 ***
	(abs)	9	5	1	2	0	0	11	28	(X ²) 46,878a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.									
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of prostitutes coming from other EU countries to work in the	(%)	22,2%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	5,9%	0,0%	2,7%	6,1%	(p) 0,000 ***
	(abs)	12	0	1	2	2	0	5	22	(X ²) 31,691a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.									
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of poor or unemployed people coming from other EU countries	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	0,0%	5,0%	2,9%	0,0%	0,0%	3,3%	(p) 0,000 ***
	(abs)	10	0	0	1	1	0	0	12	(X ²) 47,846a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.									
	(%)	13,0%	12,5%	17,5%	20,0%	32,4%	21,7%	16,4%	18,0%	(p) 0,375
	(abs)	7	1	7	4	11	5	30	65	(X ²) 6,448a
Other	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,44.									

V4.5a Should political rights be extended to non-citizens?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V4.5a Should political rights be extended to non-citizens?	Question not answered	2 4,1%	0 ,0%	5 16,1%	4 21,1%	7 21,9%	2 9,1%	20 13,0%	40 12,7%
	NO. Only the citizens of this country should have political	40 81,6%	8 100,0%	7 22,6%	9 47,4%	2 6,3%	2 9,1%	44 28,6%	112 35,6%
	YES. Non-citizens should also have political rights.	7 14,3%	0 ,0%	19 61,3%	6 31,6%	23 71,9%	18 81,8%	90 58,4%	163 51,7%
Total		49 100,0%	8 100,0%	31 100,0%	19 100,0%	32 100,0%	22 100,0%	154 100,0%	315 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 89,714a (p) ,000 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 7 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,02.							

V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?

Passive voting rights at local level

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at local level	Question not answered	10 38,5%	1 25,0%	11 39,3%	6 42,9%	8 28,6%	6 30,0%	55 42,6%	97 39,0%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	6 23,1%	3 75,0%	2 7,1%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	10 7,8%	22 8,8%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 3,6%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 3,9%	6 2,4%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	2 7,7%	0 ,0%	4 14,3%	6 42,9%	12 42,9%	7 35,0%	31 24,0%	62 24,9%
	Groups not specified	8 30,8%	0 ,0%	10 35,7%	1 7,1%	8 28,6%	7 35,0%	28 21,7%	62 24,9%
Total		26 100,0%	4 100,0%	28 100,0%	14 100,0%	28 100,0%	20 100,0%	129 100,0%	249 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 53,349a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 20 cells (57,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,10.							

Passive voting rights at national level

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at national level	Question not answered	9 60,0%	1 50,0%	11 50,0%	6 42,9%	10 41,7%	9 47,4%	66 68,8%	112 58,3%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	1 6,7%	1 50,0%	2 9,1%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	8 8,3%	13 6,8%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 4,5%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 4,2%	5 2,6%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 35,7%	9 37,5%	6 31,6%	11 11,5%	31 16,1%
	Groups not specified	5 33,3%	0 ,0%	8 36,4%	2 14,3%	5 20,8%	4 21,1%	7 7,3%	31 16,1%
Total	15 100,0%	2 100,0%	22 100,0%	14 100,0%	24 100,0%	19 100,0%	96 100,0%	192 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 50,732a (p) ,001 **							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 26 cells (74,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,05.							

Passive voting rights at European level

		Cat. of Organizations							Total
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at European level	Question not answered	11 61,1%	1 33,3%	11 52,4%	6 42,9%	15 53,6%	8 42,1%	78 69,6%	130 60,5%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	2 11,1%	2 66,7%	3 14,3%	2 14,3%	0 ,0%	1 5,3%	15 13,4%	25 11,6%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 4,8%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,9%	2 ,9%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	4 28,6%	8 28,6%	6 31,6%	11 9,8%	29 13,5%
	Groups not specified	5 27,8%	0 ,0%	6 28,6%	2 14,3%	5 17,9%	4 21,1%	7 6,3%	29 13,5%
Total	18 100,0%	3 100,0%	21 100,0%	14 100,0%	28 100,0%	19 100,0%	112 100,0%	215 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 51,186a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 26 cells (74,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,03.							

Active voting rights at local level

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at local level	Question not answered	10 35,7%	1 33,3%	10 34,5%	6 42,9%	7 24,1%	5 22,7%	47 35,9%	86 33,6%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	7 25,0%	2 66,7%	2 6,9%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	10 7,6%	22 8,6%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 6,9%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 3,8%	7 2,7%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	4 14,3%	0 ,0%	5 17,2%	6 42,9%	14 48,3%	7 31,8%	47 35,9%	83 32,4%
	Groups not specified	7 25,0%	0 ,0%	10 34,5%	1 7,1%	8 27,6%	10 45,5%	22 16,8%	58 22,7%
Total		28 100,0%	3 100,0%	29 100,0%	14 100,0%	29 100,0%	22 100,0%	131 100,0%	256 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,820a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 20 cells (57,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,08.							

Active voting rights at national level

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at national level	Question not answered	9 60,0%	1 50,0%	11 57,9%	6 42,9%	9 39,1%	6 33,3%	67 69,8%	109 58,3%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	1 6,7%	1 50,0%	2 10,5%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	9 9,4%	14 7,5%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 5,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 3,1%	4 2,1%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 35,7%	9 39,1%	6 33,3%	11 11,5%	31 16,6%
	Groups not specified	5 33,3%	0 ,0%	5 26,3%	2 14,3%	5 21,7%	6 33,3%	6 6,3%	29 15,5%
Total	15 100,0%	2 100,0%	19 100,0%	14 100,0%	23 100,0%	18 100,0%	96 100,0%	187 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,684a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 26 cells (74,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,04.							

Active voting rights at European level

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at national level	Question not answered	9 60,0%	1 50,0%	11 57,9%	6 42,9%	9 39,1%	6 33,3%	67 69,8%	109 58,3%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	1 6,7%	1 50,0%	2 10,5%	1 7,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	9 9,4%	14 7,5%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 5,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 3,1%	4 2,1%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 35,7%	9 39,1%	6 33,3%	11 11,5%	31 16,6%
	Groups not specified	5 33,3%	0 ,0%	5 26,3%	2 14,3%	5 21,7%	6 33,3%	6 6,3%	29 15,5%
Total		15 100,0%	2 100,0%	19 100,0%	14 100,0%	23 100,0%	18 100,0%	96 100,0%	187 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 52,684a (p) ,001 ***							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 26 cells (74,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,04.							

They should have no political rights before acquiring the citizenship of this country

		Cat. of Organizations							Total
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: They should have no political rights before acquiring the citizenship of this country	Question not answered	4	0	12	7	13	7	68	111
		12,5%	,0%	57,1%	50,0%	72,2%	58,3%	70,8%	55,5%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	0	1	1	1	0	0	3	6
		,0%	14,3%	4,8%	7,1%	,0%	,0%	3,1%	3,0%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	6	1	0	0	0	0	4	11
		18,8%	14,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	4,2%	5,5%
BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	8	2	4	2	1	0	5	22	
	25,0%	28,6%	19,0%	14,3%	5,6%	,0%	5,2%	11,0%	
Groups not specified	14	3	4	4	4	5	16	50	
	43,8%	42,9%	19,0%	28,6%	22,2%	41,7%	16,7%	25,0%	
Total	32	7	21	14	18	12	96	200	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared	(X ²) 64,151a (p) ,000 ***								
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001	a. 24 cells (68,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,21.								

Other political rights

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Other political rights	Question not answered	9 60,0%	1 50,0%	13 72,2%	9 69,2%	12 66,7%	7 53,8%	75 83,3%	126 74,6%
	ONLY EU-citizens should have:	1 6,7%	1 50,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 2,2%	4 2,4%
	ONLY resident immigrants who are not EU citizens should have	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 1,1%	1 ,6%
	BOTH EU citizens and immigrants who are not EU-citizens shou	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 5,6%	2 15,4%	2 11,1%	2 15,4%	5 5,6%	12 7,1%
	Groups not specified	5 33,3%	0 ,0%	4 22,2%	2 15,4%	4 22,2%	4 30,8%	7 7,8%	26 15,4%
Total		15 100,0%	2 100,0%	18 100,0%	13 100,0%	18 100,0%	13 100,0%	90 100,0%	169 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 39,594a (p) ,024 *							
*<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001		a. 27 cells (77,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,01.							

V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared	
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	12,5%	15,0%	17,6%	4,3%	9,3%	9,4%	(p)	0,278
	(abs)	2	0	5	3	6	1	17	34	(X ²)	7,488a
Question not answered	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,75.										
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	20,0%	30,0%	35,3%	60,9%	10,4%	16,9%	(p)	0,000 ***
	(abs)	2	0	8	6	12	14	19	61	(X ²)	56,560a
No restrictions should apply	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,35.										
	(%)	18,5%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,7%	5,2%	(p)	0,000 ***
No further migrants should be hosted in the continent	(abs)	10	4	0	0	0	0	5	19	(X ²)	60,148a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,42.										
	(%)	46,3%	50,0%	32,5%	15,0%	23,5%	30,4%	44,3%	39,0%	(p)	0,037 *
	(abs)	25	4	13	3	8	7	81	141	(X ²)	13,434a
Labour migrants	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,12.										
	(%)	13,0%	0,0%	32,5%	35,0%	17,6%	21,7%	26,8%	24,0%	(p)	0,101
Spouses and family members of resident migrants (extended family notions)	(abs)	7	0	13	7	6	5	49	87	(X ²)	10,624a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,92.										
	(%)	27,8%	12,5%	35,0%	35,0%	32,4%	34,8%	35,5%	33,4%	(p)	0,832
	(abs)	15	1	14	7	11	8	65	121	(X ²)	2,812a
Refugees and asylum seekers	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,67.										
	(%)	38,9%	12,5%	10,0%	30,0%	20,6%	17,4%	32,2%	28,2%	(p)	0,026 *
	(abs)	21	1	4	6	7	4	59	102	(X ²)	14,379a
Highly educated/qualified people	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,25.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	12,5%	5,0%	0,0%	17,4%	10,9%	9,7%	(p)	0,296
	(abs)	5	0	5	1	0	4	20	35	(X ²)	7,276a
Poor migrants (economic migrants)	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,77.										

	(%)	13,0%	0,0%	7,5%	15,0%	0,0%	8,7%	8,7%	8,6%	(p)	0,381
	(abs)	7	0	3	3	0	2	16	31	(X ²)	6,392a
Migrants with health problems	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.										
	(%)	18,5%	25,0%	2,5%	10,0%	0,0%	13,0%	9,8%	9,9%	(p)	0,044 *
Co-ethnics (e.g., ethnic Germans migrating from Russia to Germany)	(abs)	10	2	1	2	0	3	18	36	(X ²)	12,936a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,80.										
	(%)	25,9%	37,5%	5,0%	10,0%	0,0%	13,0%	11,5%	12,4%	(p)	0,002 **
Culturally / religiously similar migrants	(abs)	14	3	2	2	0	3	21	45	(X ²)	20,778a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,99.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	0,0%	17,4%	6,0%	5,8%	(p)	0,138
Muslim migrants	(abs)	3	0	1	2	0	4	11	21	(X ²)	9,704a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,46.										
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	0,0%	15,0%	0,0%	21,7%	7,1%	6,6%	(p)	0,010 *
Migrants from different regions (Africa, Middle East, South America, Central Asia etc)	(abs)	3	0	0	3	0	5	13	24	(X ²)	16,735a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,53.										
	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	2,9%	8,7%	1,6%	1,9%	(p)	0,277
Illegal migrants	(abs)	0	0	1	0	1	2	3	7	(X ²)	7,496a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,15.										
	(%)	20,4%	25,0%	17,5%	10,0%	20,6%	4,3%	13,7%	15,2%	(p)	0,481
Others	(abs)	11	2	7	2	7	1	25	55	(X ²)	5,505a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,22.										

V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi- squared \$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
Question not answered	362	54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362	(p)	0,351
	(%)	5,6%	12,5%	20,0%	15,0%	23,5%	17,4%	14,8%	14,9%	(X ²)	6,682a
	(abs)	3	1	8	3	8	4	27	54		
a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.											
The government of this country is granting too many asylum applications	36	25,9%	87,5%	0,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	7,1%	9,9%	(p)	0,000
	(%)	25,9%	87,5%	0,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	7,1%	9,9%	(X ²)	81,490a
	(abs)	14	7	0	2	0	0	13	36		
a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,80.											
The government of this country is granting too few asylum applications	67	1,9%	0,0%	32,5%	25,0%	41,2%	56,5%	11,5%	18,5%	(p)	0,000
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	32,5%	25,0%	41,2%	56,5%	11,5%	18,5%	(X ²)	57,121a
	(abs)	1	0	13	5	14	13	21	67		
a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,48.											
Some asylum seeker groups with known inability to integrate/adapt in this country should not be accepted	22	22,2%	0,0%	0,0%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	3,8%	6,1%	(p)	0,000
	(%)	22,2%	0,0%	0,0%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	3,8%	6,1%	(X ²)	32,005a
	(abs)	12	0	0	2	1	0	7	22		
a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.											
Quota refugees should not be accepted if they belong to the problematic migrant populations in this country	22	20,4%	0,0%	5,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,9%	6,1%	(p)	0,000
	(%)	20,4%	0,0%	5,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,9%	6,1%	(X ²)	25,339a
	(abs)	11	0	2	0	0	0	9	22		
a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.											
Other arrangements than individual asylum should be made to help refugees and asylum seekers in regional safe zones close to their home countries	50	33,3%	0,0%	5,0%	20,0%	8,8%	4,3%	12,0%	13,8%	(p)	0,000
	(%)	33,3%	0,0%	5,0%	20,0%	8,8%	4,3%	12,0%	13,8%	(X ²)	24,755a
	(abs)	18	0	2	4	3	1	22	50		
a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,10.											
Other views	164	57,4%	0,0%	50,0%	40,0%	32,4%	26,1%	48,1%	45,3%	(p)	0,010
	(%)	57,4%	0,0%	50,0%	40,0%	32,4%	26,1%	48,1%	45,3%	(X ²)	16,703a
	(abs)	31	0	20	8	11	6	88	164		
a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,62.											

V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared	\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	1,9%	12,5%	15,0%	10,0%	8,8%	4,3%	7,1%	7,5%	(p)	0,351
	(abs)	1	1	6	2	3	1	13	27	(X ²)	6,685a
Question not answered	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,60.										
	(%)	0,0%	12,5%	10,0%	10,0%	0,0%	4,3%	2,7%	3,6%	(p)	0,049 *
	(abs)	0	1	4	2	0	1	5	13	(X ²)	12,658a
The respondent has no information	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,29.										
One common European communication space does NOT exist today	(%)	53,7%	62,5%	20,0%	35,0%	41,2%	39,1%	38,8%	39,5%	(p)	0,044 *
	(abs)	29	5	8	7	14	9	71	143	(X ²)	12,943a
There is a common European communication space of experts (e.g. academia, research institutions, universities)	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,16.										
	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	17,5%	5,0%	11,8%	26,1%	16,9%	16,3%	(p)	0,440
	(abs)	10	0	7	1	4	6	31	59	(X ²)	5,850a
There is a common European communication space of political parties and leaders	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,30.										
	(%)	24,1%	12,5%	30,0%	10,0%	23,5%	17,4%	27,3%	24,9%	(p)	0,555
	(abs)	13	1	12	2	8	4	50	90	(X ²)	4,915a
There is a common European communication space of social movements (e.g ATTAC, social fora, SocialPlatform, ENAR, etc)	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,99.										
	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	22,5%	15,0%	23,5%	39,1%	12,0%	15,7%	(p)	0,010 *
	(abs)	6	0	9	3	8	9	22	57	(X ²)	16,699a
There is a common European communication space of European media	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,26.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	12,5%	10,0%	11,8%	4,3%	7,7%	8,6%	(p)	0,835
	(abs)	5	0	5	2	4	1	14	31	(X ²)	2,789a
There is a common European communication space of European citizens and residents	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,69.										
	(%)	9,3%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	5,9%	8,7%	4,9%	5,8%	(p)	0,713
	(abs)	5	0	1	2	2	2	9	21	(X ²)	3,732a
Other common European communication spaces	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,46.										
	(%)	22,2%	0,0%	12,5%	25,0%	23,5%	13,0%	19,7%	19,1%	(p)	0,566
	(abs)	12	0	5	5	8	3	36	69	(X ²)	4,831a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,52.										

V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson	Chi-squared
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		\$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
	(%)	16,7%	12,5%	40,0%	15,0%	38,2%	30,4%	37,2%	32,3%	(p)	0,031 *
	(abs)	9	1	16	3	13	7	68	117	(X ²)	13,847a
Question not answered	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,59.										
	(%)	27,8%	75,0%	15,0%	25,0%	29,4%	34,8%	18,6%	23,2%	(p)	0,004 **
An elite public sphere excluding normal citizens	(abs)	15	6	6	5	10	8	34	84	(X ²)	18,887a
	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,86.										
A public sphere of the representatives of the Member States, excluding representatives of minorities	(%)	0,0%	0,0%	7,5%	0,0%	14,7%	4,3%	6,6%	5,8%	(p)	0,106
	(abs)	0	0	3	0	5	1	12	21	(X ²)	10,475a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,46.										
A public sphere of member states' governments, excluding the national and regional level political opposition	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	2,9%	0,0%	3,3%	2,8%	(p)	0,935
	(abs)	2	0	1	0	1	0	6	10	(X ²)	1,823a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,22.										
A public sphere of the richer ones, excluding socially disadvantaged people	(%)	13,0%	12,5%	7,5%	20,0%	2,9%	8,7%	4,4%	7,2%	(p)	0,084 \$
	(abs)	7	1	3	4	1	2	8	26	(X ²)	11,146a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,57.										
A public sphere of firms and corporations, excluding employees and workers	(%)	3,7%	25,0%	5,0%	5,0%	2,9%	0,0%	2,2%	3,3%	(p)	0,032 *
	(abs)	2	2	2	1	1	0	4	12	(X ²)	13,826a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.										
A male public sphere, excluding women	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	5,9%	0,0%	3,8%	3,3%	(p)	0,845
	(abs)	2	0	1	0	2	0	7	12	(X ²)	2,705a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.										
	(%)	16,7%	0,0%	12,5%	10,0%	20,6%	4,3%	16,4%	14,9%	(p)	0,506
	(abs)	9	0	5	2	7	1	30	54	(X ²)	5,298a
Other forms of exclusion	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,19.										

V5.3a Do you think there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication and collaboration?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Mainstream political party
V5.3a Do you think there should be more possibilities for trans-European communication and collaboration?	Question not answered	6 12,5%	5 62,5%	18 48,6%	3 17,6%	5 15,6%	5 29,4%	49 30,6%	91 28,5%
	YES	24 50,0%	3 37,5%	15 40,5%	12 70,6%	23 71,9%	10 58,8%	97 60,6%	184 57,7%
	NO	18 37,5%	0 ,0%	4 10,8%	2 11,8%	4 12,5%	2 11,8%	14 8,8%	44 13,8%
	Total	48 100,0%	8 100,0%	37 100,0%	17 100,0%	32 100,0%	17 100,0%	160 100,0%	319 100,0%
Pearson Chi-squared		(X ²) 44,419a (p) ,000 ***							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001		a. 8 cells (38,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,10.							

V5.3b How should trans-European communication be organized?

		Cat. of Organizations						Total	
		State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist		Main stream political party
V5.3b How should trans-European communication be organized?	Question not answered	17 38,6%	7 87,5%	28 73,7%	6 33,3%	13 43,3%	13 61,9%	89 56,7%	173 54,7%
	The European Public Sphere should be organized at TWO separa	2 4,5%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 3,3%	0 ,0%	6 3,8%	9 2,8%
	The European Public Sphere should be organized at SEVERAL se	4 9,1%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	3 10,0%	0 ,0%	1 ,6%	8 2,5%
	The European Public Sphere should be organized at SEVERAL se	2 4,5%	0 ,0%	1 2,6%	1 5,6%	3 10,0%	1 4,8%	12 7,6%	20 6,3%
	The European Public Sphere should be organized at multiple 1	8 18,2%	0 ,0%	3 7,9%	4 22,2%	3 10,0%	1 4,8%	20 12,7%	39 12,3%
	The European Public Sphere should be organized as a single,	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 5,3%	3 16,7%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	7 4,5%	12 3,8%
	Other	2 4,5%	1 12,5%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	5 16,7%	0 ,0%	4 2,5%	12 3,8%
	Other, please describe	9 20,5%	0 ,0%	4 10,5%	4 22,2%	2 6,7%	6 28,6%	18 11,5%	43 13,6%
Total	44 100,0%	8 100,0%	38 100,0%	18 100,0%	30 100,0%	21 100,0%	157 100,0%	316 100,0%	
Pearson Chi-squared		(χ^2) 77,998a (p) ,001 *** a. 42 cells (75,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.							
* <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001									

V5.4a Why should the trans-European communication be organized in the way you mentioned

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi- squared \$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		**
	(%)	37,0%	75,0%	60,0%	15,0%	61,8%	69,6%	47,0%	48,6%	(p)	0,001 *
	(abs)	20	6	24	3	21	16	86	176	(X ²)	22,836a
Question not answered	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,89.										
Because it would give better opportunities for the empowerment of groups, such as ethno-national minorities, gender groups, transnational groups, or individual citizen	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	7,5%	20,0%	23,5%	4,3%	10,9%	11,6%	(p)	0,170
	(abs)	6	0	3	4	8	1	20	42	(X ²)	9,071a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,93.										
Because it would give better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system of the EU	(%)	14,8%	12,5%	17,5%	40,0%	17,6%	8,7%	12,6%	15,2%	(p)	0,070 \$
	(abs)	8	1	7	8	6	2	23	55	(X ²)	11,659a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,22.										
	(%)	22,2%	12,5%	5,0%	30,0%	5,9%	13,0%	13,1%	13,8%	(p)	0,059 \$
	(abs)	12	1	2	6	2	3	24	50	(X ²)	12,114a
Other	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,10.										

V5.10 Which actors on all levels do you want to address with your activities

	N	State nationalis t	Peoples nationalis t	Regiona l national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigran t	Pro- immigran t / Anti- racist	Main stream political party	Total		Pearson Chi- squared \$<0.1; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362		**
	(%)	18,5%	0,0%	50,0%	5,0%	32,4%	34,8%	40,4%	34,3%	(p)	0,000 *
	(abs)	10	0	20	1	11	8	74	124	(X ²)	25,273a
Question not answered	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,74.										
	(%)	7,4%	25,0%	12,5%	20,0%	14,7%	13,0%	9,8%	11,3%	(p)	0,579
	(abs)	4	2	5	4	5	3	18	41	(X ²)	4,727a
European Commission	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,91.										
	(%)	1,9%	12,5%	5,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,9%	4,1%	(p)	0,353
	(abs)	1	1	2	2	0	0	9	15	(X ²)	6,662a
Council of the European Union	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,33.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	2,5%	15,0%	0,0%	4,3%	6,6%	5,0%	(p)	0,169
	(abs)	1	0	1	3	0	1	12	18	(X ²)	9,076a
European Council	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,40.										
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	2,5%	10,0%	2,9%	0,0%	3,8%	3,3%	(p)	0,615
	(abs)	1	0	1	2	1	0	7	12	(X ²)	4,459a
Presidency of the Council	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.										
	(%)	16,7%	87,5%	20,0%	35,0%	11,8%	4,3%	19,7%	19,9%	(p)	0,000 **
	(abs)	9	7	8	7	4	1	36	72	(X ²)	31,070a *
European Parliament	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,59.										
European Court of Justice	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	5,9%	0,0%	4,9%	5,0%	(p)	0,747
	(abs)	2	0	3	2	2	0	9	18	(X ²)	3,478a

	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,40.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1,6%	2,2%	(p)	0,183	
	(abs)	1	0	2	2	0	0	3	8	(X ²)	8,834a	
European Court of Auditors	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,18.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	5,0%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,2%	2,5%	(p)	0,276	
	(abs)	1	0	2	2	0	0	4	9	(X ²)	7,515a	
European Ombudsman	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.											*
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	5,0%	15,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,2%	2,8%	(p)	0,028	
	(abs)	1	0	2	3	0	0	4	10	(X ²)	14,136a	
European Economic and Social Committee	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,22.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	7,5%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,7%	3,0%	(p)	0,214	
	(abs)	1	0	3	2	0	0	5	11	(X ²)	8,345a	
European Committee of the Regions, Agencies	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,24.											
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	5,0%	15,0%	2,9%	0,0%	2,2%	3,6%	(p)	0,102	
	(abs)	3	0	2	3	1	0	4	13	(X ²)	10,590a	
Council of Europe	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,29.											\$
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	7,5%	15,0%	8,8%	0,0%	2,2%	4,1%	(p)	0,060	
	(abs)	2	0	3	3	3	0	4	15	(X ²)	12,076a	
European Court of Human Rights	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,33.											\$
	(%)	31,5%	25,0%	20,0%	35,0%	29,4%	8,7%	17,5%	21,5%	(p)	0,099	
	(abs)	17	2	8	7	10	2	32	78	(X ²)	10,683a	
Citizens in general	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,72.											**
	(%)	3,7%	12,5%	7,5%	35,0%	8,8%	0,0%	1,1%	5,0%	(p)	0,000	*
	(abs)	2	1	3	7	3	0	2	18	(X ²)	47,948a	
Ethnic minority organizations/networks	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,40.											

	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	2,5%	5,0%	11,8%	0,0%	1,1%	3,0%	(p)	0,035	*
	(abs)	3	0	1	1	4	0	2	11	(X ²)	13,571a	
Religious organizations/networks	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,24.											
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	7,5%	0,0%	5,9%	0,0%	3,3%	3,6%	(p)	0,645	
	(abs)	2	0	3	0	2	0	6	13	(X ²)	4,234a	
Gender organizations/networks	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,29.											
	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	10,0%	5,0%	8,8%	4,3%	6,0%	6,4%	(p)	0,911	
	(abs)	3	0	4	1	3	1	11	23	(X ²)	2,096a	
Other organizations/networks	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,51.											
	(%)	1,9%	0,0%	2,5%	0,0%	0,0%	4,3%	3,8%	2,8%	(p)	0,818	
	(abs)	1	0	1	0	0	1	7	10	(X ²)	2,923a	
Lobbies	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,22.											
	(%)	20,4%	37,5%	15,0%	30,0%	32,4%	4,3%	14,8%	18,0%	(p)	0,037	*
	(abs)	11	3	6	6	11	1	27	65	(X ²)	13,443a	
Political parties and/ or party families	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,44.											
	(%)	3,7%	0,0%	12,5%	20,0%	14,7%	13,0%	4,9%	7,7%	(p)	0,049	*
	(abs)	2	0	5	4	5	3	9	28	(X ²)	12,647a	
Certain groups- or communities	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.											
	(%)	20,4%	12,5%	12,5%	30,0%	41,2%	39,1%	10,4%	18,0%	(p)	0,000	**
	(abs)	11	1	5	6	14	9	19	65	(X ²)	29,722a	*
Other	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,44.											

V5.17 Which (European, national, regional) media are of relevance for your work

	N	State nationalist	Peoples nationalist	Regional national minority	Jews & Roma	Immigrant	Pro-immigrant / Anti-racist	Main stream political party	Total	Pearson Chi-squared	
		54	8	40	20	34	23	183	362	**<0.01; ***<0.001	
	(%)	20,4%	12,5%	57,5%	5,0%	52,9%	39,1%	41,0%	38,1%	(p)	0,000 ***
	(abs)	11	1	23	1	18	9	75	138	(X ²)	28,920a
Question not answered	a. 2 cells (14,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,05.										
There is NOT any media (European, national, regional) relevance of our work	(%)	1,9%	25,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,9%	0,0%	2,7%	2,5%	(p)	0,004 **
	(abs)	1	2	0	0	1	0	5	9	(X ²)	19,006a
	a. 7 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,20.										
National broadcasting	(%)	37,0%	37,5%	22,5%	65,0%	17,6%	39,1%	26,8%	30,1%	(p)	0,005 **
	(abs)	20	3	9	13	6	9	49	109	(X ²)	18,474a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,41.										
National radio	(%)	24,1%	37,5%	17,5%	60,0%	17,6%	30,4%	24,6%	25,7%	(p)	0,014 *
	(abs)	13	3	7	12	6	7	45	93	(X ²)	15,936a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,06.										
National print media	(%)	42,6%	62,5%	22,5%	60,0%	29,4%	39,1%	26,8%	32,3%	(p)	0,006 **
	(abs)	23	5	9	12	10	9	49	117	(X ²)	17,895a
	a. 1 cells (7,1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,59.										
European media	(%)	11,1%	0,0%	10,0%	15,0%	5,9%	4,3%	11,5%	10,2%	(p)	0,766
	(abs)	6	0	4	3	2	1	21	37	(X ²)	3,333a
	a. 5 cells (35,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,82.										
International media	(%)	5,6%	0,0%	7,5%	15,0%	2,9%	4,3%	9,3%	7,7%	(p)	0,596
	(abs)	3	0	3	3	1	1	17	28	(X ²)	4,597a
	a. 6 cells (42,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,62.										
Internet sites and debates	(%)	35,2%	12,5%	7,5%	55,0%	23,5%	13,0%	16,4%	20,7%	(p)	0,000 ***
	(abs)	19	1	3	11	8	3	30	75	(X ²)	28,846a
	a. 3 cells (21,4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,66.										
Others	(%)	13,0%	12,5%	17,5%	40,0%	14,7%	17,4%	7,7%	12,7%	(p)	0,004 **
	(abs)	7	1	7	8	5	4	14	46	(X ²)	19,059a
	a. 4 cells (28,6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,02.										

References

- Bärenreuter, C., Brüll, C., Mokre, M., & Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2009). An Overview of Research on the European Public Sphere (updated version). *EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER SERIES, Online Working Paper No. 03, 2009*.
- Boos, V. (2005). *Bypassing regional identity :a study of identifications and interests in Scottish and Catalan press commentary on European integration, 1973-1993*. (EUI PhD theses series) Florence: European University Institute.
- Coen, D. (2007). Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14, 333 - 345.
- De Vreese, C. H. (2007). The EU as a public sphere. Retrieved 28-01-2010, from <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-3>.
- Elias, A. (2009). From Protest to Power: Mapping the Ideological Evolution of *Plaid Cymru* and the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19, 533 - 557.
- Esmark, A. (2007). The Europeanization of Public Spheres. In C. Vreese & H. Schmitt (Eds.), *A European Public Sphere: How much of it do we have and how much do we need?* (pp. 329-362). (Connex Report Series, Volume 2), Mannheim: CONNEX.
- Fischer, F. (1995). *Evaluating Public Policy*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Greenwood, J. (2003). *Interest Representation in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hepburn, E. (2007). *The New Politics of Autonomy. Territorial Strategies and the uses of European Integration by Political Parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia 1979-2005*. (EUI PhD theses series) Florence: European University Institute.
- (2009). Introduction: Re-conceptualizing Sub-state Mobilization. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19, 477 - 499.
- Jolly, S. K. (2007). The Europhile Fringe?: Regionalist Party Support for European Integration. *European Union Politics*, 8, 109-130.
- Keating, M., & Hooghe, L. (2001). By-passing the nation state? - regions and the EU policy process. In J. J. Richardson (Ed.), *European Union: power and policy-making* (pp. 239-255). London Routledge.
- Koopmans, R. (2007). Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 183-210.
- Kutay, A. (2008). Legitimising the Postnational European Polity: Re-visiting the Contract Theory and Governmentality. *EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER SERIES, Online Working Paper No. 11, 2008*.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.