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Assessing Transnational Spaces

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Assessing Transnational Spaces

Karin Creutz-Kämppi, Peter Holley, Peter A. Kraus, Petri Laine, Johanna Warius

1 Introduction

The point of departure of this report is the assumption that the importance of social spaces defined by patterns of mobility which transcend the national has been growing over the last decades, as many recent studies of migration and transnationalism show. In addition, it can be argued that such patterns have attained particular importance in the European Union (EU): for example, the mobility of labour within the Union should, in principle, not be affected by the existence of national borders anymore. The transnational dimension of political processes cuts across both entrenched national spaces and the ‘official’ institutional realm of the EU, and there are manifold intersections of transnationalism and Europeanization. For primarily pragmatic reasons, this study operates with the following differentiation: transnational spaces are seen as having a variable and institutionally loose format, be it within or beyond the EU, while Eurospaces are defined as spaces that have a direct and clear-cut institutional connection with the EU.

Our report is an attempt at mapping transnational spaces on the basis of data collected for the project EUROSPHERE – the information provided by the interviewed social and political actors. The study relates perceptions of diversity, migration and the European public sphere to actors and delineates common discursive patterns and networks among types of actors and across countries. In addition, we detect and interpret salient features of the mapped transnational spaces. In this context, we start from a general definition of transnational relations, which are conceived of as entailing sustained interactions between participants across national borders. In much of the recent literature dealing with transnationalism, the use of the term transnational is closely linked to the dynamics of migration, and in consequence concentrates on the movement of people and the ties that migrants create between countries of origin and countries of residence. In view of the characteristics of our empirical material, and the salience of the European dimension in this material, we have tried to anticipate some more peculiar manifestations of the transnational phenomenon in our approach. Thus, we have aimed at capturing specific forms of transnationalism that emerge in the data, for instance

with regard to the situation of external minorities and the links between these groups and their kin-states in Central Eastern Europe.


2 Transnational Spaces: A Conceptual Approximation

Transnationalism only became part of the popular lexicon of the social sciences towards the end of the 20th century.¹ In the 1970s, political scientists focusing on world politics began to emphasize the growing importance of intersocietal connections and the role of non-state actors in this realm (Nye and Keohane 1971). Two decades later, the concept of the *transnational* also gained prominence in the field of migration studies, where it is now mainly applied to grasp the properties of the emerging social spaces constituted by the manifold relations and interactions that cut across the borders of nation-states (Basch *et al.* 1994; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Kivisto 2001; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Vertovec 1999, 2009).

In the context of our research, the most appropriate conceptualization of the *transnational* captures not only relations and interactions between non-state entities, but also connections which may involve governmental actors. In this sense, we lean on the definition put forward by Alejandro Portes (1999: 464), who defines transnational interactions “as those that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants.” The participants engaged in transnational activities may be “relatively powerful actors, such as representatives of national governments and multinational corporations or [...] more modest individuals, such as immigrants.” (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, our report conceives of transnational interactions as sustained transborder exchanges amongst various types of actors. Although transnational activities may involve governmental entities, they can be deemed as transnational only when they include the participation of actors which are not representatives of states. Such actors can be individuals or collectives of them, for example in forms of social movement organizations. As this work is part of a wider series of reports, one of which also involves the analysis of Europeanizing spaces (EUROSPHERE Work Package 6.4), it excludes from the analysis all articulations of interactions that are explicitly connected to the political institutions of the European Union

¹ However, we note that the first use of the term emerged in the United States in the early 20th century in an influential essay entitled “Trans-National America” by the writer and intellectual Randolph Bourne. This essay sought to critique the perceived American ‘melting-pot’, which “instead of washing out the memories of Europe, made them intensely real. Just as these clusters [of society] became more and more objectively American, did they become more and more German or Scandinavian or Polish” (Bourne 1994 [1916]: 304).

(EU).² Equally, our study does not take into account articulations of intergovernmental relations (between State₁ and State₂), interactions in the supranational institutional setting of the EU, or multinational activities (*cf.* **FIGURE 1**).



3 Methodology

This study is based on an analysis of EUROSPHERE country reports, which were composed between 2008 and 2009. These reports were considered appropriate for assessing the breadth of the discussions on transnational interactions, as they provide an insight to the information accumulated from the participant countries of this project. Although there are some

² For example, networking through European Parliament group affiliations or a communication space limited to the institutions of the EU.

differences in the manner these reports were compiled, in most cases they still provide a sufficient amount of comparability for this research. At the same time, it has to be noted that this report does not present a systematic comparison of actors or countries.³ Instead, it seeks to illustrate the sizeable variation in which transnational interactions are discussed among the respondents in the context of four central themes of the EUROSPHERE project (i.e. diversity, migration, networks, and the European Public Sphere). In sum, our sample material consists of twelve EUROSPHERE Country Reports that were written to present an overview of the expansive qualitative interview data.⁴ Our material therefore consists of reports generated by the Austrian, Bulgarian, Danish, Finnish, German, Hungarian, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Spanish, Turkish, and British EUROSPHERE Work Package 3 teams.^{5,6}

We approach the selected material by focusing on the substantial content of interactions, which are delineated as *cultural*, *economic*, *political* and *social* dimensions. The aforementioned EUROSPHERE Country Reports were analyzed by *close reading*⁷ of the texts and systematic coding of each articulation of the transnational. This approach was grounded in the above dimensions in order to provide an analytic structure to our work. However, the cultural, economic, political and social dimensions of articulations of transnational interactions are not reflected upon further within discussion of each theme addressed in the following sections. Each articulation within the EUROSPHERE Country Reports analyzed has

³ No systematic analysis of the selected EUROSPHERE actors is available due to differences in the content and structure of the various reports included in our sample.

⁴ The interview transcripts and/or summary codings were not deemed appropriate for analysis as the research team is not competent in all of the languages in which the interviews were conducted, and at the time the time of analysis summary coding of each interview in English was not available to the research team. In addition, our choice of analytical approach has been conditioned by time constraints and a voluminous amount of EUROSPHERE material.

⁵ When developing an overview of the articulations of transnational interactions, the cases of Belgium, France, the Czech Republic and Estonia were discarded from this analysis for the following reasons: In the Belgian case, the selection of respondents was considered incompatible with the EUROSPHERE selection criteria, because the interviewees were too few in number and only represented francophone Belgium. The Belgian report was thus seen as delivering only a partial view to the possible array of opinions among Belgian elite. The French country report was discarded for similar reasons – the selection of interviewees from political parties and NGOs was considered as biased towards Corsican regional entities. The emphasis on a particular region, in other words, did not correspond to the foci of other reports. In the case of the Czech and Estonia reports the selection of respondents was perceived as appropriate, but scant attention paid the interview data made the using them problematic. In contrast to the above excluded cases, the analyzed Country Reports follow a structure whereby actor opinions are subdivided according to the organizations represented by the interviewed respondents, thus allowing the reader to assess the opinions of distinct units of observation independently.

⁶ Confer: Álvarez *et al.* (2010); van de Beek *et al.* (2010); Bozoki *et al.* (2010); Kraus *et al.* (2010); Küçük *et al.* (2010); Mackevics (2010); Mokre (2010); Sciortino (2010); Sicakkan (2010); Siim *et al.* (2010); Wahl-Jorgensen *et al.* (2010); Zografova *et al.* (2010).

⁷ An approach akin to a loose interpretation of content analysis guided by specific themes.

been coded into a spreadsheet and checked by another member of the research team.⁸ In order to ensure that we have approached our material in a coherent manner, peer validation of each coding has been carried out. Whilst this has been a time consuming process, it ensures a methodological consistency to this report.

With this focus in mind, specific features and manifestations of transnational spaces were analyzed. As an analytical tool, this approach: (i) connects the empirical material to a theoretical framework; (ii) enables us to include all observations in the material and distinguish them from other EUROSPHERE Work Package 6 task groups foci; (iii) anticipates the complexity of the research data and overcomes problems associated with pre-established categorizations that are based on specific phenomena; and (iv) comes to terms with the problems that result from the fact that some occurrences of such categories relate directly to the EUROSPHERE elite interview questionnaire.

In an effort to delineate the transnational features of the analyzed themes, the four dimensions on which we base our analysis can be defined in the following way: the cultural dimension denotes interactions that entail sharing of, for example, knowledge, expertise and information; the economic dimension refers to the exchange of resources, money and goods; the political dimension relates to organizational networks and institutional ties of individuals to multiple states, for example in terms of dual citizenship and political rights; finally, the social dimension indicates issues such as belonging, group consciousness and valued relations that cut across national borders. Three of the analyzed themes are considered to be discursive; they aim at capturing articulations of transnational interactions on the central themes of EUROSPHERE; i.e., diversity, migration and the public sphere. The fourth theme, networks, grasps the concrete forms the actors articulate as their transnational interactions, for example, their cooperative networks.

By comparing and interpreting the key features of transnational interactions we aim to delineate the general perceptions on the analyzed themes. In this study, *diversity* covers the border crossing aspects of minority relations which link communities together. Thus the discussion on *diversity* is restricted to articulations which entail sustained trans-border connections between members of national minorities and migrant communities, as well as their relations to kin-states and countries of origin. With regard to *migration*, the discussion focuses on articulations that are connected to forms of migration, ways to manage it and to the

⁸ The research team consisted of three researchers (Karin Creutz-Kämppi, Peter Holley and Petri Laine) and one research assistant (Johanna Warius). Due to the strong qualitative methodological competencies of the above members of the team, all members took part in coding reports and validating one another's analyses.

outcomes that international migration may have. As such, the section on migration focuses on describing phenomena which are more dynamic and process orientated, whereas the section on diversity describes more stable aspects.

The discussion on the transnational networking of the EUROSPHERE actors concentrates on the articulation of sustained cooperations/collaborations which cut across national borders. The transnational forms of *networks* of organizations are further delineated by the context in which the networking takes place. As observed above, the network section of this report does not consider those forms of cooperation which have a direct institutional connection to the EU. In practice this means that cooperation in the context of European Parliament group affiliations are not covered in the discussion on transnational networks. The transnational aspects of the *public sphere* are delineated from communication within networks; in accordance with our approach, special emphasis is placed on sub-spheres with cross-border features. On the level of media discourses, a distinction is made between simultaneous media events and sustained communication flows across borders.

4 Diversity

In the context of transnational interactions, diversity denotes sustained trans-border connections between members of national minorities and migrant communities, as well as their relations to kin-states and countries of origin. Diversity, as conceptualized in this report, therefore denotes more structural and stable communities and issues than the notion of migration. As described in the theoretical and methodological sections of this report, the information presented here is based on respondents' accounts on such connections, which include both concrete interactions as well as connections of a more symbolic nature. The first part of the discussion on diversity focuses on explaining the general trends in the data with regard to such linkages. The latter parts of the text describe the particularities of the Hungarian and the Bulgarian cases, where the bulk of the discussion on diversity takes place.⁹

4.1 General Discussion

In general, references to the transnational facets of diversity in the material are occasional. Excluding the consistent and frequent discussions on the Bulgarian and Hungarian communities outside their respective borders, primarily opinions regarding interferences of

⁹ Discussion on transnational aspects of diversity can be found, first and foremost, in Hungary and Bulgaria. In addition, occasional codes exist in the cases of Finland, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey and the UK. See appendix.

sending countries to the affairs of their expatriate communities have emerged in the discussion on transnational aspects of diversity. In the context of such discussions, interviewees from the Netherlands and Austria have voiced opinions regarding attempts of kin-states to influence the affairs of their current or former citizens who reside in other countries. For example, an Austrian respondent perceives that the rights of immigrant minorities to establish their own institutions should be dependent on the length of stay in the country, in order to assure that such institutions are not used to propagate the interests of their countries of origin.¹⁰ An interviewee from the Austrian NGO *Moschee Ade* explicitly mentions the Turkish minorities, and stresses that they ought to be “considered as a special case”, because, according to the interviewee’s account, they are well organized, governed by Turkey and generate pressure on European governments.¹¹ A further reference to the issues surrounding relations between Turkish emigrants and their kin-state was made in the context of dual citizenship, where it was seen as problematic that the members of the Turkish immigrant communities are obliged to attend military service in their country of citizenship.¹² An alternative stance to the abovementioned critical approaches was voiced by a respondent from the British Conservative party, who saw immigrant communities, which are part of larger diasporas, as beneficial to the society rather than problematic.¹³ In contrast to the opinions above, which suggest challenges for states’ control over a specific territory and its residents, remaining comments regarding the transnational aspects of diversity in the material are references to communities that stretch across state borders, usually in contexts where other issues are discussed.¹⁴ To exemplify, an Italian NGO representative suggested that “it would be interesting and stimulating” for the Roma, as a large European stateless minority, whose culture stretches across state borders, to make use of European citizenship.¹⁵ In a similar manner, a representative of a Sámi NGO is reported to have stated that s/he wishes that citizenship would not only be tied to a nation-state, “but [also] to a possible transnational community”.¹⁶

¹⁰ Austrian League for Human Rights, *Österreichische Liga der Menschenrechte* (Mokre 2010: 8).

¹¹ *Moschee Ade* (Mokre 2010: 39).

¹² People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands), *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD (van de Beek et al. 2010: 76).

¹³ British Conservative Party (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2010: 10).

¹⁴ For examples see: Dutch GreenLeft, *GroenLinks* (van de Beek et al. 2010: 67); Turkish Justice and Development Party, AKP (Küçük 2010: 11).

¹⁵ Cultural and Recreational Italian Association, *Associazione ARCI* (Sciortino 2010: 58–59).

¹⁶ Sámi Association of Finland, SAF (Kraus et al. 2010: 71).

4.2 The Particularities of Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches to Diversity

As stated above, the bulk of the discussion on transnational aspects of diversity takes place among interviewees from Bulgaria and Hungary, where the discussion revolves around co-ethnics outside the borders of the countries in question. Although discussion in this context is abundant, it is relatively uniform. In both cases, the discussion consists of references to co-ethnics as a group of immigrants which should be let into the country, along with opinions according to which ethnicity, as well as religious and cultural similarity, should be regarded as conditions for citizenship. Whereas among the Western European respondents¹⁷ 3.3%¹⁸ⁱ of the interviewees have mentioned co-ethnics and 6.9% culturally and religiously similar groups as immigrants who should be admitted into the country, the corresponding figures among Bulgarian and Hungarian respondents are significantly higher. Taken together, 44.1% of the Bulgarian and Hungarian respondents have mentioned co-ethnics and 32.4% culturally and religiously similar groups as immigrant collectivities who should be let into the country. With regard to conditioning citizenship on the basis of ethnicity, the differences persist. Among those Bulgarian and Hungarian elite interviewees who thought that state discretion to grant citizenship should be dependent on fulfilment of certain criteria, 62.5% considered that it should be easier for co-ethnics to acquire citizenship, whereas only 3.2% of the Western European respondents mentioned such preferential treatment. With regard to the exceptions on the basis of cultural and religious similarity, 15.4% of the Bulgarian and Hungarian respondents have supported such conditions, while 6.7% of the Western European respondents thought the same. When a justification is given for easing requirements for co-ethnics and culturally and religiously similar, it is reported to be based on notions such as historical ties and obligations.¹⁹ In addition, and in the Hungarian case in particular, the

¹⁷ Western Europe comprises respondents from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK. It should be noted, however, that the samples include small proportions of representatives of minorities and thus the notion of co-ethnicity should not necessarily be equated with that of the titular nations.

¹⁸ Unless stated otherwise, the figures presented in this report are calculated based on the number of respondents, which either have been coded as having an opinion on the matter or which have been coded as having not answered the question. Thereby respondents who have not voiced any opinion on a given question, or who have not been coded as having not answered the question, were excluded from the analysis.

¹⁹ For examples see: *Dneven Trud* Newspaper (Zografova et al. 2010: 42); *Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma*, MCF (Bozoki et al. 2010: 60); Institute for World Economics, IWE (Bozoki et al. 2010: 72); Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, AFCI (Kraus et al. 2010: 70); *Bund der Vertriebenen*, BdV (Mackevics 2010: 40); ABC (Álvarez et al. 2010: 54).

discussion on co-ethnics beyond the borders involves also favourable opinions regarding dual citizenship.²⁰

The consistency in the discussion among Bulgarian and Hungarian respondents can be seen as indicative of a distinctive social constellation, which cuts across state boundaries, and support for institutionalized linkages between co-ethnics and their kin-state. Establishment of such institutionalized relations between external minorities and kin-states can be deemed, at least to some extent, as a regional tendency, which according to Brigid Fowler (2002: 22-24) “should [...] be seen as part of the process of self-redefinition in which the Central and East European states are engaged following the collapse of the communist system.” The correspondence between the two cases could therefore be explained with the significant number of co-ethnics that both of the countries have outside their borders and the role that they play in “the effort to make the Central and East European states ‘of and for’ particular nations” (*ibid.*: 24).²¹ While in the case of Bulgaria, these external national communities are a result of the large scale emigration which took place after the transition of 1989,²² in the context of Hungary, the external populations are rather based on the movement of borders during the 20th century.²³ Like in the case of Hungarian diaspora (Tóth 2002), the statistics on Bulgarian expatriates are fairly imprecise, based on estimations and on various sources (Gächter 2002: 5-6; Markova 2010: 24; Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2008: 5). However, there are certain documented trends in migration from Bulgaria as well as sufficient

²⁰ For examples see: FIDESZ (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 50); *Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma*, MCF (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 60); Institute for World Economics, IWE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 70–71). See also: Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 28–29).

²¹ It should be noted, however, that at least in terms of conceptions of citizenship and legal arrangements, which provide co-ethnics preferential treatment, the particularity of the Central Eastern European states is contested (See for example Bauböck and Liebich 2010).

²² In 2008, the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy estimated the numbers of Bulgarian expatriates as follows: Germany over 50 000; Austria approximately 25 000; the Czech Republic about 10 000; Italy approximately 50 000; Slovakia about 3 000; Hungary approximately 5 000; Belgium approximately 4 000; Greece approximately 110 000; the UK approximately 60 000; Sweden about 2 000; France over 15 000; Portugal about 10 000; Spain over 120 000. The United States of America around 200 000; Canada approximately 45 000; the Republic of South Africa between 15 000 and 20 000; Australia between 15 000 and 20 000. In addition, significant historical communities of ethnic Bulgarians exist in Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine. (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2008: 5-7) According to Markova (2010: 24, 37) there are approximately 4 million Bulgarians in total who reside outside the borders of Bulgaria, including approximately 700 000 Bulgarian Turks in Turkey.

²³ The discourse on Hungarian diaspora suggests that the figure of Hungarians living within Hungary is ten million and five million outside Hungarian borders. According to the censuses in the neighbouring states where Hungarian minorities reside, the numbers seems to be lower. According to the 1991 census of Austria, 33 459 individuals claimed to use Hungarian as first language. In Croatia, the census of 1991 recorded 22 355 individuals who declared themselves as ethnic Hungarians. In Slovenia the number was 8 503 and in Vojvodina 340 946. In Ukraine the number of Hungarians was according to the 1989 census 155 177. In 1991, the census of Slovakia documented 556 447 ethnic Hungarians and in 1992 the census in Romania 1 624 142. The total number of Hungarians in the neighbouring countries is therefore approximately 2 741 000. In Western Europe, the number of Hungarians is believed to be around 250 000 (Puskás 2009: 81-88; Tóth 2002).

contextual information regarding the relations between Hungarian minorities and their kin-state, which can cast light on the reasons for the similarity in the discussion among the interviewees from the two countries.

Prior to 1989, people emigrated from Bulgaria primarily for political reasons. In addition, the bulk of emigration movements during the Communist era and immediately afterwards had a pronounced ethnic character, as it involved the Bulgarian Turks, whose out-migration peaked between the spring and summer of 1989, when approximately 220 000 persons left the country mainly for Turkey. More than a third returned after the ban on Turkish names was lifted in December 1989; however, the emigration of Bulgarian Turks has persisted. Additionally, the volatile economic situation and low living standards throughout the 1990s have constituted a significant ‘push’ factor, which has encouraged emigration mainly to Western Europe, North America and to the neighbouring countries of Turkey and Greece. Despite the declining numbers of emigrating Bulgarian citizens after the 1990s and the increased importance of temporary and seasonal migration, the stock of emigrants as a percentage of the population according to the World Bank (2008) statistics remains at approximately 12% and Bulgaria was fourth most significant country of origin for migrants in the EU in 2006 (Ilchev 2000: 244-246; Markova 2010: 2-12; Rangelova and Vladimirova 2004: 8).

The large scale emigration from Bulgaria has contributed to a distorted demographic profile and to depopulation, particularly in ethnically mixed areas, which has hindered the development of those regions. To counteract the depopulation and the effects it has had, the Bulgarian state has tried to settle ethnic Bulgarians from abroad to those regions in the past, albeit with limited success.²⁴ Furthermore, the current national strategy on migration and integration states as its primary strategic goals the permanent repatriation of Bulgarian citizens and persons with Bulgarian origin (Markova 2010: 12-26, 35; Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2008: 18-23).

Much like in the Bulgarian case, the dominant discussion among Hungarian interviewees suggests a form of “external politics of belonging” where “the membership status” of co-ethnics outside the borders is contested (Brubaker 2010). In the Hungarian case, however, emigration plays a less significant role than the co-ethnics in the vicinity of the Hungarian borders, which is made evident by the central role that the Hungarians beyond the

²⁴ This policy is seen also as an attempt to modify the demographic make-up of ethnically mixed and “politically sensitive” regions (Guentcheva *et al.* 2003: 53; Markova 2010: 35).

borders have for the Hungarian political elite.²⁵ Although support for the legislations which stipulate the relations between Hungarian minorities and their kin-state can to an extent be assigned to the Hungarian political right,²⁶ in the EUROSPHERE material the relevance of Hungarians minorities in the neighbouring states cannot easily be reduced to a particular position in the left-right spectrum. This finding would corroborate Tünde Puskás' (2009: 84) statement that “the discourse of a borderless community and the rhetoric of national reintegration have been embraced even by parties on the left.” Drawing on a debate initiated by Rainer Bauböck (2010), such legislations that have now culminated in the recent amendments to the citizenship law,²⁷ should be perceived from a symbolic, rather than from consequential point of view. Namely, these legislations can be seen as representing an opportunity to actualize one's identity by establishing an institutionalized relationship to the state representing one's 'own' nation, and as a symbolic restoration of the national unity, rather than as an attempt to redraw the borders surrounding Hungary.²⁸ Indeed, Fowler (2002: 27) notes that “the offer of citizenship to co-ethnics abroad without requiring them to take up residence represents an alternative to territorial revisionism which similarly institutionalises the relationship (but which does not necessarily encourage immigration).”

4.3 Summary Discussion

Although the Bulgarian and Hungarian cases have evident contextual differences, the material analyzed here suggests similar attempts to incorporate co-ethnics to the national community regardless of the fact that they reside in other states. In the Hungarian case, such arrangements

²⁵ According to the authors of the Hungarian Country Report, “[w]hat is common for the entire Hungarian political scene is a preoccupation with the Hungarian coethnics living in countries surrounding Hungary. Many references on how ethnocultural groups should be treated within Hungarian society were made with having Hungarian diasporas in mind, rather than reflecting ethno-cultural minorities within the country.” (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 36) See also Puskás (2009: 81-93) for a discussion on the discourses regarding the Hungarian diaspora, and the differences in the role that the ‘Hungarians beyond the borders’ and the ‘Hungarians in the West’ have for the Hungarian political elite. Furthermore, the loss of Hungary's territory in Transylvania after the Treaty of Trianon (1920) has, according to Baár and Ritivoi (2006: 206), “been seen by Hungarian nationalists as a historical calamity and an unprecedented injustice which Hungary had to suffer in the course of its existence.” Therefore, a focus upon the Hungarian ‘national family’ beyond the borders of the state is somewhat unsurprising.

²⁶ The centre-right party Fidesz has been an initiator of the Status Law of 2001, the referendum on dual citizenship in 2004 and the recent change in the citizenship law. Furthermore, according to a survey regarding the amendments to the citizenship legislation, “it was only among socialist voters that there was a majority who still did not agree with the extension of citizenship [to Hungarians beyond the borders]” (Ablonczy and Élő 2010).

²⁷ The citizenship law, amended in May 2010, allows persons with Hungarian ancestry an access to citizenship without the need to take up residence in Hungary or without renouncement of current citizenship, but so far it does not subscribe the right to participate in elections or an access to Hungarian social services.

²⁸ See especially Gábor Egry's (Bauböck 2010) contribution to the debate: *Why Identity Matters. Hungary's New Law on Citizenship and the Reorganisation of an Organic Nation.*

can be seen as an attempt to maintain the “Hungarianness” of those regions where Hungarian minorities live²⁹ (Stewart 2002: 14-15; Puskás 2009: 90-92), whereas in the case of Bulgaria state policies concentrate on the repatriation of émigré Bulgarians and on the preservation of their ethno-cultural particularity (Markova 2010: 12-26, 35; Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2008).³⁰ The efforts of Bulgaria and Hungary can therefore be seen as constituting a transnational space, where the government of one country bypasses the government of another, in order to establish a direct institutionalized relationship between co-ethnic minorities and their kin-state (*cf.* **FIGURE 1**, see page 4). As such, the two countries bear a resemblance to those “deterritorialized nation-states” described by Basch *et al.* (1994), where the conception of nation-state incorporates “as citizens those who live physically within the boundaries of many other states, but who remain socially, politically, culturally and often economically part of the nation-state of their ancestors” (*ibid.*: 8).

5 Migration

The transnational aspects of migration emerge in the material under three broad topics, which will be approached in this section in sequence. The first type of discussion focuses on forms of migration and ways of qualifying it. This section contains discussion regarding respondents’ perceptions on issues such as guest workers, particular immigrant groups that have emerged in the material and particular policies, which are, for example, aimed at attracting suitable immigrants. The second topic discussed, covers the perceptions of interviewees regarding the effects of international migration that can be deemed as transnational. Such outcomes of migration denote, for example, linkages between societies in forms of remittances or family ties, as well as diffusion of values and skills between the sending and receiving countries. The last part of this section outlines perceptions on issues that relate to structures which connect an individual to two or more societies. Institutionalized connections of individuals can be seen as a further outcome of mobility, which indicate an ability to exercise political rights in multiple states and dual citizenship. The section on

²⁹Respondents from the Hungarian MKMP opposed easing of regulations for ethnic Hungarians in the context of immigration by arguing explicitly that “Hungarian diasporas would disappear if everybody could easily come to Hungary.” (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 53)

³⁰Although the policy document of the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (2008) names the repatriation of Bulgarian emigrants as the primary strategic goal in the context of migration and integration, the Bulgarian state seeks to maintain relations to their expatriates also in other forms. For example, the Bulgarian State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad states their mission as follows: “The main goals of the agency include the preservation of the spiritual heritage of the nations – its language, culture, traditions and history among our compatriots across the world and the establishment of Bulgarian lobbies abroad, which have to assist in increasing the authority of both Bulgaria and of the Bulgarian communities in the respective countries.” (<http://www.aba.government.bg/aba.bg/old/english/index.php>)

migration thereby concentrates on discussions, which are dynamic, rather than focused on communities of migrants and national minorities, as in the case of diversity.

5.1 Forms of Migration

As stated above, this section shall first focus on discussions regarding forms of migration and opinions on how to qualify it. With regard to the discussion on temporary and circular forms of migration, a certain variation in opinions exists. In the context of the considerations on circular migration, one can find both endorsing and opposing opinions with different justifications behind these stances. On the one hand, the phenomenon of the ‘guest workers’ is perceived as the only preferable form of migration,³¹ and as a way to manage possible negative effects that international migration may have.³² In part, these positive perceptions on circular migration models can be seen as following the considerations of a number of reports produced by both international and national organizations, which see circular migration as a way to manage the negative consequences of migration and as a way to produce benefits for both migrant sending and receiving countries, along with the migrants themselves (*cf.* Vertovec 2007). On the other hand, temporary migrants are seen as a problematic group in terms of their integration to the receiving society,³³ and as a group in danger of “human rights violations, exploitation and human trafficking”.³⁴ Support for temporary migration thus entails both statements that focus on curbing the negative effects of migration in sending and receiving countries, as well as perceptions according to which only temporary migration should be allowed. Equally, the opposition to temporary migration is divided between a concern for the wellbeing of migrants and a concern for the cohesion of the society in question. One can thus argue that, rather than conditioning support or objection, the ideological orientation of a given actor has an important effect on the rationalizations underlying his/her stance towards temporary migration.

In addition to the discussion in the material on circular migration chains and temporary migration, collaboration with sending countries in the forms of professional training³⁵ and opening of information centres³⁶ are seen as further measures to regulate

³¹ Proud of the Netherlands, *Trots op Nederland*, ToN (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 86); *Voorpost Nederland* (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 173).

³² For examples see: Christian Democratic Union of Germany, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010: 30); Danish Social Democrats (Siim *et al.* 2010: 15); *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 35).

³³ The Austrian Green Party, *Gruene* (Mokre 2010: 19).

³⁴ German Institute for Human Rights, *Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte*, DIMR (Mackevics 2010: 49).

³⁵ Italian General Confederation of Labour, CGIL (Sciortino 2010: 35). See also: *Corriere* (Sciortino 2010: 40).

migration. These opinions coincide with notions of reducing illegal migration and recruiting individuals directly from the sending countries. The recruitment of migrants from the countries of their origin is discussed in the analyzed EUROSPHERE material both as a positive measure to ensure that the needs of the country in question are met as well as a practice to be condemned.³⁷ To exemplify the latter approach, a Hungarian interviewee is reported to have explained that “the greatest disadvantage of international migration was not only brain drain but also the practice, according to which more developed countries hire people from poorer countries for unskilled job positions, which generates cultural tensions”.³⁸

With regard to the discussion on specific migrant communities, perceived as suggesting routinized migration, the Roma are occasionally mentioned, in addition to the groups that are significant to the particular country in question. In general, particular immigrant communities are typically used as examples by the respondents in order to clarify their positions, for instance, when reflecting on the consequences of free movement.³⁹ For example, a respondent from Norway is reported to have explained that “integration has made Europe smaller, because of the rights to free movement/mobility – which could lead to us meeting strangers in the streets, in a negative sense as with the beggars from Romania”.⁴⁰

5.2 Transnational Outcomes of International Migration

In the context of the discussion on transnational outcomes of international migration, the most recurring topics are the diffusion of values and skills, crime and remittances. When it comes to temporary migration, “the ‘re-import’ of knowledge and experiences by returning emigrants”⁴¹ is perceived as one of the benefits of international migration, which emerges in the discussion in different forms on several occasions. However, for the most part, the discussion does not specify either the manner in which expertise, skills and knowledge diffuse or what it entails in more specific terms; instead, the phenomenon is simply mentioned as one

³⁶ Social Democratic Party of Germany, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD (Mackevics 2010: 32); *Federació Convergència i Unió*, CiU (Álvarez et al. 2010: 36).

³⁷ For examples see: Austrian League of Human Rights, *Österreichische Liga der Menschenrechte* (Mokre 2010: 11); *Der Standard* (Mokre 2010: 23).

³⁸ *Blikk* (Bozoki et al. 2010: 82). See also: *Izquierda Unida*, IU (Álvarez et al. 2010: 36); *Federació Convergència i Unió*, CiU (Álvarez et al. 2010: 36).

³⁹ For examples see: *Fondazione Migrantes* (Sciortino 2010: 55); Anti-Racist Centre, *Antirasistisk Senter* (Sicakkan 2010: 65).

⁴⁰ *Aftenposten* (Sicakkan 2010: 33).

⁴¹ For example see: “All Political Parties” in the section “2.2.5 International migration and immigration policies” (Mokre 2010: 18). See also: Danish Social Democrats (Siim et al. 2010: 15).

of the benefits of migration.⁴² In connection to the diffusion of values, the main contexts where improvements are said to take place are gender equality and working conditions, in addition to the more general notions regarding the spreading of democratic values.⁴³ Thus, for example, a respondent from the Finnish Centre Party is reported to have explained how immigrants who “study here and see this country [...] spread the Nordic women [sic] democracy” to the countries of their origin.⁴⁴ Such spreading of norms and practices, along with social capital and identities, are conceptualized as social remittances by Peggy Levitt (2001), who stresses that the diffusion of values and skills takes place both ways. Although migrants certainly export ideas and practices from the receiving countries, they also import and continue receiving them from their countries of origin whilst staying abroad (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves *forthcoming*). References in the analyzed EUROSPHERE material to “international convergence”⁴⁵, “cultural exchange”⁴⁶, “exchange of knowledge”⁴⁷ and learning “new methods [and] norms”⁴⁸, can be seen as suggesting such global circulation of ideas, norms and practices.

On a more concrete level, financial remittances are frequently mentioned as a benefit for sending countries.⁴⁹ In fact, remittances amount to the largest resource of foreign finance particularly for the poorest countries and the recorded sums which developing countries receive are estimated to be around 338 billion USD in 2008 (Irving *et al.* 2010). It is worth noting that the real transactions through informal and formal channels are believed to be even larger. With its ability to reduce poverty, remittances are acknowledged to constitute the most uncontroversial linkage between development and migration and thus the frequency in which remittances are discussed as a positive aspect of international migration is hardly surprising (*ibid.*). When remittances are discussed in the analyzed EUROSPHERE material as something beyond fiscal transactions, they are said to indicate social connections between individuals

⁴² For examples see: *Blick* (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 82); *Ecologistas en Acción* (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 61); Hindu Council of the Netherlands, *Hindoe Raad Nederland*, HRN (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 156); The Liberal Think Tank, CIVITA (Sicakkan 2010: 77); Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, TMMOB (Küçük 2010: 40).

⁴³ For examples see: *Hürriyet* (Küçük 2010: 49); Finnish Red Cross, FRC (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 66); Women's Rights Association, *Nök a Nökért Együtt az Eröszak Ellen*, NANE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 62).

⁴⁴ Finnish Centre Party (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 30).

⁴⁵ German Green Party, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (Mackevics 2010: 20).

⁴⁶ Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, TMMOB (Küçük 2010: 40). See also: Sámi Association of Finland, SAF (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 70).

⁴⁷ Hindu Council of the Netherlands, *Hindoe Raad Nederland*, HRN (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 156).

⁴⁸ *Blick* (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 82).

⁴⁹ For examples see: Austrian League of Human Rights, *Österreichische Liga der Menschenrechte* (Mokre 2010: 11); New Agenda (Siim *et al.* 2010: 23); *Zentralrat der Muslime*, ZMD (Mackevics 2010: 42); Institute for World Economy, IWE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 72); *El País* (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 54); The Norwegian Labor Party, *Arbeiderpartiet*, DNA (Sicakkan 2010: 36).

residing in separate societies.⁵⁰ Although remittances are predominantly perceived as a positive aspect, a Finnish respondent, for example, is reported to have noted that financial remittances may also produce negative outcomes as they can be used to sustain political conflicts in the sending countries.⁵¹ Furthermore, at times the positive effects of remittances for the sending countries are doubted, because, for example, they are seen as only benefitting those directly gaining from the transactions.⁵²

Regarding the negative outcomes of international migration, different forms of crime are recurrently mentioned. Where crime is mentioned in the material, migrants are perceived both as offenders and victims of such acts. In terms of the latter, human trafficking is the most frequently mentioned form of crime, which is typically discussed in the context of freedom of movement. In more precise terms, some respondents perceive human trafficking as a result of excessively strict immigration policies,⁵³ while others consider that human trafficking could be curbed if limitations to the freedom of movement for particular groups were introduced.⁵⁴ Therefore regulations governing the freedom of movement are seen as connected to human trafficking; however, the effects that these regulations may have are not agreed upon. Concerning migrants as perpetrators of crime, specific illegal acts have not been mentioned in the material; instead the phenomenon is discussed as the downside of freedom of movement and international migration.⁵⁵ A Norwegian respondent, for example, is reported to have associated “international migration with challenges of terror and criminality”.⁵⁶

5.3 Belonging and Citizenship

In a more general vein, migration is seen as creating a more interconnected world by allowing one to be in direct contact with other cultures.⁵⁷ Social connections, in the form of family reunifications and arranged marriages, are also reported as being referred to by the respondents as providing a basis for further migration,⁵⁸ as well as facilitating the integration

⁵⁰ Unspecified actor(s) in section “Immigration: social movement organizations” (Sciortino 2010: 35).

⁵¹ Finnish Red Cross, FRC (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 66). See also: *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 35).

⁵² For example see: *Izquierda Unida*, IU (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 35).

⁵³ For examples see: Anti-Racist Centre (Sicakkan 2010: 45); Dutch GreenLeft, *GroenLinks* (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 62).

⁵⁴ Austrian Social Democratic Party, SPOe (Mokre 2010: 18).

⁵⁵ For examples see: True Finns, TF (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 64); Danish People's Party (Siim *et al.* 2010: 20).

⁵⁶ The Norwegian Labour Party, *Arbeiderpartiet*, DNA (Sicakkan 2010: 36). See also: ABC (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 53); *Pro Köln* (Mackevics 2010: 42).

⁵⁷ For examples see: International Peace Research Institute, PRIO (Sicakkan 2010: 25); German Green Party, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (Mackevics 2010: 20).

⁵⁸ Norwegian Progress Party (Sicakkan 2010: 40).

of future migrants into receiving societies.⁵⁹ Most frequently, however, issues which relate to the notions of belonging and loyalty have emerged in the material in the context of discussions regarding dual citizenship. Here, along the lines of transnational conceptions of citizenship (Bloemraad 2007: 394-396; Bloemraad *et al.* 2008: 166-169), the dominant opinion regards dual citizenship as a way for migrants to maintain connection to their countries of origin and as a way of expressing belonging to more than one country in a formal manner.⁶⁰ To exemplify, an interviewee from the UK's Conservative party has been reported to have stated that s/he “fully understand[s] why people tend to keep their dual citizenship simply because their roots belong in another community”.⁶¹

Although there are several references where such dual belonging is approached with a positive tone, dual citizenship is also perceived as leading to conflicts of loyalty and to unwarranted benefits for persons who hold multiple citizenships. Such opinions can be seen as illustrating the significance that traditional conceptions of citizenship have, which perceive citizenship to be equated with a membership in a specific political community and as a distinctive linkage between the members of a nation and ‘their’ state. Dual citizenship, thus, stands in contrast to the traditional conceptions of citizenship by “allowing, and even promoting, multiple belonging, claims making, rights and responsibilities”, which brings about questions regarding the loyalty of dual citizens towards their new countries (Bloemraad 2007: 392-393 Bloemraad *et al.* 2008: 162-169). For example, interviewees from the Austrian NGO *Moschee Ade* referred explicitly to such divided loyalties, along with unfounded advantages, when justifying their opposition to dual citizenship.⁶² While the majority of the discussion on dual citizenship connects it to the notions of loyalty and belonging, among the Dutch interviewees there are also diverging opinions according to which citizenship and loyalty are unrelated. A representative of the *Socialistische Partij* (SP) from the Netherlands, for example, is reported to have stated that “there isn’t a connection [between citizenship and loyalty] in any way”.⁶³

⁵⁹ Italian General Confederation of Labour, CGIL (Sciortino 2010: 35).

⁶⁰ For examples see: The Austrian Greens/Austrian Social Democratic Party (Mokre 2010: 17); *Extra Bladet* (Siim *et al.* 2010: 31); Demos Helsinki (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 79); The European Movement, *Europabevegelsen* (Sicakkan 2010: 51); *Federació Convergència i Unió*, CiU (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 31); **Dutch** GreenLeft, *GroenLinks* (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 64).

⁶¹ British Conservative Party (Wahl-Jorgensen *et al.* 2010: 19).

⁶² *Moshee Ade* (Mokre 2010: 10). See also: Austrian Freedom Party, FPOe (Mokre 2010: 17); Danish Association (Siim *et al.* 2010: 38); The Anti-Racist Centre (Sicakkan 2010: 46).

⁶³ Dutch Socialist Party, *Socialistische Partij*, SP (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 55). See also: Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 37); Turkish Muslim Cultural Federation, TICF (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 120); Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in Amsterdam and its Surroundings, UMMAO (van de

In addition to the discussion on dual citizenship above, which concentrates on its linkages to the notions of loyalty and belonging, dual citizenship is also discussed in connection to political rights. On the one hand, the possibility of participating politically in several countries is discussed in the material as unproblematic or as something positive by various respondents.⁶⁴ In fact, approximately 60% of the respondents⁶⁵ in our sample have supported the extension of political rights to non-citizens. A number of respondents also perceive that the allocation of citizenship, along with political rights, can facilitate integration into the receiving society.⁶⁶ In the context of Bulgaria and Finland, a few respondents also advocate for giving an opportunity to their expatriate communities to take part in the decision-making of their countries of origin.⁶⁷ On the other hand, as an Italian respondent observes, it is a paradox if immigrants, who contribute to the societies where they reside, are being denied the possibility to participate politically, whereas expatriates who pay their taxes elsewhere are allowed to participate in elections from abroad.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the possibility to be politically active in multiple countries is at times perceived as problematic or as constituting a challenge for democracy.⁶⁹ As a solution to the possible problems that may stem from multiple citizenships, it was argued that political rights should be based on residence rather than on citizenship *per se*.⁷⁰ As a way to reconcile with the possible problems that may stem from dual citizenship and from the possibility of exercising political rights in several countries, it was suggested by a representative of the social democratic party from Germany (SPD) that one could have one active citizenship at a time and another which can be activated if needed.⁷¹ In general terms, opinions according to which rights should be dependent on the place of residence, rather than being conditioned by a legal status in a given country, can be seen as echoing postnationalist conceptions of citizenship. Such conceptions have challenged the traditional notions of citizenship and claim that the attributes of citizenship, such as

Beek *et al.* 2010: 132–133); Centre Information and Documentation on Israel, CIDI (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 161–162).

⁶⁴ For examples see: Center for Study of Democracy, CSD (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 58); Danish Socialist People's Party, SPP (Siim *et al.* 2010: 13); The Anti-Racist Centre (Sicakkan 2010: 46).

⁶⁵ When asked whether political rights should be extended to non-citizens, 59.5% were in favour, 31.2% thought that only citizens should have political rights and 9.3% did not answer the question.

⁶⁶ For examples see: Unspecified German think tank representatives (Mackevics 2010: 48); *Partito Democratico*, PD (Sciortino 2010: 27).

⁶⁷ National Roma Forum of Finland, NRFF (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 42); OJB “Shalom” (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 49–50).

⁶⁸ *Partito Democratico*, PD (Sciortino 2010: 27).

⁶⁹ German Green Party, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (Mackevics 2010: 29).

⁷⁰ The Finnish Red Cross, FRC (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 67). See also: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, SZ (Mackevics 2010: 54).

⁷¹ German Social Democratic Party, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD (Mackevics 2010: 26). See also: Unspecified German media actors (Mackevics 2010: 54); Sámi Association of Finland, SAF (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 71).

political rights, should be vested in individuals regardless of their legal status within a given country (Bloemraad 2007: 396-397; Bloemraad *et al.* 2008: 164-169).

The remainder of the discussion on dual citizenship in the material is focused on reflections regarding existing policies of the countries in question, as well as on opinions which discuss dual citizenship in more wide-ranging terms without further contextualization. To exemplify the former type of discussion, respondents from the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) are reported to have discussed the current compulsory option model⁷² in a positive light, whereas interviewees from the largest opposition party (SPD) approached it with a more critical stance and favoured the *jus soli* principle as the basis for citizenship.⁷³ In more general terms, dual citizenship is perceived by a number of respondents as something which is either necessitated by the contemporary world⁷⁴ or as something which is supported or opposed without further reflection as to the reasons behind the respondents' particular dispositions.⁷⁵ Additionally, approximately half of the respondents⁷⁶ regard the idea of forcing one to renounce their current citizenship, or the rights attached to it, as a condition for applying another as unnecessary.⁷⁷ To exemplify these discussions, a respondent from a British think tank is reported to have stated that “[a]s more and more people are now bilocal I don't see why the state should ask you to renounce to your citizenship to acquire another”.⁷⁸

5.4 Summary Discussion

In summary, our discussion of the transnational facets of migration suggests a range of different interactions across various dimensions. Whereas references to family ties, remittances and to the diffusion of values and skills imply interactions between migrant

⁷² The “*Optionmodell*” obliges children of foreign parents to choose before the age of 23 whether they want keep their foreign citizenship or opt for the German one (*cf.* Anil 2006).

⁷³ Christian Democratic Union of Germany, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010: 27–28); Social Democratic Party of Germany, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD (Mackevics 2010: 26).

⁷⁴ For examples see: Swedish People's Party (Finland), SPP (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 58); Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 37); Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 28).

⁷⁵ For examples see: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 77); ENAR Finland (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 73–74); *Iltalehti*, IL (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 85); The Hungarian Civic Union, FIDESZ (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 49).

⁷⁶ 49.4% of the respondents thought that the state should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship in this country, and 16.0% declared that state should require renouncement of previous citizenships from all foreigners who apply for acquisition of citizenship.

⁷⁷ For examples see: Finnish Association of Russian Speaking Organizations, FARO (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 69); *Helsingin Sanomat*, HS (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 82); Demos Helsinki (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 79); The European Movement, *Europabevegelsen* (Sicakkan 2010: 51).

⁷⁸ Centre for European reform (Wahl-Jorgensen *et al.* 2010: 21).

sending and receiving countries on an individual level, discussions regarding immigration policies of receiving countries and citizenship legislations indicate the involvement of representatives of states. In reference to **FIGURE 1** (see page 4), individual level interactions (for example, social relations) take place between society one (Society₁) and society two (Society₂). However, interactions between migrant communities and a kin-state can be seen as taking place between society one (Society₁) and government two (State₂). Moreover, the transnational facets of migration involve not only various types of actors, but also an array of interactions in the political, economic, social and cultural domains. The multiplicity of the transnational linkages in the context of migration thus demonstrates the diversity of transnational phenomena within Europe at large.

6 Networks

The following section seeks to delineate the various bases for transnational networking as they emerge within our material. We understand the transnational networking of the selected EUROSPHERE actors as the articulation of sustained cooperations/collaborations that traverse national borders. For the purpose of this analysis we select variable 5.7b (“*Is your organization a member of one or more trans-European and/or transnational networks?*”) to highlight the degree to which EUROSPHERE respondents consider the actor they represent to be engaged in trans-European and/or transnational networks. In response to the above question the EUROSPHERE ‘tick box’ data suggest that the vast majority – *in fact, virtually all respondents* – claim that their organizations are engaged in trans-European/transnational networks.⁷⁹

The data pertaining to the transnational networks dimension can be divided into three themes: (1) political orientation as a basis for transnational networking, (2) belonging/identity as a basis for transnational networking, and (3) functional explanations of transnational networking. In addition to the above, we have sought to exemplify some organizations that have been listed by the actors in our sample as important to their transnational networking.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Variable 5.7b: *Is your organization a member of one or more trans-European and/or transnational networks?* In the EUROSPHERE NSD dataset there are two possible negative responses: these are “Question not answered” and “The organization is not member of any trans-European and/or transnational network”. Based upon the assumption that all unchecked responses indicate a participation in transnational/trans-European networks, the dataset suggests that 98.6% of respondents perceive their organization as participating in such networks (Unchecked = 98.6%, Checked = 1.4%).

⁸⁰ *We have not sought to construct a comprehensive list, but rather extract illustrative examples from our material.*

6.1 Political Orientation

Political orientation refers to transnational networking based upon the political ideology of the specific actor on the left versus right political spectrum. It is noteworthy that instances in which actors' political ideologies form a basis for *some* of their transnational networking are most prevalent amongst the selected political party actors within our EUROSPHERE interview data.

On the left-hand side of the spectrum, some of the representatives of the selected social democratic political parties seek to collaborate with other social democratic parties on a regional, European or global scale, and with organizations maintaining similar views. A clearly articulated example of such is provided by a Norwegian political party which is reported to seek an influential position in “the international area [*sic*] with the objective of strengthening and promoting social democratic values and ideology at the Nordic, European and global levels.”⁸¹ When discussing their collaboration in transnational networks, representatives of a German social democratic party⁸² mention, amongst others, the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity,⁸³ ECOSY – Young European Socialists,⁸⁴ and Socialist International⁸⁵ as specific fora in which they are engaged. All of these organizations provide a formal networking structure, a milieu in which the party and its contemporaries seek to further the social democratic ideology across ‘Europe’ or at a global level.

On the right, the networking activities of the selected EUROSPHERE actors can further be sub-divided according to their ideological position; that is according to actors understood to identify with the European ‘centre-right’ and those who represent the ‘far-right’ or national populists. Much like the above actors representing the left, the actors seen to represent the centre-right within the EUROSPHERE data are also reported to network with one another on a perceived common ideological basis. This is particularly apparent in case of a German political party⁸⁶ whose representatives note that the party is active in two (Christian) democratic networks at an international level: *Internationale Démocrate-Chrétienne*⁸⁷ (CDI-IDC) and the International Democrat Union⁸⁸ (IDU). Much like the above social democratic

⁸¹ Norwegian Labour Party, *Det norske arbeiderparti*, DNA (Sicakkan 2010: 75).

⁸² Social Democratic Party of Germany, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD (Mackevics 2010).

⁸³ <http://www.europeanforum.net/>

⁸⁴ <http://www.ecosy.org/>

⁸⁵ <http://socialistinternational.org/>

⁸⁶ Christian Democratic Union, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010).

⁸⁷ Now Centrist Democrat International, but formerly the Christian Democrat International. <http://www.cdi-idc.com/>

⁸⁸ <http://www.idu.org/>

organizations, the CDI-IDC and IDU function as networks in which the actors may exchange ideas pertaining to their centre-right ideology.

It is notable that all actors who mention transnational networking on the basis of social democratic and centre-right ideologies represented political parties; the picture is, however, quite different with regard to those holding populist and nationalist ‘far-right’ views.⁸⁹ For the purposes of this analysis, the actors we understand to represent a nationalist far-right political ideology in our sample do not only consist of representatives of political parties. Rather, actors with a nationalist far-right ideology include two NGOs: the Bulgarian National Alliance⁹⁰ (BNA) and *pro Köln*.⁹¹ When discussing their engagement in transnational networks, respondents from the former NGO stress that the BNA seeks to collaborate “with patriotic organizations in Europe and with other patriotic organizations abroad that have the same outlook on life.”⁹² On much the same basis, although somewhat more explicitly, respondents from the latter NGO emphasize their institutionalized ties to various European far-right political parties such as “*Vlaams Belang* in Belgium, the *FPÖ* in Austria and even [the] *Liga Nord [sic]* in Italy as well as the *Front National* in France.”⁹³ Such networking may, in part, be explained by the political aspirations of these NGOs: indeed, *pro Köln* has been represented in Cologne’s municipal council since 2004.⁹⁴ Whilst some extreme right and populist organizations claim to engage systematically in transnational collaborations with organizations with which they share an ideology, other actors note that their ties are less systematic. The representatives of a populist (value conservative) political actor, the True Finns,⁹⁵ acknowledge that “the party has not had any systematic cooperation”, and that “contacts have been established by individuals, most significantly by the chair of the party.”⁹⁶

⁸⁹ We feel it necessary to delineate a difference between populist, right-wing parties and the nationalist far-right as, whilst they both may be considered right of centre in certain regards (for example, in their opposition to migration), populist parties such as the True Finns or the UK Independence Party cannot be easily likened to parties of the extreme right such as the Jobbik party (Hungary) or *Vlaams Belang* (Belgium).

⁹⁰ The “Bulgarian National Alliance (BNA) is a non-party organization, which identifies itself as a patriotic, nationally oriented, cultural and educational organization. It is oriented to nation preservation and national development and is characterized by explicit Anti-European and anti-Internationalism views. [The] BNA is often blamed for fascist and neo-Nazi views” (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 17).

⁹¹ *Bürgerbewegung pro Köln*, Germany. *pro Köln* “is a local citizens’ movement in Cologne fighting against Islamization. [... It can be considered to be an] anti-diversity movement in Germany” (Mackevics 2010: 38).

⁹² Bulgarian National Alliance (Zografova *et al.* 2010: 91).

⁹³ *pro Köln* (Mackevics 2010: 75).

⁹⁴ For further information with regard to *pro Köln*’s political activities, please refer to Brandt and Kleinhubbert (2008).

⁹⁵ *Perussuomalaiset*, Finland. We do not regard the True Finns as a nationalist far-right political party by European standards as their agenda may more accurately be referred to as populist, value conservative. Affiliated to the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group of the European Parliament due to their Eurosceptic and migration critical stance, the True Finns certainly do not openly express the far-right views commonly articulated by parties such as the British National Party (UK), Front National (France), or the Freedom Party of Austria to name but a few. Indeed, Kraus *et al.* (2010: 33–34) note the problematic relationship of the party with

In addition to transnational cooperations based upon a right-left ideology, some actors seek to collaborate on the basis of a Green ideology. Actors seeking transnational engagements on the basis of a Green ideology are not particularly prevalent within our selected material. However, the German Green Party,⁹⁷ in particular, clearly stresses that they seek to collaborate with actors abroad on the basis of the key “themes of the party”.⁹⁸

6.2 Belonging/Identity

The theme of belonging or identity often emerges within our data as a key foundation upon which transnational networking is established. As transnational networking on the basis of perceived belongings/identities is diverse, we have divided this theme into three topics: these being regional (cross border) cooperations, religion and ethnicity.

When referring to a regional identity/belonging as the basis for their transnational engagements, only one specific area was mentioned by the selected actors: that of the Nordic region. This regional identity/belonging is expressed by various interviewees as structuring trans-Nordic collaboration/cooperation.⁹⁹ Within our material, trans-Nordic collaborations can be seen to take two forms. Firstly, the Nordic Council¹⁰⁰ provides an overall structure in which transnational cooperation occurs. Such cooperation often is based on common political affiliation, but still takes place *within* an overarching Nordic cooperative frame that motivates such actions. This is exemplified by the party of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, whose representatives remark upon their participation in “the Centre Group of the Nordic Council.”¹⁰¹ Secondly, trans-Nordic cooperation is also observed to be based upon ‘bilateral ties’ between sister-parties in the Nordic region.¹⁰² In a singular concrete example of a transnational relationship between Nordic sister-parties, an interviewee representing the

regard to its views on migration caused by the by the party chair’s (Timo Soini) strong Catholic faith: a religious conviction that is overwhelmingly held by immigrants in Finland.

⁹⁶ True Finns (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 113).

⁹⁷ *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*.

⁹⁸ German Green Party, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*. (Mackevics 2010: 68).

⁹⁹ In this fashion, trans-Nordic networking was only mentioned by Dutch, Finnish, and Norwegian actors within the Nordic region itself as structuring their transnational ties.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.norden.org/fi>

¹⁰¹ Swedish People’s Party (Finland), *Svenska folkpartiet*, SFP (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 113).

¹⁰² Whilst sister-parties are noted to be important to the actors’ transnational networking, these relationships are, for the most part, not clearly articulated by the actors. For examples see: the Danish Socialist People’s Party (Siim *et al.* 2010: 54); the Finnish Centre Party (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 112); the Norwegian Centre Party, *Senterpartiet* (Sicakkan 2010: 76); the Norwegian Conservative Party, *Høyre* (Sicakkan 2010: 76).

Swedish-speaking branch of the Finnish Centre party mentions collaboration with its “Danish sister party (*Venstre*) around agricultural issues.”¹⁰³

With regard to religious identity/belonging as a basis for transnational networking, Islam is the only belief reported to be mentioned by the respondents.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, such mentions with regard to transnational networking appear only sporadically amongst interviewees who, quite unsurprisingly, represent Muslim Non-governmental Organizations/Social Movement Organizations (NGOs/SMOs). Such actors seek transnational collaborations with others who identify themselves as ‘progressive’ Islamic organizations. Within the Dutch material, representatives of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands (FION) note that their goal when engaging in transnational networking, much like that of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe’s (FIOE), is “to develop a kind of institutionalized Islam that is supported by European Islamic scholars, instead of relying on Islamic clergymen that are educated within the context of an Islamic society and who lack feeling with the contemporary European society.”¹⁰⁵ Similarly, representatives of a Danish NGO have also sought to establish transnational collaborations on the basis of religious belonging. It is noted that the NGO had “originally hoped to participate in creating an international organisation, called something like International Democratic Muslims, because they have sister organisations in countries like England, Holland, France, Switzerland, [and] Indonesia. [... They,] however, have not found the resources to realize this wish.”¹⁰⁶ In view of the advocacy of such actors for dialogue between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, the networking of the above actors on the basis of a religious belonging can be seen as an attempt to combat fundamentalist Islamic beliefs within both European societies and at a global level.¹⁰⁷

With regard to ethnicity as a basis for transnational networking, we located references to a diffuse variety of ‘communities’ in our material. Like the other forms of belonging outlined above, ethnicity appears only intermittently within our data. However, such networking is particular to political actors and NGOs. Such ‘communities’ include diasporic groups, transnational minorities (for example the Sámi) and territorial ethno-national groups

¹⁰³ Finnish Centre Party (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 113).

¹⁰⁴ *Where a religious belonging/identity is seen as the basis transnational networking, we observe that only Muslim NGOs are articulated to collaborate on such a foundation. Such observation does not imply that other religious convictions do not engage in transnational networking on the basis, but rather suggests that the actors selected as representative on immigrants groups within our material consider such religious belonging as important to their transnational engagements. As no groups representative of other religious convictions are found within our material, no such bases emerge in our data.*

¹⁰⁵ Federation of Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 129).

¹⁰⁶ Democratic Muslims (Siim *et al.* 2010: 71).

¹⁰⁷ For a detailed discussion of the dichotomization of Islam and ‘the West’/occident see Chérif (2008) and Creutz-Kämpfi & Holley (2009)

who articulate a perceived ‘belonging’ that serves as a basis for transnational collaborations (such as the Welsh nationalists).

Where diasporic groups are mentioned, their discussion can be divided into two types: national and migrant diasporas.¹⁰⁸ Networking based upon an identification with a national diaspora is exemplified by a Hungarian think tank who seeks to collaborate with “Hungarian minority youth organizations of the neighbouring countries: [For example, the] Youth Organization of the Sub-Carpathian Hungarian Cultural Association (Ukraine), Youth Forum of Vojvodina (Serbia), and the Youth Association of Lendava (Slovenia).”¹⁰⁹ Whilst transnational networking on the basis of a national diaspora seeks to build and maintain ties/cooperation with other related groups, transnational networking on the basis of a migrant diaspora seeks to tie migrant communities to institutions and organizations in the migrant ‘homeland’. Such associations are exemplified by an NGO in our German material, who claims to represent the interests of Turkish people in Germany when collaborating with “ministries and other entities in Turkey that are responsible for Turkish people abroad.”¹¹⁰

In contrast to diasporas, we also identify networking amongst transnational minorities – that is, ethnic ‘communities’ that are not bound to a particular nation-state but have been historically dispersed across several states. Globally many such transnational (*ethnic*) minorities exist with the Kurds and Jews along with Roma and Sámi being particularly visible examples. When analyzing our data, networking on the basis of a belonging to a perceived transnational minority was only found in relation to a single actor in Finland. This actor, an NGO that sees itself as representing the interests of the Sámi minority, claims to “participate in the activities of international and European projects and organizations, when possible, in order to address political actors at [... multiple] levels.”¹¹¹ It seeks influence on behalf of the ‘Sámi community’¹¹² and notes that “[s]ome of its key figures have been engaged in

¹⁰⁸ A distinction between “national” and “migrant” diasporas, as the former can be defined as ethnic groups who through the redrawing of state borders in the twentieth century now reside outside of the nation-state to which they are perceived to belong. For example, please refer to the above discussion of the Hungarian diaspora in Romania and Slovakia (see the above section on Diversity). Migrant diasporas by contrast refer to post World War II mass migrations of people, often as migrant workers who have since remained in the state to which they/their parents/grandparents migrated. An example of this would be the large ethnically Turkish population in Germany.

¹⁰⁹ *Századvég* (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 94). As similar basis for their transnational networking activities is expressed by the *Bund der Vertriebenen* (BdV) in Germany who, as Mackevics (2010: 74) notes, emphasize “the importance of an existing network with an informal character coordinated by the general secretary of the South Tyrolean Institute of Ethnic Groups.”

¹¹⁰ *Türkische Gemeinde*, TGD (Mackevics 2010: 73).

¹¹¹ Sámi Association of Finland (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 116).

¹¹² Please note that a claim is made to represent the “Sámi community”, which we understand to be far wider than the association’s own membership.

indigenous peoples' issues at the international level for a long time.”¹¹³ Whilst one might also expect to locate a discussion of networking on the basis of a belonging to the ‘Roma community’, no such articulations were found in the Country Reports with respect to actors who claim to represent ‘the Roma’ in their particular national polities. Such a lack of Roma collaboration has also been acknowledged by Erin Jenne (2000: 200-202) who engages in a detailed discussion of the multiple causes of Roma marginalization in Central and Eastern Europe during the post-communist period.

The third type of ‘community’ that emerges in our material is that of the ‘ethno-national territorial group’, whose claims to nationhood are linked to a particular territory. Instances in which ethno-national territorial groups engage in transnational networking, whilst limited to Welsh respondents in our UK material, are understood to be based upon a common ‘struggle’ for national ‘recognition’. Indeed a Welsh nationalist political party mentions its collaboration with a Basque nationalist party which is active in Spain and France.¹¹⁴ The collaboration between this party (*Plaid Cymru*) and *Eusko Alkartasuna* is noted to be based upon “minority language questions”¹¹⁵ that are key to defining the ethno-national community as ‘different’ to that of the hegemonic majority within the state.

6.3 Functional Cooperation

In the following, functional cooperation refers to the specific types of transnational networking by EUROSPHERE actors that are not directly based upon political orientations or perceived identities. In contrast, such cooperation rather refers to specific, issue-related interests (or sets of interests) that are key to the actors’ agendas or actions. As with the themes above, within the matter of functional cooperation we have, broadly speaking, located four key bases or topics structuring or motivating the transnational networking of the actors studied: these being research interests, media collaboration, gender issues, and other issue-based cooperation.

In regard to transnational networking motivated by common research interests, this topic is, unsurprisingly, only discussed by think tank actors within our material. Such actors tend to view transnational collaborations pragmatically, as an *incentive to or means of*

¹¹³ Sámi Association of Finland (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 116).

¹¹⁴ *Plaid Cymru* (Wahl-Jorgensen *et al.* 2010).

¹¹⁵ *Plaid Cymru* (Wahl-Jorgensen *et al.* 2010: 59).

generating funding from sponsors aboard.¹¹⁶ These think tank actors often specify research agendas that motivate their transnational collaborations. Such agendas include research on economic matters,¹¹⁷ peace/armed conflicts,¹¹⁸ and specific regional interests.¹¹⁹ For all the think tank actors for whom concrete transnational relationships are listed, these ties more often than not reflect organization's central research themes.¹²⁰

The second basis for transnational networking is also limited to a single type of EUROSPHERE actor: that of the media. Where media actors mention their engagement in transnational networks, it is primarily the exchange of media content (articles) that is stressed by the actors. For example, in the Norwegian material, three media actors – *Klassekampen*, *Dagbladet* and *Aftenposten* – report that they are engaged in networks of information sharing. Indeed, in reference to one of the above actors, transnational collaborations are reported to be “mainly journalistic in the sense of buying and selling news items and other journalistic pieces from newspapers with a bigger organization and greater resources than *Klassekampen*. Buying content clearly enriches the newspaper and presents differing perspectives.”¹²¹ Such ‘buying content’ was common amongst media actors across the countries in our selected sample.¹²² Other actors, for example the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and the *Tageszeitung* (taz) in Germany are noted to share content with publications in Europe and the United States.¹²³ However no clear articulation of an exchange of capital is made in these cases. Few instances within our material indicate a clear motivation for the actor's transnational collaboration. *NRC Handelsblad* notes that its cooperation with *Politiken* (Denmark) “started in the run-up

¹¹⁶ For an example of such, see the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt*, NUPI (Sicakkan 2010: 79).

¹¹⁷ Examples of think tanks collaborating in research on economic matters CIVITA, Norway who are noted to collaborate “mostly with free market oriented think tanks, and most of such think tanks are in the USA” (Sicakkan 2010: 78) and CIDOB, Spain who collaborate with various actors that on the basis of “economic issues that affect Europe's present and future” (Álvarez et al. 2010: 77).

¹¹⁸ Examples of think tanks collaborating in research on peace and conflict research include PRIO (International Peace Research Institute), Norway who are noted to be “engaged in international cooperation through collaborative projects and umbrella international projects, especially with research institutes and universities in countries with problems of peace” (Sicakkan 2010: 80) and DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies), Denmark who cooperate with “Eastern European research institutes (primarily related to Cold War research)” (Siim et al. 2010: 62).

¹¹⁹ Specific regional interests are exemplified by TEPAV (The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey), Turkey who collaborate “with the Black Sea Trust, and also with specific projects in countries in the region such as Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, [and] Kirghizistan” (Küçük 2010: 20).

¹²⁰ For example, FIIA (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs) publicly lists its involvement in the following networks: “The Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), EU-CONSENT, Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) and EuroMesco.” (Kraus et al. 2010: 21).

¹²¹ *Klassekampen* (Sicakkan 2010: 92).

¹²² For example, see *El País*, Spain, who has participated since the early ‘[19]90s in European networks, exchanging informative contents with other progressive and Europeist [*sic*] papers like *Le Monde*, *Publico* (Portugal), *The Independent*, *Frankfurter* and *La Repubblica*.” (Álvarez et al. 2010: 80).

¹²³ *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Tageszeitung* (Mackevics 2010: 83).

to the European Parliament elections of 2009 ‘with the idea that you can exchange articles and explore the [common European] space’.”¹²⁴

In contrast with the material discussed thus far, gender issues¹²⁵ upon which transnational networking amongst EUROSHERE actors are based appear amongst *different actor types* in our material (predominantly NGOs and political parties).¹²⁶ In particular, gender issues were articulated as a basis for transnational collaborations in relation to one political party actor in Germany and two NGO actors in Turkey. In regard to the political party actor – *the German Green Party*¹²⁷ – gender equality is articulated as one of the core themes of the party and therefore key to its transnational cooperations. Amongst others, the party is noted to collaborate with *Terres des Femmes*, an international “non-profit human rights organization [...] that supports girls and women through raising public awareness, international networking, campaigning, individual personal assistance and the promotion of self-help projects abroad.”¹²⁸ Like the German Green party, a Turkish NGO focusing explicitly upon women’s rights, is noted to engage in gender based collaborations at a number of levels. For example, this NGO “has also been active at the European level, working with women’s groups in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, as well as actively participating in the European Women’s Lobby.”¹²⁹

Much like the discussion in which think tank actors base their transnational networking upon their particular research interests, issue based cooperations exclusively refer to NGO networking motivated by the key foci of particular organizations. Such issue based cooperations can be summarized according to the particular focus of the actor on political, economic, environmental or social issues.¹³⁰ Where networking is sought on the basis of a political issue, transnational collaborations appear to take place in opposition to the subject raised. An appropriate example of such networking is broached by an openly EU critical

¹²⁴ *NRC Handelsblad* (van de Beek et al. 2010: 180). A further mentioning of a media actor engaging in the transnational exchange of Media content is made by the Bulgarian newspaper *Dvenen Trud*. However, its “membership” of *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Zografova et al. 2010: 94) implies that it is not transnational networking between media actors that takes place, but rather transnational media *ownership* that is responsible for such collaborations (*Dvenen Trud* is in fact “a subsidiary company of the German Media Concern” [Zografova et al. 2010: 12]).

¹²⁵ *Whilst actors’ transnational networking on the basis of gender issues often evoke gendered identities, in this analysis, we stress that it is not so much ‘gender’ as an identity but rather issues (i.e. gender inequalities) that are stressed where transnational networking is mentioned.*

¹²⁶ *Whilst gender might be seen as an issue upon which transnational networking is based, we address this topic as distinct from other issue based networking as this theme is not limited to NGO actor interests, but appears in relation to the transnational networking of a political party also.*

¹²⁷ *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, Germany.


¹²⁸ <http://frauenrechte.de/online/index.php>

¹²⁹ KAMER (Küçük 2010: 34).

¹³⁰ For a detailed discussion of transnational SMO/NGO actor networks as an umbrella for protest campaigns directed towards a variety of actors within the public sphere see Beyeler and Kriesi (2005).

NGO who strongly opposes EU integration and seeks to “keep Norway out of the EU”.¹³¹ This organization is noted to be “a member of The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements [... and] it maintains a direct contact to organizations like the People’s Movement against [the] EU in Denmark (*Folkebevægelsen mod EU*).”¹³²

Where networking is sought on the basis of an economic issue, transnational collaborations appear to support or oppose specific market ideologies. Indeed, the Spanish NGO *Ecologistas en Acción* (EeA) is reported to engage in transnational networks that are “devoted to criticize [*sic*] the neoliberal economic agenda of the EU.”¹³³ In regard to environmental issues, actors note that they seek collaborations in order to combat ecological threats such as global warming.¹³⁴ Where networking is sought on the basis of a social issue, such collaborations tend to confront the perceived social ills raised/tackled by national NGOs at a transnational level. This is exemplified in the UK material by a Welsh NGO the Anti-Poverty Network Cymru who seeks to confront poverty in Wales. In their transnational engagements, it is noted that they participate in the “European Anti-Poverty Network” which has the same agenda albeit at a supranational scale.¹³⁵ It is noteworthy that many of the NGOs included in the EUROSPHERE data claim some engagement within transnational NGO networks similar to the one above.



One might interpret the engagement of the national NGO actors within our sample material within such transnational NGO networks, as a form of “transnational collective action” in which the selected actors engage in “*coordinated international campaigns [...] against international actors, other states, or international institutions*” (della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 2-3, *emphasis*

in original text). Indeed, drawing upon a figure presented in the work of Donatella della Porta

¹³¹ <http://www.neitileu.no/english>.

¹³² No to the EU, *Nei til EU* (Sicakkan 2010: 85).

¹³³ *Ecologistas en Acción* (Álvarez et al. 2010: 82). Additional examples of such include the EeA’s collaborations in the “Seattle to Brussels Network, and the Europe – Latin America network ‘Enlazando Alternativas’” (Álvarez et al. 2010: 82).

¹³⁴ Examples of networking on the basis of environmental issues are particularly evident amongst the *Ecologistas en Acción*, Spain (Álvarez et al. 2010: 82) and the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, TMMOB (Küçük 2010: 33).

¹³⁵ Anti-Poverty Network Cymru (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2010: 60).

and Hanspeter Kriesi (2009: 5) (see **FIGURE 2** above), the articulations of networking between NGO actors located in our material is indicative of the transnational level interactions modelled. Such transnational interaction/networking is according to Goertz (1994: 82 cited della Porta and Kriesi 2009: 6) located in “a web of spatio-temporal relations.” It is these webs that are made visible in our analysis of the issue based cooperations of NGO actors. Further, various authors (*cf.* Castells 1997: 268; della Porta and Kriesi 2009: 6) note that transnational NGO/SMO networking is symptomatic of processes of globalization. Indeed, della Porta and Kriesi (2009: 6) point out that “[i]deas travel easily in the ‘global village’.”

6.4 Summary Discussion

It is striking that such a broad variety positions emerges (if only in an *ad hoc* manner), when the bases for transnational networking are articulated in the material. This breadth of networking is arranged around three bases for transnational action: (1) political orientation, (2) belonging/identity, and (3) functional explanations. The political orientation theme highlights our selected actors as engaging in transnational networking on the basis of social democratic, centre-right, nationalist far-right/populist and Green ideological positions. Whilst social democratic, centre-right and Green ideologies as a basis for transnational networking were exclusively articulated by political party actors, it was notable that networking on the basis of a nationalist far-right ideology was also articulated by different NGO actors.

By contrast, within the belonging/identity theme transnational collaborations have been identified on the basis of a regional (cross-border) identity, religious belonging and ethnic identity. Here, perhaps the most interesting finding to emerge from our material is that religious belonging as a basis for transnational cooperation was limited to the networking of Muslim NGOs. However, we cannot compare this finding to networking on the basis of other religious convictions, as they do not appear in our material.

The final theme serving as a basis for the collaboration between actors in our sampled material, functional explanations of transnational networking, can be roughly divided into the research interest based cooperation of think tank actors, collaboration between media actors, gender issues, and other issue-based forms of cooperation between NGO actors. Whilst functional bases for transnational networking are for the most part limited to specific types of actors, gender issues as a basis for transnational networking are articulated by different types of actors in our material (NGOs and political parties). In sum, while the above demonstrates that the bases for transnational networking are often linked to specific actor types and their

interests, the EUROSPHERE material selected for this analysis illustrates a considerable variation in the collaboration sought by actors in the EPS.

7 Public Sphere

The scope of a transnational public sphere or spheres denotes sustained border-crossing communication. Within our delineation of transnational communicative spaces from other forms such as national and international spaces and spaces tied to the EU polity, the transnational dimension refers to both border-crossing spaces of communication on the level of citizens and actors, and to border-crossing media spaces consisting of sustained two-way flows of news across national borders, or in regard to transnational media. From the perspective of mediation of political discourses, the media are more than simply a forum for discussion; they provide information that affects citizens' cognitions, attitudes and behaviours. In our study the transnational communicative spaces are generally approached by the respondents in a broad sense, as a general context for the interaction in which public discussions take place, ideas are circulated, and the political order is criticized (*cf.* Karppinen 2009: 57). There are not any notable differences between areas or actors in the **EUROSPHERE** material; furthermore, the interview discourses and discourses within the social scientific research are surprisingly analogous. The transnational public sphere is in our material mainly brought up in connection to four themes – the role of the media in the transnational public sphere; the transnational spheres as based on citizens' communicative participation and mobility; actor-specific transnational communicative spaces; and elitism within these spaces.

7.1 The Role of the Media

In the context of border-crossing communicative spaces, the media connects the segmented public spheres. A large amount of the citizens' experiences of politics involves media – the media represent a structured space in which speakers and actors can offer input for and engage in public discussions. News media provide an arena in which views may be expressed and announcements made by political actors, civil society and to some extent citizens; de Vreese and Boomgarden (2009: 118) stress the media as important locations for manifestations of the public sphere. Political events are re-contextualized within an emerging global space of meanings through world-wide news broadcasting; public opinion and attitudes, shared concerns and problem perceptions are shaped by the emerging global newsroom (Trenz 2009: 38). A Finnish political party interviewee notes that by reading

papers in the UK, Germany and France, one may well get the illusion of a common European discussion, but in Finland, such a conception is hardly evident. On the other hand, another Finnish interviewee points out that modern communications enable people to comment on events transnationally. The Finnish representatives outline a sub-sphere consisting of citizens who consume transnational media and engage in a European discussion.¹³⁶

The political news economy remains strongly nationalized within the European common market, and there are according to Hans-Jörg Trenz (2009) no genuinely European newspapers or TV channels that could constitute a European newsroom. The newspapers with a transnational character, such as the Financial Times, are mainly used for communication on the elite level. Trenz (*ibid.*: 42) stresses that investigations into the transnational dynamics of public communication must acknowledge that nationally confined media markets are already saturated, with only small niches left that can be occupied by European political communication. This aspect is brought up by a respondent from a German political party, who states that the development of the European public sphere points to a slow Europeanization of the media.¹³⁷ De Vreese and Boomgarden (2009: 119) also point out that even though European communicative spaces may exist at the level of national media, their focus is on specific topics and specific segments, defined as “elite quality newspapers”. The notion of a singular, pan-European public sphere has been largely abandoned in light of the failure of efforts to create pan-European media, as for example the newspaper The European and the subsidized Euronews.

According to Philip Schlesinger (1999: 276), there is no broad public engagement in European public affairs, but European media such as the Financial Times and the Economist are perceived as possible starting points; this is however still at a very initial stage. Some European elites have begun to constitute a constrained communicative space (Mörä 2009: 86). A Finnish think tank respondent shares this view – the EPS is perceived as an elite space that excludes citizens, as the available media such as Financial Times and the International Herald are perceived as “only reaching a self-selected group of English-speaking, well-educated, quite possibly Brussels-oriented political and maybe business elites”.¹³⁸ Peter A. Kraus (2008: 164) emphasizes that “the Financial Times can be considered the authoritative transnational press organ for political and economic elites with a strong interest in European affairs”, further stressing that it is in the context of elite communication where English has been

¹³⁶ Finnish Centre Party (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 111).

¹³⁷ Christian Democratic Union of Germany, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010: 69).

¹³⁸ The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 118).

visibly strengthening its position as an emerging *lingua franca* in Europe. The perceptions of Austrian media actors are divided, some stating that there is a single communication space of European media, as for example Euronews, while Europe lacks a common media according to others.¹³⁹ A Norwegian respondent from an NGO believes that the Eurosport channel creates some type of transnational public sphere, at least in the sense of an information flow or community of shared experience.¹⁴⁰ This is another central approach to the communication spaces in relation to media – the transnational public sphere is perceived as border crossing flows of news, rather than as tied to a specific medium.

Media respondents from Bulgaria perceive of themselves as contributing to the development of the communicative spaces through exchange of news.¹⁴¹ All the instances where transnational features of the public spheres are brought up as border crossing information flows are in statements by media actors. A Danish respondent highlights the cross-border distribution of news, stressing that “the stream of news across countries create a common frame of reference for anybody interested in following the discussions, we are ‘members of a dialoguing culture’”.¹⁴² An interviewee from a Turkish newspaper stresses that his/her employer contributes to various transnational spheres with international editions.¹⁴³ Interestingly, regardless of the significant role of border-crossing minority media in Europe (for example the Turkish *Hürriyet* with its editorial office in Germany, distributed to approximately 20 000 sales points in Germany and 30 000 across Europe¹⁴⁴) the role of minority media within the transnational communicative sphere is markedly absent in the **EUROSPHERE** material.

7.2 Transnational Citizens’ Spheres and Means of Communication – Internet, Mobility and Network Participation

The public sphere as a common reference point is according to Inka Salovaara-Moring central to European social cohesion from many perspectives – public communication enables integration of social imaginaries, bringing people from different cultural spheres together as fellow members of a shared community. When the public sphere transcends national borders it is itself a medium of broader social integration and social solidarity. (Salovaara-Moring 2009: 10.) A Finnish think thank respondent has from the perspective of citizens a positive

¹³⁹ *Standard* (Mokre 2010: 56).

¹⁴⁰ *No to EU, Nei til EU* (Sicakkan 2010: 86).

¹⁴¹ *Standard* Newspaper (Zografova et al. 2010: 99); *Dneven Trud* Newspaper (Zografova et al. 2010: 115).

¹⁴² *Jyllands-Posten* (Siim et al. 2010: 63).

¹⁴³ *Zaman* (Küçük 2010: 55).

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/eng/circulation.asp>

perception of the EPS, which is seen as a border crossing space for communicating mutual knowledge better and in a less partial way – as a channel for discussion about common issues.¹⁴⁵ The transnational citizens' spheres are within our material approached mainly from three different perspectives; in relation to the Internet, as generated through mobility and as communicative spaces in relation to network participation. The opinions of social scientists regarding the Internet as a basis for a citizens' public sphere or spheres are to some extent divided. The post-national public sphere has been approached from the role of the old and the new media as amplifiers of political knowledge and information – increasingly de-contextualised from local spaces. Cases of this kind of transnational communication are identified easily; “the Internet has developed into a powerful global communication tool that opened the first truly boundless communication space” (Cederman and Kraus 2005: 284). Information technology has a central position in the debate about how to promote a closer union of the people of Europe (*ibid*). Trenz (2009: 37) sees the Internet as giving everyone instant and affordable access to global information, simultaneously enabling anyone to publish to the world. Kraus (2008: 164-165), however, points out that uneven and inadequate spread of information technology may cause social exclusion both within and among the European countries. This aspect is mentioned by a respondent from a Hungarian political party, stating that the average citizen cannot participate in the transnational communicative spheres as the Internet and travelling is expensive. Hence, individuals have little chance of experiencing European communication according to this respondent.¹⁴⁶

A Danish interviewee from an NGO stresses the importance of the Internet and its “anarchistic qualities”,¹⁴⁷ as this enables communication free from political interference. The respondent emphasizes that there should be no political meddling concerning communication between citizens within and across countries.¹⁴⁸ A Norwegian media respondent sees the Internet as a natural platform as it demands little resources, but emphasizes that it is a medium which favours the more privileged middle and educated classes.¹⁴⁹ Two Hungarian NGO respondents stress that the Internet is a common European communication space *per se*.¹⁵⁰ Representatives of an Austrian political party see the Internet as a central aspect of a communication space of European citizens; they further stress the role of mobility, in

¹⁴⁵ The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 118).

¹⁴⁶ Hungarian Communist Workers Party, MKMP (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 88).

¹⁴⁷ Danish Association (Siim *et al.* 2010: 70).

¹⁴⁸ Danish Association (Siim *et al.* 2010: 70).

¹⁴⁹ *Klassekampen* (Sicakkan 2010: 92).

¹⁵⁰ Women's Rights Association, *Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen*, NANE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 90).

connection to for example travelling and migration.¹⁵¹ Mobility is also emphasized by Bulgarian political party representatives; direct communication is realized in relation to citizens' increased mobility and their qualification, work, travel through Europe – the improved mobility of citizens facilitates an increase in direct contacts.¹⁵² A Bulgarian NGO respondent, however, sees the communicative space of European citizens and residents as at its very initial stage of development.¹⁵³ A Finnish political party respondent points out that the student exchange and university cooperation contribute to the development of a transnational public sphere, stressing that as “the great dynamic emerges naturally, through the life lived, the new generation, which grows more European than any of the previous generations, is in a very crucial position”¹⁵⁴.

In some cases the notion of a citizens' sphere or spheres is perceived from the perspective of peoples' interests and identification. According to a Danish NGO respondent, a communication space exists among likeminded people with similar, often urban lifestyles.¹⁵⁵ One Norwegian NGO respondent speaks of a public sphere of private (elite) citizens – resourceful people who can afford travelling frequently to meet and know each other. These citizens are seen as consequently creating their own elite public sphere.¹⁵⁶ This view bears similarities with the notion of cosmopolitanism as a project of capitalism, that according to Craig Calhoun (2002: 11) “joins elites across national borders while ordinary people live in local communities” – a notion of frequent travellers with visa-friendly passports and credit cards, that easily enters and exits politics and social relations around the world (*ibid.*: 3). From a less elite-focused perspective, a Norwegian NGO respondent mentions football and music, such as youth music and opera, as examples of transnational public spheres.¹⁵⁷ Interest and identification based citizens' spheres are also discussed by a Norwegian NGO respondent who emphasizes the role of supranational and transnational participants – the Catholic and Protestant Churches, Mosques, the Rotary and Lions Clubs.¹⁵⁸

The transnational communicative spaces are by some interviewees perceived as partly related to territorial matters. One respondent, representing a Dutch media actor states that an EPS indeed is available for people who are interesting in entering it: “I have lived in it, worked in it. For me it is not a question that this space exists, but that it is not experienced by

¹⁵¹ Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ (Mokre 2010: 47).

¹⁵² Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (Zografova et al. 2010: 79).

¹⁵³ Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF (Zografova et al. 2010: 79).

¹⁵⁴ Finnish Social Democratic Party, SDP (Kraus et al. 2010: 110).

¹⁵⁵ Women's Council (Siim et al. 2010: 67). See also: *Extra Bladet* (Siim et al. 2010: 65).

¹⁵⁶ No to EU, *Nei til EU* (Sicakkan 2010: 86).

¹⁵⁷ The European Movement, *Europabevegelsen* (Sicakkan 2010: 88).

¹⁵⁸ The Anti-Racist Center, *Antirasistisk senter* (Sicakkan 2010: 83).

everyone in the same way. [...] [A European space] is there for everyone who uses it. Not everyone is using it or wants to use it”.¹⁵⁹ According to the respondent, a sub-sphere of mobile citizens exists, but it is not accessible to all European citizens, the respondent further highlights that the EPS may be experienced when living abroad, outside the protected sphere of the nation state.¹⁶⁰ Also a Spanish think tank interviewee refers to the existence of a practical dimension and awareness in relation to the transnational space; i.e., Germans residing in Majorca, or the personal experiences of middle-class and high-class students within the Erasmus programme.¹⁶¹ Border regions are brought up by one Dutch think tank representative as special cases in relation to public spheres: “[I]f you find yourself in a three border area, you can sense it [...] [A]mong some people there is certainly some sense of European transnationalism, but their number is very limited”.¹⁶²

7.3 The EPS as Multiple Overlapping Communication Spaces

The public sphere as multiple overlapping communicative spaces is a general perception in the EUROSPHERE material. This non-normative approach bears similitude with Hannu Nieminen’s (2009) suggestion that instead of speaking of one common border-crossing public sphere, European communication could be perceived as a multiplicity of networks, each encompassing a unique public sphere. “These networks operate across all areas of life, but in essence they are social and cultural in origin. These networks have developed, transformed, and vastly expanded across time and space, so that it is now difficult to distinguish clearly between different networks operating locally, nationally, transnationally, regionally, and trans-regionally as well as globally” (*ibid.*: 19). Multiple level communication spaces are acknowledged by all German actor types. Political party interviewees stress that multiple level communication spaces are open ended and that overlapping public spheres are the ideal form, and confirm the existence of transnational communication spaces.¹⁶³ Also a German NGO respondent highlights vivid trans-European communication, and sees overlapping public spheres as preferable. From a broader temporal perspective, one German political party representative brings up European-wide symbols and actions which have long been and still are in practice, denoting the work of churches, NGOs and lobby-organizations which already

¹⁵⁹ *NRC Handelsblad* (van de Beek et al. 2010: 181).

¹⁶⁰ *NRC Handelsblad* (van de Beek et al. 2010: 181).

¹⁶¹ CIDOB (Álvarez et al. 2010: 78).

¹⁶² Forum (van de Beek et al. 2010: 114).

¹⁶³ Unspecified actors in section “4.1.3 Views on the existence of communicative public space(s) in Europe” (Mackevics 2010: 69).

constitute the European level as an arena for action.¹⁶⁴ A respondent from a Danish newspaper stresses that plenty of interest associations already exist, and that people may develop formal and informal channels of cooperation as they wish.¹⁶⁵

Within the data, the most frequently occurring notion of sub-spheres is from an actor-oriented approach – the transnational communicative spaces are perceived as formed around political parties, social movements, academia and experts, and media. This is a general perception among Bulgarian respondents; border-crossing communicative spaces as organized around particular types of actors, existing on several levels.¹⁶⁶ Frequently mentioned types of actors involved in these spaces are politicians, experts, social movements, academic institutions and media.¹⁶⁷ Also members of Austrian NGOs agree on the existence of distinct border-crossing spheres on the levels of NGOs, political parties, social movements and European media.¹⁶⁸ The Spanish respondents follow along the same line – there are transnational sub-spheres of political elites, professionals, Erasmus students, academia, business, NGOs and media. A Turkish NGO respondent believes that there is a rapidly developing communicative space across national borders at the level of organizations and suggests that a common European communicative space might exist for experts such as university personnel – this is, however, limited to big cities.¹⁶⁹ In terms of the cross-border communicative spheres that exist around particular types of actors, the most frequent perception among the Hungarian interviewees follow the pattern of the above mentioned countries; the spheres are organized around political parties, media, experts and social movements.¹⁷⁰ One Hungarian think tank respondent, who sees the communicative space as multiple levels of overlapping European, transnational, national and sub-national spheres, stresses the importance of the vertical dimension due to the top-down directedness of the transnational public sphere.¹⁷¹

In the case of Denmark, only media and NGO interviewees discuss the sub spheres from a transnational perspective; these are perceived as communication spaces within some

¹⁶⁴ Christian Democratic Union of Germany, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010: 69).

¹⁶⁵ *Extra Bladet* (Siim et al. 2010: 65).

¹⁶⁶ See for example Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (Zografova et al. 2010: 79).

¹⁶⁷ For examples see: Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF (Zografova et al. 2010: 79); Bulgarian European Communities Studies Association, BECSA (Zografova et al. 2010: 84); *Sega Newspaper* (Zografova et al. 2010: 93).

¹⁶⁸ Poverty Conference (Mokre 2010: 45).

¹⁶⁹ TMMOB (Küçük 2010: 56).

¹⁷⁰ For examples see: Forum Hungarian Roma Organizations, *Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma*, MCF (Bozoki et al. 2010: 90); Hungarian Communist Workers Party, MKMP (Bozoki et al. 2010: 88); Political Capital, PC (Bozoki et al. 2010: 95).

¹⁷¹ Political Capital, PC (Bozoki et al. 2010: 95).

areas, between actors with similar interests.¹⁷² All interviewees from a Danish newspaper agree that there is no overarching common communication space, although there are some rudiments of it, but there are different transnational sub-public spheres, dealing with various types of interests, for example lobbyists, NGOs, various professional and economic interests.¹⁷³ Almost all Finnish actors stress that there is a common transnational space made up of several separate spheres of communication. Predominantly, the Finnish actors specify the media, political elites and civil servants, academic researchers and universities, business and economic interest (such as the European Central bank), social movements working in the same sectors, and the environmental movement.¹⁷⁴ In addition, one Finnish representative of a think tank notes that “language-based sub-spheres of discussion (for example, German and Spanish) will also survive”.¹⁷⁵ Language is also brought up by a German political party respondent, who stresses the knowledge sharing elements of the EPS with a particular focus on border regions as a sub-sphere of communication. Border regions, in which cross-border cooperation can be based on a common knowledge of historical, cultural and social developments of neighbours, are seen as integral parts of the European unification process with a bridgehead function; thus, a support of this transnational communication and collaboration is favoured, for example by promoting the knowledge of the neighbours’ language.¹⁷⁶

Interest and identification based spaces are another topic in the data. The prevailing opinion among Hungarian respondents is that there are several issue and actor specific transnational spheres. For example, respondents from a political party conceived of these sub-spheres as “based on occupation, religion, ethnic, economic, and cultural belonging”.¹⁷⁷ One interviewee from a Danish NGO states that it is possible to find trans-European communication groups based on almost any type of self-identification.¹⁷⁸ According to the respondents from this NGO, there are many intersecting spheres among different types of interest groups on a transnational level.¹⁷⁹ The perception of transnational spheres consisting of minorities is surprisingly rare in the EUROSPHERE material. One German NGO respondent

¹⁷² For examples see: Women’s Council (Siim *et al.* 2010: 67); Denmark’s Social Forum (Siim *et al.* 2010: 68).

¹⁷³ *Politiken* (Siim *et al.* 2010: 64).

¹⁷⁴ For examples see: True Finns, TF (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 112); The Finnish Business and Policy Forum, EVA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 119); Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, AFCI (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 115); *Hufvudstadsbladet*, HBL (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 120).

¹⁷⁵ The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 118).

¹⁷⁶ Christian Democratic Union of Germany, *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU (Mackevics 2010: 65).

¹⁷⁷ Hungarian Civic Union, FIDESZ (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 87).

¹⁷⁸ Democratic Muslims (Siim *et al.* 2010: 71).

¹⁷⁹ Democratic Muslims (Siim *et al.* 2010: 71).

refers to minorities spread over different countries in regards to European communicative spaces.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, a Hungarian NGO interviewee points out that a joint public sphere for the Roma exists in relation to the European Roma Forum.¹⁸¹ A transnational public sphere related to the Roma minority is also brought up by a Finnish NGO respondent, however from a different perspective – “Roma issues” are perceived as discussed jointly in many European countries.¹⁸² Accordingly, one respondent from another Finnish NGO points out that there are thematic sub-spheres around minority questions.¹⁸³

Respondents from Norwegian think tanks conceive of the European public space as existing among particular types of actors and/or topics; for example a border-crossing public sphere for think tanks and other social and political actors, which makes it an elitist one in the sense that there is little citizens’ representation.¹⁸⁴ This is a perception further discussed in the following subchapter. Interviewees from one Norwegian think tank see the EPS as not necessarily limited to the borders of the EU, stressing that sometimes Russia, Norway and other non-EU countries also participate.¹⁸⁵ However, the interviewees from another Norwegian think tank state that there is a division between EU countries and non-EU countries in terms of access.¹⁸⁶ A normative approach is brought up by a German political party, declaring that it supports the development of European NGOs, trade unions and citizens’ initiatives and sees the need of taking weak interest groups into account. This may according to the respondents be interpreted as the ideal model.¹⁸⁷ The sub-sphere approach of the respondents in the above mentioned countries has similarities with Nieminen’s suggestion on the public sphere as spaces of networks; the concept of public sphere within the framework of the network approach can according to Nieminen be understood as a space or spaces of negotiation among different networks. As all modes of networks are based on some kind of membership, rules of exclusion and inclusion are necessarily brought about. (Nieminen 2009: 31.) This kind of a descriptive approach towards transnational communicative spaces differs from the normative one, rather denoting border-crossing webs of ongoing communication, than as fora for transnational *demos* (see Fraser 2007). Kraus (2008: 150) stresses that there is

¹⁸⁰ Unspecified actor in section “4.2.3 Views on the existence of communicative public space(s) in Europe” (Mackevics 2010: 76).

¹⁸¹ Forum Hungarian Roma Organizations, *Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma*, MCF (Bozoki et al. 2010: 90).

¹⁸² Finnish Red Cross, FRC (Kraus et al. 2010: 114).

¹⁸³ Sámi Association of Finland, SAF (Kraus et al. 2010: 115).

¹⁸⁴ The Liberal Think Tank, CIVITA (Sicakkan 2010: 78).

¹⁸⁵ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI (Sicakkan 2010: 80).

¹⁸⁶ International Peace Research Institute, PRIO (Sicakkan 2010: 81).

¹⁸⁷ German Green Party, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, Greens (Mackevics 2010: 66).

not yet an interculturally networked space of political communication on a transnational level that would fulfil the minimum requirements of a critical public sphere.

7.4 The Exclusive Character of the Transnational Public Spheres

According to de Vreese and Boomgarden (2009: 119), research has distinguished segmented transnational public spheres, conceptualized as issues-specific communicative spaces largely dominated by political and economic elites. The perception of the transnational communicative spaces in the European context as elite spheres excluding citizens is notably shared by both social scientists and respondents in our data. According to Austrian political party respondents, elites control and censor information; consequently women, citizens and minorities are occasionally excluded.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, Bulgarian respondents conceive of the EPS as an elite sphere which excludes private citizens.¹⁸⁹ The transnational public sphere is by a Danish media respondent perceived as functioning only at an elite level, “only for those belonging to ‘the European jet-set’”.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, a Danish think tank respondent expresses scepticism that the EPS will ever evolve beyond those interacting at an elite/specialist level.¹⁹¹ The main perception of the exclusive character of the border-crossing public sphere among the Turkish respondents is in regards to the existence of sub-spheres for elites and experts; respondents highlight the exclusive forms, and the difficulties in gaining access. A Turkish think tank interviewee stresses that only educated, middle-class elites participate in the EPS,¹⁹² and according to a Turkish NGO respondent the communication takes only place among elites.¹⁹³ A British think tank representative mentions groups of cosmopolitans as an example of people living in a transnational sphere of their own.¹⁹⁴ According to another British respondent, there are cross-border public spheres of politicians, journalists and experts that nevertheless exclude ordinary citizens.¹⁹⁵

More often than not, the EPS excludes “normal citizens” according to respondents from a Finnish NGO.¹⁹⁶ The exclusion mainly concerns people with a lower level of education and senior citizens according to a Finnish political party representative.¹⁹⁷ In

¹⁸⁸ Austrian Green Party, *Gruene* (Mokre 2010: 47).

¹⁸⁹ *Ataka* Coalition (Zografova et al. 2010: 79).

¹⁹⁰ *Jyllands-Posten* (Siim et al. 2010: 63).

¹⁹¹ DIIS (Siim et al. 2010: 62).

¹⁹² TESEV (Küçük 2010: 52).

¹⁹³ ABF (Küçük 2010: 56).

¹⁹⁴ Centre for European Reform (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2010: 57).

¹⁹⁵ No Borders (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2010: 61).

¹⁹⁶ Demos Helsinki (Kraus et al. 2010: 118).

¹⁹⁷ The Finnish Centre Party (Kraus et al. 2010: 111).

addition, one interviewee from a Finnish think tank sees the EPS as an elite space, stressing that the available media (the International Herald and Tribune and the Financial Times) only reaches their elite readership.¹⁹⁸ According to a Finnish NGO interviewee, several transnational elite sub-spheres exist based upon shared interests, and exclude citizens and “the socially disadvantaged” from participation.¹⁹⁹ In general, the Hungarian respondents from political parties, NGOs and think tanks deem that access to transnational communication spaces is unequal and a majority of citizens are excluded from them. Among some Italian respondents, the EPS is perceived as existing only among “opinion-makers” and is “insufficient, elitist and too small”. With regard to the functions, another respondent from the same think tank adds that it is a policy oriented and problem solving space – difficult to access and often excluding the civil society.²⁰⁰ The transnational sub-spheres noted by Dutch respondents are communication spaces of elites and politicians, characterized by a certain degree of exclusion, and existing mainly for the elite. A Dutch political party respondent wishes that more people would have the feeling that they are part of it.²⁰¹ Among two Norwegian political parties, there is somewhat of an agreement that an EPS does exist at elite level, where the public does not participate.²⁰² Interviewees from a Norwegian think tank observe that there is a transnational public sphere among specific societal actors, which makes the existing public sphere an elitist one in the sense that there is little citizens’ representation.²⁰³ In terms of the two Norwegian media actors’ perceptions on the EPS, the respondents’ overall opinions are that it exists in an exclusionary and elitist form²⁰⁴. An interviewee from a Norwegian newspaper states that “there is one general part of the European public sphere to which everyone has access, and another one at the elite level, which is dominated by economical and political elites, and which the media to great extent is part of”.²⁰⁵ Also several of the Norwegian NGO interviewees observe that there are communication spheres for particular actors, to which private citizens have only a limited access. In most cases the elitist nature of EPS is mentioned in a fairly explicit manner, as in

¹⁹⁸ The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 118).

¹⁹⁹ Finnish Red Cross, FRC (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 114).

²⁰⁰ *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, IAI (Sciortino 2010: 56).

²⁰¹ Dutch GreenLeft, *GroenLinks* (van de Beek *et al.* 2010: 67).

²⁰² The Norwegian Conservative Party, *Høyre* (Sicakkan 2010: 77). For a similar comment see: The Norwegian Labor Party, *Arbeiderpartiet*, DNA (Sicakkan 2010: 76).

²⁰³ The Liberal Think Tank, CIVITA (Sicakkan 2010: 78).

²⁰⁴ See for example: *Klassekampen* (Sicakkan 2010: 92).

²⁰⁵ *Dagbladet* (Sicakkan 2010: 90).

the case of an NGO representative who states that “[p]ublic debates forego [*sic*] between political elites, and excludes citizens because of language barriers”.²⁰⁶

The issue of language is brought up by Spanish respondents, mentioning some form of exclusion, elite rule or need for more communicative equality: “the existing spaces are somehow elitist, because European elites have more information, more mobility, as well as more intercultural and linguistic skills”.²⁰⁷ Language is brought up by two Spanish political parties as a central factor in the pan-European communicative spheres; according to the interviewees, the key element is language – “you need to be proficient in English in order to access the existing communication space, and therefore it is much easier for cultural elites to access it”.²⁰⁸ Interestingly, a Welsh nationalist political party respondent from the UK, on the other hand, points out that British citizens are isolated from the “European core” due to a lack of skills in foreign languages.²⁰⁹ According to a Norwegian think tank interviewee the effectiveness of a public sphere on a transnational level is limited by the lack of a common language, hence also the basis of exclusion depends on language.²¹⁰ Also a Norwegian NGO respondent emphasizes linguistic aspects – the access to a larger border-crossing sphere is largely limited by language barriers²¹¹; this view is shared by an interviewee from another Norwegian NGO.²¹² A German think tank interviewee points out that, with regard to exclusion, education is not a relevant aspect anymore, but rather media and linguistic skills are gaining importance; another respondent from the same think tank also stresses that besides institutions, economic and cultural elites participate in the European communication.²¹³ A Dutch political party respondent emphasizes that although trans-European cooperation increases, language will remain a restrictive factor. “People are very much oriented to their own language area. Indeed, there is an elite that is able to think and debate in the English language, and for whom European borders are less important, but I think that a real European public sphere will be limited by the language problem”.²¹⁴ A Finnish political party interviewee stresses that the lack of a common language is a hinder to the development of a transnational communicative sphere. A respondent from the same actor points out that

²⁰⁶ The European Movement, *Europabevegelsen* (Sicakkan 2010: 88).

²⁰⁷ *Partido Popular*, PP (Álvarez et al. 2010: 75).

²⁰⁸ *Federació Convergència i Unió*, CiU (Álvarez et al. 2010: 76).

²⁰⁹ *Plaid Cymru* (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2010: 59).

²¹⁰ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI (Sicakkan 2010: 80).

²¹¹ No to EU, *Nei til EU* (Sicakkan 2010: 86).

²¹² The European Movement, *Europabevegelsen* (Sicakkan 2010: 88).

²¹³ Unspecified actor in section “4.3.3 Views on the existence of communicative public space(s) in Europe” (Mackevics 2010: 82).

²¹⁴ People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands), *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD (van de Beek et al. 2010: 83).

individual citizens, especially the ones with a lower level of education and modest language skills, are excluded.²¹⁵ Also two respondents from a Hungarian NGO stress that in addition to the poor, those not familiar with English or French are excluded from the European public sphere.²¹⁶ A Hungarian think tank respondent states that both language barriers and a consequent disinterestedness exclude citizens in general from the transnational public sphere.²¹⁷ The frequent notion within the EUROSPHERE material of the risks of the transnational public sphere only evolving at the level of elites makes Kraus' observation on the dangers involved in the development of transnational communication quite fitting – experts and elites may become isolated, sealing off entire areas of decision-making into specialized forums from where citizens will be excluded (Kraus 2008: 152). In addition to individuals with lacking linguistic skills, also the aged, unskilled and uneducated are seen as excluded from the transnational communicative spaces. Furthermore, one respondent thinks that the EPS is controlled by transnational corporations and large media companies, and that it is patriarchal.²¹⁸ It is interesting to note that the emphasis in the EUROSPHERE material on the transnational communicative spaces as elitist is articulated by elite representatives *per se*.

7.5 Summary Discussion

There are many similarities between the perceptions on the transnational public sphere of the respondents in the EUROSPHERE material and the general views within social sciences. The general approach within the material is covered by Nieminen's (2009) definition of *the processual line of thinking*. The approach perceives the sphere as elitist, on the level of media dominated by elite press. Furthermore, there are “weak” or general publics that consist of non-politically oriented everyday communication (such as the notion of citizens' spheres within the EUROSPHERE material); segmented issue-based publics including social movements, civic activities *et cetera* (such as the actor-related sub-spheres in the EUROSPHERE material), with an intention of influencing political decision makers; and on the top-level strong publics consisting of decision makers, embodied in supranational polities (such as Euro-spaces; *ibid.*: 23).

²¹⁵ Swedish People's Party (Finland), SPP (Kraus *et al.* 2010: 108).

²¹⁶ Women's Rights Association, *Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen*, NANE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 90).

²¹⁷ Institute for World Economics, IWE (Bozoki *et al.* 2010: 93).

²¹⁸ *Ecologistas en Acción* (Álvarez *et al.* 2010: 85).

8 Conclusions

Transnational phenomena appear in various articulated forms in our discussion. The first sections of this report focus on describing articulations of transnational interactions with regard to national minorities and international migration. The former, articulated in terms of societal diversity, centres upon relations/policies of states towards their perceived co-ethnics that we deem to be transnational. In our study the most visible examples of such “deterritorialized nation-states” (Basch *et al.* 1994) are Bulgaria and Hungary, which both have significant numbers of “nationals” living outside the state borders, and which employ various arrangements to maintain contact with their perceived co-ethnics. The section on migration offers a discussion of interactions which involve both migrants and sending and receiving countries. The articulated aspects of transnational interactions which take place between migrants and the residents of their countries of origin include social relations, remittances and the diffusion of values and skills. The discussion on transnational aspects of migration where states play an active role focuses on ways to regulate migration, including opinions on circular and temporary migration and on citizenship legislations.

The latter two sections of this report describe the transnational facets of networking and public spheres. With regard to the transnational networking of the analyzed EUROSPHERE actors, our discussion focuses on the articulations which describe the various bases of cooperation. Such bases consist of the political orientations of various actors, belonging/identity issues and functional collaborations motivated by specific issues. Amongst political parties, unsurprisingly, political orientation plays a prominent role in the articulated transnational engagements of the actors. Belonging/identity issues come to the fore in articulations where the basis for transnational cooperation is motivated by a shared regional (cross-border) identity, a religious belonging or an ethnic identity. Functional cooperation, where articulated, involves think tanks, NGOs and Media actors. Whereas cooperation among media actors focuses on the sharing of content, NGO actors tend to motivate their collaborations as based upon common agendas (e.g., fighting perceived social ills such as poverty). Think tank actors, on the other hand, stress their cooperation as taking place on the basis of common research interests.

There are no major differences between countries or actors concerning the perceptions of the transnational public sphere. The concept of public sphere is approached from three different angles – as a sphere constituted around transnational media; as a sphere related to European citizens through virtual communication, mobility and network participation; and as

transnational sub-spheres related to social movements, political parties, experts and academia, economic actors, and to a lesser extent as interest and identification based spheres, denoting culture, language, minority groups *et cetera*. A general theme is the exclusive character of the transnational communicative spaces. These are by respondents from all countries perceived as existing mainly for the elite, and often excluding citizens. Linguistic issues are also brought up in this context, the transnational communicative spaces being perceived as excluding people with limited language skills.

Several of the findings are rather striking and deserve further exploration. Substantial portions of the material point at the great importance the ‘national’ dimension continues to have in the articulation of transnational spaces. Thus, the dynamics of transnationalization cannot be easily associated with a process that would entail the supersession of nationalism. To a significant extent, the very emergence of transnational patterns of interactions seems to be reinforcing national allegiances at the same time. Such a tendency becomes particularly visible in two East European countries, namely Bulgaria and Hungary. Here, ethno-national diversity is largely framed in the terms of what one might call ‘kin-state transnationalism’. It is hard to determine on the basis of the EUROSPHERE data to what extent the phenomenon in question should be associated with an ongoing exacerbation of conflicts along nationalist lines. At any rate, however, recent political developments in the region do not indicate that Europeanization and transnationalization have involved an abatement of nationalist cleavages. Finally, the evidence from our material also appears to be somewhat sobering for those who place major hopes in the participatory potential opened up thus far through the formation of transnational public spheres. In a nutshell, the picture we get is that the elites interviewed in the EUROSPHERE research largely perceive the segments of the transnational public in which they communicate as being highly elitist. This general perception ultimately corroborates the view that the democratic quality of transnational communicative processes in Europe still remains limited due to the lack of a mass-based participatory infrastructure.

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