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Trans-Europeanizing Political Spaces in Europe

Hakan G. Sicakkan

Are there any trans-border interactions and networking patterns, any common systems of competing political discourses, and/or any common channels, platforms, or arenas of communication, which can be regarded as the beginnings of a European public sphere? If so, how is this embryonic European public sphere being structured? By using interview and institutional data collected from more than 200 civil society organizations operating at member state and trans-European levels, this research aims to answer these questions.

1 Introduction

There are few widely recognized facts to help explain the processes of change in today’s Europe – but what are established as facts depict a remarkable picture: The European territory is owned and politically structured by nations and nation states. The relations between the European states are to a considerable extent characterized by an unprecedented degree of supranational and intergovernmental institutionalization through the European Union and other European organizations and treaties – and the current development is towards more supranational integration. Although these international institutions shape their lives increasingly more, the citizens continue to play a miniscule role in European level decision-making. Next, Europe is inhabited by a complex diversity of historical and new publics. These publics – e.g., minority publics, national publics, transnational publics, European publics, and new publics that are more challenging to categorize – create their distinct, internal discursive and interactive spaces. More importantly, the institutional and other collective actors emerging from and operating in these distinct spaces, and voicing the publics that inhabit these spaces, interact increasingly more beyond the existing boundaries.

Some of these trans-boundary communications and interactions – be they collaborations, conflicts, exchanges, or contestations – are explained with common past, shared cultural heritage, collective identities, geographical proximity, economic structures and incentives, practical suitability, exit/voice possibilities, political opportunity structures, and elitism. This research is about the ingredients of this reality that cannot be explained exclusively by such factors, but also with the increasing physical and mental mobility, or immobility if one will, of people that enables them to transcend their immediate surroundings, something which allows them to identify with distant political entities, hard-to-imagine collectivities, and less
tangible ideas about their own belongings. The social and political dynamics triggering the emergence of a European public sphere must be sought in the tensions between, on one hand, the architects and gatekeepers and, on the other, the transcenders and trespassers of borders and boundaries within and around the existing and newly emerging European publics. Through submission, compliance, endorsement, resistance, and opposition; through boundary-making, gate-keeping, trespassing, and transcendence; the architects and trespassers create multiple poles and polarizations in the very same European political space.

To what extent can this phenomenon – creation of a transnationally shared political space through transcendence and trespassing of boundaries – be regarded as the beginnings of a multi-level, multi-pole, multi-public European public sphere? More concretely, are there any trans-border networks or interaction patterns, any common systems of competing political discourses, and/or any common channels, platforms, or arenas of communication, which can be regarded as the beginnings of a European public sphere? If so, how is this embryonic European public sphere being structured? Although the various answers given in earlier research have not been entirely affirmative, it is worthwhile to revisit this old question with new comprehensive empirical evidence collected in the Eurosphere project.

This research deploys a synthesis of actor-oriented, network-oriented, and discourse-oriented approaches to the study of the European public sphere, combining them in a political-space perspective. First, the paper gives the main outline of Eurosphere research programme in order to put this study in context. Then, it depicts the current structure of only one component of the European public sphere, the trans-Europeanizing political spaces, by analyzing the discourses and networks of the collective actors that are identified as the most visible participants in the national and trans-European public spheres. Next, it does an attempt to answer the question of whether these actors, networks and discourses can be regarded as components constituting a shared trans-European European political space.

2 Diversity, Polity and Public Sphere

Although mainstream approaches state that public sphere is a space located between the state and civil society, they hold that public spheres are not limited to countries’ borders. Participation in public sphere is not membership based, and everybody can freely take part in it. However, if public sphere is a space between the state and civil society, between citizens and political institutions, its external boundaries are drawn by its definition: it must have clear external boundaries in terms of who inhabits it and who speaks in it. In reality, “outsiders” are not expected to take party or “intervene” in “our own” matters; it is the right of those who are
directly affected by state actions to speak in the public sphere. Earlier research on EPS shows that there is little “foreign” appearance in national public spheres on themes of internal relevance compared to the appearances of national actors.\footnote{Peters 2006} External boundaries of public spheres must, then, be expected to follow polities’ borders, expansions of states’ territories (through unifications, secessions, enlargements, invasions), and the movements of people (transnational and global politics emerging from migration and other sorts of physical and mental mobility) – because it is these phenomena that affect the composition of who inhabit it. Therefore, polity borders have to be taken as a relevant dimension of public sphere’s external boundaries. However, by polity borders, one should understand the zone of a state’s power and influence in and beyond physical borders. Indeed, this is what is happening in the European Union: boundaries of national public spheres are changing, though slowly and slightly, as the EU political institutions become relevant as a new political center increasing its decision power on citizens’ lives. Earlier findings indicating the presence of EPS on certain themes, and not on other issues, are due to the degree of the EU’s decision power on different themes.\footnote{Latzer and Saurwein 2006} Therefore, one should expect to observe a more clearly present EPS on, say, enlargement and EU constitution issues than on issues concerning citizenship and diversity – because the EU has attempted to exert central power concerning the former.

Secondly, if public sphere is a space inhabited by state institutions, persons, groups, civil society organizations, etc, then, processes of internal inclusion, marginalization and exclusion that are in place in all human interactions must be expected to be in full force also in the public sphere. Issues of inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion are about internal power relations between the groups constituting the citizen body in a state, and they shape the social and political cleavage structures on which the political system and politics in a country is based. These power relations have historical roots in the initial geopolitical conditions at the onset of a country’s state formation and nation building process. Indeed, state forms and regimes are based on such initial conditions prior to state formation processes.\footnote{Rokkan (1975), Sicakkan (2005, 2008).} It is largely these cleavage structures entrenched in diversity and power (defined in different ways in different historical contexts) that determine which inclusions/ exclusions and which notions of diversity are legitimate and relevant in public sphere and in policymaking. Union states (e.g., UK), federal/confederal states (e.g., Germany, Switzerland), and unitary states (e.g., France, Scandinavia) in Europe came into being as a result of the power relations between the groups.
in the diverse societies inhabiting the territory and public sphere of a political center that attempted to consolidate that territory. This historical fact about varieties in formation of European states and their politics is the biggest challenge awaiting the Europeanists longing for a common EPS. If polity boundaries are relevant for the boundaries of public sphere, then internal territorial power structures of states should be expected to be reflected on the structure of public sphere. In federal state forms with strong local governments, for example, public sphere should be expected to be more segmented than in unitary states with a strong degree of centralization. This is simply because, if public sphere is about politics between the rulers and the ruled, then a segmented political rule will result in a segmented public sphere.

Indeed, observed rhetoric and practice about diversity in the European Union implies that national diversity is the “most legitimate” diversity at European level politics. European level politics barely relates to member states’ internal diversities beyond accepting the normative approaches about the minority definition and minority rights developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Concerning diversity issues, the power balance between member states and European level institutions is in favor of the member states, and if there is a European public sphere, it should be expected to be segmented along national boundaries with trans-Europeanization tendencies on certain themes. However, the variety of approaches to internal diversity in member states and the emerging complex trans-European multilevel governance system in Europe, which makes some decision-making levels redundant on certain policy issues, should be expected to make this depiction foggier than what the previous statement suggests. The question of which diversities are legitimate in public sphere and considered relevant for policymaking in national and European public debates is, therefore, a key indicator of the prospects for a common European public sphere. A rigorous research effort on the EPS should therefore identify the variations as well as alignments and misalignments between European and national level public debates, concerning which diversities are relevant for policymaking. Such a research effort will also serve as an inquiry into the initial conditions of the EU-polity formation processes.

This brief discussion aimed to demonstrate the importance of identifying how polity, diversity, and public sphere constitute each other differently in different contexts, and the relevant of this thought for conceptualization of the European public sphere. These three phenomena subsist in each other and exist in symbiosis. The symbiotic co-existence is the biggest challenge to research attempts to identify the presence of an EPS in the present context of unpredictability about the direction of political development in the EU.
3 Accommodating Diversity in the Public Sphere

Approaches to accommodation of diversity in the public sphere are inspired by discussions between individualists, communalists, multiculturalists, and pluralists. To accommodate individual differences, individualists\(^4\) suggest a single, discursive public sphere (e.g., Jürgen Habermas). For the European case, this implies “Europeanization of national public spheres” (e.g., Jürgen Gerhards, Erik O. Eriksen). Colonialists and multiculturalists propose multiple, segmented public spheres at two levels to accommodate separate historical/cultural communities in one polity (e.g., Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka).\(^5\) In case of Europe, this implies a segmented public sphere divided along the lines of national (and sub-national) cultures (e.g., Peter G. Kielmannsegg). Criticizing both alternatives because of their singular recipes for good life, pluralists\(^6\) advocate the midway perspective of accommodating both individual and group differences in multiple, multi-level public spheres (e.g., Nancy Fraser’s subaltern counter-publics). The implication of this for the European case is “a European sphere of publics” (e.g., Philip Schlesinger).

\(^4\) Liberal-republican version of the individualist approach emerges from a rapprochement between liberals and republicans. On the liberal side, Habermas asserted that individual identities needed to change in order to function in a democratic constitutional state. For membership in a democratic constitutional state requires a civic political culture based on public deliberation and communicative action. Effectivity in the public sphere as participating citizens and, for this purpose, assimilation into the deliberative political culture was what Habermas expected from all individuals (Habermas 1994). In the private sphere, he concurred, individuals did not need to adapt their particular identities to society at large. The limit to change was political culture. This stance is, on the one hand, republican, because it requires individuals’ assimilation into a political culture and their identification with a constitution – i.e. constitutional patriotism. On the other, it is also liberal because it allows individual and group identities to exist in the private sphere. From the republican side, Barber argued that it was necessary to create the civic identity that is essential in a “strong democracy”, without requiring individuals to abandon their group identities, as long as such identities allow individuals to assume their civic responsibilities and duties (Barber 1994, 1998).

\(^5\) There are varieties of multiculturalism: Amongst reputed multiculturalists, Kymlicka (1995) advocated “liberal policies of multiculturalism”. Based on the ontological priority of individuals and their autonomy, he asserted that individuals can choose to belong to certain communities. As long as a communal identity is an individual choice, he claimed, multiculturalist policies and rights regimes based on groups were defensible. On the communal side, Walzer defended a type of communitarianism based on individuals’ choice. Walzer made a distinction between two types of liberalism (Walzer 1990). In Walzer’s framework, Liberalism-1 can be similar to the Kantian or Lockean liberalisms. Liberalism-2 emerges from Liberalism-1 as a result of individuals’ free choices to belong to a particular community. In Walzer’s approach, communal identity is defended because it is understood as an individual choice. On the other hand, departing from communitarian premises, Taylor, too, defended multiculturalist policies and rights regimes, but those which were based on the priority and autonomy of communities (Taylor 1992). Although their ethical and ontological premises were substantially different, liberal and communitarian multiculturalisms have become quite similar in their policy implications: recognition of group rights, affirmative action policies, sovereignty devolutions/autonomy to suppressed historical minorities, etc.

\(^6\) Similarly, one finds a multitude of pluralist approaches to diversity. Radical pluralism (e.g., John Gray 2000) argues with a point of departure in the incommensurability of value-sets in diverse society. Proposing a context-sensitive Modus Vivendi as a solution for co-existence in diverse societies, the basic assumption in radical pluralism seems to be a momentous fixity of individuals’ and groups’ cognitive positions in relation to different identification alternatives that are available in society. The diversity perspective of Eurosphere, accepting the incommensurability argument only partially, assumes that individuals have different degrees of mobility of minds between the existing alternatives as well as self-created alternatives.
These four normative approaches unfold differently at various intersections of (1) individualism/collectivism and (2) internal and external openness/closedness of the political system. Figure 1 illustrates a ranking of six models of political society, which are derived from the above-mentioned ontological approaches, along two dimensions: *vision of political system* and *image of person*. The former dimension represents “political visions” in terms of preferences concerning direct democracy, which empowers all social groups to be effectively influential in the political decision-making process and allow radical changes in the political system through mass participation. The latter dimension conceptualizes “image of man” in terms of beliefs about the alterability of human identity and belonging independently of individuals’ immediate surroundings. The combination of these two dimensions implies six political society models in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Six Normative Models of Society](image)

Commonality of these four paradigms – individualism, communalism, multiculturalism, and pluralism – is their embedded perspective of difference and their focus on accommodation of differences. Difference thinking conceives individuals/groups as indivisible wholes and potentially restricts our thinking to what is shared between people and between communities. Even in radical versions of pluralism that are based on incommensurability arguments and *Modus Vivendi* solutions, like that of John Gray (2000), difference thinking underestimates
the role of communication, and mental and physical mobility between different types of public spaces and value sets – not the least communication through media. The diversity perspective that we attempt to develop at the end of this research project takes into consideration such “anomalies” to a greater extent than these four perspectives.

The conceptual frameworks in Figure 1 comprise various relationships between internal and external boundaries, norms, institutions, public sphere, form of political society (the perpendicular axis) and individuals’ belongings and identities (the horizontal axis). The models which advocate radical openness for internal systemic changes through direct democracy, and which at the same time assume that individuals’ basic features such as culture, life-style, identity and political preferences are unalterable, prescribe the most restrictive models of inclusion in the public sphere (e.g. the community-of-culture perspective). On the other end of this continuum, those models which advocate radical openness for systemic changes and which simultaneously hold that human identity is utterly changeable, prescribe the most inclusive models of public sphere (e.g. the diverse-society perspective). The way of conceptualizing diversity and inclusion / exclusion of different types of belongings in each model is different.

Table 1: Theoretical Relationships between Models of Public Sphere and Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visions of Political Society</th>
<th>Types of Belongings and Diversity Allowed in the Public Sphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singular and Historically Fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community of culture</td>
<td>1. Single Protected Sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The multicultural society</td>
<td>2. Multiple Segmented Spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civic political society</td>
<td>3. Single Shared Sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civil political society</td>
<td>4. Multi-level Overlapping Nested Spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civil plural society</td>
<td>5. Multi-level Differential Spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civic diverse society</td>
<td>6. Multiple Composite Eurospheres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 gives a simplified overview of theoretical relationships between visions of political society, notions of diversity, and envisioned models of public sphere. These conceptual relationships constitute the alternative scenarios and the general heuristic frame for empirical research in Eurosphere. In our attempt to answer the overall research question (“Are an inclusive public spheres possible in the context of the European Union?”), extensions / modifications of some of the theoretical public sphere models in Table 1 will be tested with respect to how inclusive they are in various concrete European contexts, including both sub-national, national, and European level actors and channels/networks of communication and interaction.

The horizontal axis (types of belongings) of Table 1 lists the assumptions about humans’ belongings, indicating the belongings acceptable for inclusion in the public sphere. The perpendicular axis (visions of society) represents the envisaged forms political society. Corresponding public sphere models are placed on the diagonal at different intersections of the two prime dimensions. The first three models (community of culture, multicultural society, and civic political community) have particularistic or universalistic presuppositions concerning the relationship between diversity and public sphere. The other three models (civil political community, civil plural society, and the civic diverse society) can be distinguished from the former three models with their ambition of context-sensitivity. The common concern in the last three models is to include, give voice to, and empower all the segments of the European societies in an effective public sphere, though in different ways. Their differences lie primarily in the ontological status they give to individuals’ different modes of belonging and identity in their perspectives of diversity.

The first model, “community of culture”, largely corresponds to the communitarian vision of society which views the common culture as the essential element of a society that provides a meaning frame for individuals – there is no meaning outside the context of a community culture. Without community and its culture, thus, the individual cannot exist. In this understanding, public sphere is a social space that accommodates and ensures the continuation of a collective meaning frame that is shared by all members of the community, in a Deweyian\(^7\) or Taylorian\(^8\) sense. Public sphere does not only serve as an instrument providing democratic legitimacy to power-holders; as a space where the gist of the community is created, preserved, reproduced, and transferred from generation to generation.

The community’s common public sphere is an end in itself. Therefore, public sphere has to be a protected space, since by shielding it we also save the community and the meaning frame that it produces and accommodates. According to this understanding, the only way of protecting the community and its public sphere is to organize the society as a small polity, as Dewey suggested, territorially and institutionally separate from other communities. In the case of European Union, this model’s viability is low. Indeed, the communitarian paradigm, in its most radical form, would be against creating a common European Public Sphere because this would mean destruction of meaning-bearing communities.

The “multicultural society” model unfolds differently in communalist and individualist perspectives. We will deal with individualist multiculturalism under another public sphere model. Communalist multiculturalism does not regard organization in a small sovereign polity as a necessity. Instead, it requires political autonomy for collective groups claiming a right to a unique culture (e.g., ethno-religious and ethno-national groups) in territorially divided federal political systems. Apart from opening for sharing in a common federal polity with other communities, communalist multiculturalism is similar to the “community-of-culture” perspective in its ontological and normative premises. In communalist multiculturalism, the public sphere model is segmented along the boundaries of the communities constituting the federal polity, and there is little horizontal communication and interaction across the boundaries of communities’ public spaces; but much communication, deliberation, interaction, and collaboration through community representatives at the federal level.

The third model in Table 1, “civic political society”, corresponds to the liberal-republican society model. Identities and belongings are viewed as alterable independently of individuals’ belonging backgrounds – an assumption that fits nicely with this model’s requirement of citizens’ assimilation into a common political culture and abidance by the rules of the democratic game, while allowing for all types of belongings in the private sphere (cf. Habermas). As a space between the state and civil society where power-holders are criticized and held accountable, public sphere’s main function is formation of common will through public deliberations, following certain rules of communication and deliberation in the public sphere. For this to happen, all citizens and residents are expected to participate in political processes and public deliberation, no matter what belongings they may have. Hence, the civic political society perspective does not tolerate segmentations in the public sphere because, then, the formation of common would be impossible. Although never explicitly said or written, what we read between the lines of liberal-republican writings – especially those of
Habermas – is that the civic political society model requires a single public sphere, shared and freely participated in by all citizens and residents of a unitary polity.

The last three models agree that the plurality of belongings should be accommodated in inter-connected multiple public spheres; however, their designs vary between nested-overlapping, differential, and embracive spaces. The “civil political community model” is the individualist version of multiculturalism. Viewing the right to belong to a community as an individual choice, the individualist version of multiculturalism does not insist on strict autonomy, but allows it if this is the choice of individuals that freely come together to form a community. The model gives priority to discrete, singular and alterable forms of belonging in its approach to diversity, structures the public space on such belongings, and proposes ad hoc institutional solutions for inclusion of multiple and mobile forms of belonging. Its nested-overlapping public spaces pre-suppose a degree of homogeneity of belonging in nested, multi-level political units, based on the existing limitations that the Westphalian states system poses, where the nested overlapping communities have a high degree of autonomy to bypass governance levels above themselves. Therefore, it pre-supposes the existence of a complex set of community specific public spaces which overlap and interact with each other, as components of a larger public sphere. The “civil plural society model”, on the other hand, recognizes the multiple and alterable nature of individuals and proposes a public space model that gives differential access to citizens and residents. The degree of inclusion in the public sphere increases with respect to individuals’ degree of “insiderness” in the political system, defined by society-determined diversity categories. The “civic diverse society model” recognizes all the above forms of belonging as equally valid and moral modes of being, and it problematizes the exclusion of belongings that are based on identities that are mobile between different references of identification and thus that cannot be classified under the political-system-defined group/citizen categories.

4 Conceptualizing the European Public Sphere

In this section as well as in the next, my task is to give an operational definition of the European public sphere and introduce the different kinds of communicative public spaces that are parts of it. As trans-Europeanizing public spaces are understood as one of the several types of communicative public spaces that constitute the overall European public sphere, this is a necessary step.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the European public is inhabited by:

- a set of historically-developed and already existing communicative public spaces (essentializing, nationalizing, transnationalizing, Europeanizing, and gendering spaces)
- a set of trans-European networks of organizations (party federations, networks of non-governmental and social movement organizations, networks of think tanks)
- a set of national and sub-national level social and political actors (political parties, SMOs/NGOs, think tanks, media actors) that operate within, from and across the above mentioned communicative public spaces and trans-European networks of organizations
- individual citizens that operate within, from and across the above mentioned communicative public spaces and trans-European networks of organizations

Figure 2: Frame for Analysis of Emerging European Public Spheres
In operational terms, the European public sphere can be conceptualized in four different ways:

(1) as a set of already existing communicative / discursive public spaces that are increasingly more interconnected and overlapping with each other (horizontal and vertical interconnectedness between sub-national, national and transnational communicative public spaces)

(2) as a separate, emerging trans-European communicative / discursive space that comes in addition to, and that complements and/or competes with, the historically developed existing communicative public spaces

(3) as a set of collective social and political actors (organizations) that are increasingly more interlinked and that collaborate with each other beyond the existing national boundaries

(4) as a separate set of social and political actors that create European-level networks that come in addition to, and that compete with, the already existing trans-European networks

In the current chaotic picture of citizens, organizations, communicative public spaces, and political institutions that interact, interconnect, and interlink with each other, social and political actors are facilitating or inhibiting the emergence of an inclusive European Public Sphere in different ways. In Eurosphere, citizens and organizations’ roles in and contributions to the formation of a European public sphere are understood in terms of:

- the inter-linkages, inter-connectedness, and overlaps that they create or deter between the existing Europeanized and non-Europeanized communicative / discursive public spaces (essentializing/minority, nationalizing, transnationalizing, Europeanizing and gendering spaces)
- the new trans-European communicative / discursive spaces that they create or participate in or work against
- the vertical and horizontal trans-European networks of organizations that they create or participate in or work against
- the discourses about the European polity, diversity (including exclusion and inclusion, citizenship, minorities, mobility, migration, asylum, gender, etc), and the European public sphere that they bring into these networks and interconnected spaces

Indeed, all the above processes of inter-connections, inter-linkages, and overlaps between communicative spaces and networks of organizations as well as a variety of discourses about Europe, the EU polity, and diversity are in place in today’s Europe. In other words interconnectedness of existing communicative public spaces and inter-linkages between organizations (collective actors) beyond a variety of borders and boundaries constitute each other. It is the social and political actors’ transgressing of boundaries that create interconnectedness between Europe’s communicative public spaces. On the other hand, it is the different degrees of openness / closure of the existing communicative public spaces that facilitate or obstruct such transgression. Hence, to understand the European Public Sphere, interconnectedness of spaces and networks of organizations should be analyzed in one common research frame.
5 Communicative Public Spaces in Europe

Historically, different types of communicative public spaces have emerged in Europe. Throughout processes of state formation and nation building, the notion of public sphere evolved from being the legitimizing aspect of states’ sovereignty and political organization to serving as a tool of collective identity promotion, which led to a conception of public sphere as both a reference and a space of belonging. To the already existing ethnic and religious essentializing spaces, these processes added the national spaces of interaction. National spaces of interaction comprise mass political parties, political and economic interest organizations, nation-wide media, and elites. However, the national spaces have not necessarily expressed the existing diversities within societies, something which resulted in the survival of the essentializing spaces as well as provoking the emergences of new sub-national public spaces. Each of these essentializing communicative public spaces created their own modes of meaning, interaction, and participation both within and beyond the frames of the nation states. Essentializing spaces are those spaces that accommodate singular forms of ethnic, religious or diasporic belongings; they are organized in ethnic and religious political parties, organizations, and ethnically and religiously oriented media as well as elite and expert forums.

The forms of belonging reaching beyond the boundaries of nation states and beyond essentializing spaces led to emergence of new public spaces – transnationalizing spaces. The transnational spaces accommodate cross-border political belongings based on common values that challenge the boundaries of national and essentializing spaces. They represent cross-border social political organizations that exclude singular ethnic, religious, national, and diasporic modes of belonging. The transnational space is, thus, different from various versions of “transnational politics” where the national references of meaning persist and constitute the basis for political action. Transnational spaces are also different from diasporic spaces that relate to physically de-territorialized singular belongings. They are about people – and their actions and interactions – which are also psychically de-territorialized. The transnational space is a macro-space comprising transnational organizations and associations with non-spatial expressions and de-essentializing symbolisms. This symbolism relates to the misalignments between transnational spaces and other types of spaces, including also national and European public spheres. Transnational spaces of interaction accommodate migrants and other people – i.e. second and third country nationals – who relate themselves to at least two states. The transnational spaces find their concrete expressions in trans-border migrant
organizations as well as corporative migrant organizations that function as channels of communication with national elites and governments of host societies as well as with the EU-institutions.

Conceptualized as a gradually growing process of merging of markets and politics within and beyond the boundaries of nation states (as predicted by Jean Monnet), globalization has further affected national states’ normative, instrumental, and symbolic influences on public sphere formation. The concept of *glocalization* has in our terminology come to mean the processes of mirroring, protrusion, and appearance of the new ethics, symbols, loyalties, and references of meaning created in globalization, beyond the nation state’s frames, and in concrete ‘places’ located within nation state territories. The glocal space is thus the facade of globalization in our concrete localities. The proliferation of alternative references of identification through globalization has added new, alternative belonging modes and citizenship practices to persons’ lives. These stretch beyond nationality, ethnicity, religion, nation, minorities, majorities, and territorial belongings. The distinguishing characteristic of the new forms of belonging and new practices of citizenship is the mobility of subjects’ minds and bodies between different references of identification. Coupled with the conventional politics’ insufficient capacity to respond to citizens’ and residents’ interests emanating from these new modes of belonging, the consequence of this proliferation to politics is the emergence of glocal spaces. Glocal spaces accommodate essentializing belongings, national modes of belonging, transnational modes of belonging, and belongings inspired and informed by the idea of a diverse society. Glocal spaces entail a variety of *local incipient forms of all-inclusive organizations*. To these, we can add the eurospaces which are in formation as a consequence of the processes of European integration (*e.g.* European movements in different countries). Eurospaces are quite similar to glocal spaces in terms of facilitating diversity and equality of belongings. As we found in our previous EU-funded project (Glocalmig), people with glocal and European belongings see the European Union as a better political entity than the nation state “because it gradually eradicates the existing national boundaries in Europe”. However, whereas people with European belongings stop reasoning at this point, persons with glocal belongings continue: “The European Union is another political entity that divides humanity with new boundaries, like nation states did. Yet the European Union is better because now the borders are broader than before”. This adds a new distinction to our analytical categories, namely the distinction between “the global subject” and “the euro-subject” accommodated in, respectively, “glocal spaces” and “eurospaces”.
In order of chronological appearance in political history, the first type of public space is that of *essentializing spaces*. Essentializing spaces are at present observed in some of European states’ religious and ethnic groups, including both majorities and minorities. In Europe, they have formed their own spaces of interaction, meaning, and channels of participation in politics and in the society at large. The second type comprises the *nationalizing spaces*, which were created by the nation states. The national space entails state building peoples and minorities that have been assimilated into the national mode of belonging. Also national public spaces may appear with an essentializing belonging-content, and historically this has happened in states with a high degree of ethnic homogeneity. The third type is the *transnationalizing spaces*, which exclude essentializing and territorialized forms of belonging. The interactions in transnational spaces are cross-border, organized in transnational organizations, and aimed at bypassing the existing political and territorial boundaries between humans. The fourth type of public space is *glocal spaces*, where all the above-mentioned modes of belonging and participation forms coexist. The fifth type is the emerging *eurospaces*. Eurospaces comprise belongings situated in local contexts which are characterized by a high degree of identification with Europe either instead of or in addition to the aforementioned references of identification. Glocal spaces and eurospaces constitute an alternative to the traditional notions of communicative public space, and they may be seen as prototypes of the diverse societies of the future. They both are inclusive of essentializing, national, transnational, glocal and European modes of belonging. Glocal spaces are localized in local incipient organizations throughout Europe (Sicakkan 2004b) whereas eurospaces are manifested in Europe-oriented political parties, organizations, social movements, and incipient organizations.

This study focuses only on what I above call “eurospaces”. However, in the rest of this paper, I will be referring to eurospaces as “*trans-Europeanizing political spaces*”. The reason for this is two-fold: Firstly, by using this term, I want to emphasize that trans-Europeanization is yet an unfinished and ongoing process. Secondly, the term can also be understood as the function of certain common arenas, networks, interaction patterns although the objectives behind these may not be Europeanization. An illustrative example to this would be the nationalist organizations’ trans-border cooperation throughout Europe. Although these organizations are basically against any political change that would reduce the sovereignty of the member states, their trans-border interactions contribute to the formation of a trans-European political space.
6 Trans-Europeanizing Political Spaces

In operational terms, a trans-Europeanizing political space is defined as a system of multiple competing discourses that are advocated and voiced by different types of collective actors at national and European levels and/or a set of trans-border networks/structured interactions between collective actors located in different countries. That is, when either the criterion of transnationally shared discourses or the criterion of transnational interactions, or both, is satisfied, one can start talking about trans-European political spaces.

Table 2: A conceptual framework for trans-Europeanizing political spaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the Organization have Trans-European Ties / Networks?</th>
<th>Is the Discourse Europeanizing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 gives a systematic overview of the categories that constitute trans-Europeanizing political spaces. In this framework, a nationalizing discourse, for instance, can be observed in both trans-European and national arenas, and similarly a Europeanizing discourse can be observed in both national and trans-European arenas. An organization may be disseminating Europeanizing discourses and simultaneously getting involved in trans-European networks (model I). An organization may also be engaging in trans-European networks while disseminating primarily nationalizing discourses (model II). Further, an organization may be disseminating Europeanizing discourses in its own member-state context without participating in trans-European networks’ activities at all (model III). Finally, an organization may be deploying nationalizing discourses only in the member-state where it is located without engaging in trans-European networks (model IV). The organizations (actors) that fall under I, II and III, their trans-European affiliations (networks), and their views and statements (discourses) on selected policy issues altogether constitute the trans-European political spaces.
Model IV in the above table, on the other hand, refers to the political spaces that are not trans-European as these organizations operate with typically non-Europeanizing discourses only in national or local arenas. The different elements of this conceptual framework is further elaborated in the following sections and used as a heuristic tool to depict the current structuring of trans-European political spaces.

6.1 Discourses

There is an abundance of literature on discourses in the European public sphere literature. This is particularly so in research focusing on the media public sphere in Europe. Themes that researchers focus on while selecting media news items seem to affect the results, contingent upon how much decision power the EU political institutions have on the respective policy issues (Latzer and Saurwein 2006). In earlier research, selection of focused themes is seldom sufficiently justified with a point of departure in a political theory of public sphere. Rather than using the criterion of relevance for the concept of public sphere, much of the selected themes in earlier research seem to be a result of the thinking that “common European matters” such as legitimacy, democratic deficit, food security, European elections etc, which are supposed to attract all citizens’ interest would be the best point of departure. While such themes presume a similarity between national and European public spheres, in the case of the European public sphere, however, the best strategy seems to be to focus on themes that are found at the intersection of external and internal boundary making.

For the purposes of this research, I measure and assess the discourses with a focus on organizations’ statements about (1) which groups to include in their vision of a diverse society and whether an ethno-nationally diverse society is acceptable / desirable / inescapable in their mindset, (2) the role that they envision for the EU central political institutions and member states in the EU, and (3) which institutions / organizations / networks they want to have as the receivers of their political messages. These three themes lie at the core of the tension between the gatekeepers and trespassers of borders and boundaries of many kinds in Europe as well as different levels of government within the EU political system. For the purpose of this study, I will simply distinguish between Europeanizing and non-Europeanizing discourses although it is possible to extend the list of the existing discourses based on the rich data material of Eurosphere. This is both because the focus of this research component is on the trans-Europeanizing political spaces within the European public sphere, and the three other types of discourses (essentializing, nationalizing and transnationalizing discourses) are comprehensively addressed by other research groups in Eurosphere.
Europeanizing discourses tend to contain favoring and inclusive attitudes towards (1) diversities of all kinds, (2) central EU institutions’ participation in policymaking at different levels along with the existing national and local political authorities, and (3) defining different European intergovernmental and supranational institutions as receivers of their political messages – along with the existing national authorities.

Non-Europeanizing discourses, on the other hand, are characterized by disfavoring and excluding attitudes towards (1) diversity caused by non-native groups of people and (2) intergovernmental and supranational authorities’ involvement in policy matters, as well as (3) regarding non-national (intergovernmental and supranational) political institutions as irrelevant addressees for their political messages.

6.2 Networks
Analytically, it is possible to approach the network dimension of trans-Europeanizing political spaces in two ways. The first approach focuses on “horizontal” (Koopmans and Erbe 2004) networks where social and political actors seek and get involved in transnational collaboration and communication without attempting to build a higher hierarchical level that structures their interactions. The second approach emphasizes “vertical” (Koopmans and Erbe 2004) networks that seek to articulate more structured, and often also institutionalized, channels of collaboration and communication, at the European level. The second approach can be further elaborated in terms of bottom-up and top-down networks. Bottom-up networks emerge through social and political actors’ own initiatives to build trans-European networks seeking to structure and/or institutionalize their collaboration at the European level. Top-down networks emerge through elite-led European-level initiatives which attempt to bring different social and political actors together under their umbrella.

Each of these processes and mechanisms of trans-European network formation implies a specific preference for a particular model of European public sphere. Collective actors’ different preferences concerning involvement in horizontal and vertical trans-European structures on the one hand, and in bottom-up and top-down structures on the other hand, imply different approaches to diversity, as well as different attributions of ontological priority to the individual, the collectivity (of different types), the sub-national, the national, and the European. In other words, I expect some actors to deliberately rule out participating in vertical structures because they do not want to contribute to a hierarchical European public sphere (EPS) structure. Therefore, in trans-European constellations of national level organizations, I expect to find not only pro-European orientations, but also different and diverging ideas and
strategies concerning how EPS should be structured (or not be structured at all) – e.g., a strictly segmented EPS along the lines of a Europe of nations, or EPS as an arena that facilitates only limited trans-national collaboration on certain issues that cannot be dealt with only at the national level, or an EPS of overlapping European publics that follows the multi-level governance structure of the EU, or an ideally integrated single EPS, etc.

In the context of this research, the network dimension of trans-European political spaces is measured through the following indicators: (1) operative level of networks (regional, national, trans-European interactions), (2) scope of collaborative interaction (collaborative projects / actions, joint projects / actions, attempts to formulate common objectives, efforts to formulate common actions to address common concerns, synchronizing existing projects / action plans, mutual information sharing), (3) membership status in networks (active membership, passive membership, observer status), and (4) geographical focus of collaboration themes (local, regional, national, European).

6.3 Actors
Assessing the structuring of public sphere in a transnational political system with a multi-level governance system is challenging and requires a strategic selection / sampling of organizations and persons involved in these organizations. The data about the collective actors included in this analysis is measured at two levels: institutional level data about organizations, gathered from organizations’ printed and online official documents and individual level data obtained from in-depth interviews with persons that are in leading positions in the organizations (elite interviews).

6.3.1 Different organization types in one research frame
As underlined above, the organizations and networks studied hereunder are of four different types: political parties, NGOs/SMOs, think tanks, and media. Around each of these, comprehensive and distinct research traditions have developed. The predicament concerning research on the formation of European publics partly derives from the dividing lines between these different research traditions and the different themes and questions that each tradition considers as relevant and meaningful:

An example from political party research is the traditionally prevalent focus on euroskepticism and pro-Europe views of political parties, where Euroskepticism was often regarded as an indication of a low degree of Europeanization, and thus as the relative absence of a European public sphere. However, this interpretation of party attitudes to the EU was mostly abandoned after recognition of the fact that the position of such party attitudes in a
political space and its contribution to the emergence / upholding of a European level political cleavage is an important factor. This Rokkanian perspective (Rokkan 1975) also brings along the insight that national political space is not the only relevant space of action and debate for political parties. Earlier research looked into this at different levels of politics. Concerning the national level, Kriesi et al. (2006) found that, as a consequence of globalization/Europeanization processes, a “new cleavage has become embedded into existing two-dimensional national political spaces, the meaning of the original dimensions has been transformed, and the configuration of the main parties has become triangular even in a country like France”. In this political space, constellations of anti-EU parties are placed as oppositional participants in the European public sphere instead of locating them outside the EU-level political space. If this happens in many EU member states, this may be considered as Europeanization of political parties, or even as the beginnings of a common political-cleavage basis for the development of a European party system, no matter what a party’s stance on European integration is. Further, at the European level, Hix (1999) documented that the main party families (the socialists, liberals and Christian Democrats) gradually converged on a more pro-integration stance. When this convergence is conceptualized and understood in relation to other convergences such as the emergence of the political party grouping Union for the Europe of Nation in the previous European Parliament terms, the “political space” approach, which takes both national and other political spaces as its contextual references, helps us to understand the Europeanization of political parties also in terms of the Europeanization of party systems. Thus conceptualized, based on a political-space approach, also nationally-oriented, or particularist, political parties can be thought to contribute to the formation of the EPS through transnational mobilizations to achieve the common goal of preserving Europe.

The primary focus on protest and contention in social movement research poses a similar challenge. Imig and Tarrow (2001: 36), for example, reported that only 17.1% of protests between 1984 and 1997 in Europe had a transnational character, and the rest 82.9% were domesticated actions. As other forms of action than protest, and other views of the EU than discontent, are not counted, it is difficult to take this as absence of social movement organizations in the European public sphere. As Imig and Tarrow state in another chapter of the above-mentioned book, the emergence of the EU-level politics has led to other methods of communicating contention, like lobbying, in social movements. On the other hand, civil society and social movement organizations with other attitudes to the EU than contention (e.g., national and trans-European networks that see the European level of interaction as
another component in the opportunity structures) is necessary to add into any research on the European public sphere, also because of the very specific features of how policymaking happens at the European level. Indeed, this has been one of our case selection criteria concerning all types of organizations included in this research.

Also policy research institutes and think tanks, and universities through EU-funded projects, are transnationally aligning with each other in order to address themes and issues concerning the EU and its politics in a European space of institutional interaction. In Europe, think tanks and policy research institutes have traditionally been working to meet the knowledge needs of national governments and other national-level political actors such as political parties and labor unions that need policy advices and evaluations. However, the diversity of political systems and institutions, political cultures and processes, political demography, and power relationships amongst the EU member states requires an immense contextual expertise, which makes it difficult for a single think tank to meet the knowledge needs of the European Union. Thus, trans-European networks of think tanks, such as TEPSA and EPIN to give only two examples, are now making efforts to mobilize national think tanks to include EU-related research themes into their project portfolio, not only from national perspectives, but also European perspectives. By joining in such trans-European networks, think tanks are also getting a new customer: the European Union.

Instead of searching for regular attitude types, action patterns, and methods of social and political actors in their trans-national existence, it is imperative to be open towards observing new attitudes, new methods, and action types that they are using in a trans-European context. The nationalist parties’ European-level institutionalization of the preference of the Europe of nations in the body of the Union for the Europe of Nations (a party group in the European Parliament in the previous term) and in the Alliance of European Nations (a European Party Federation); the network-building strategy and the opportunity-structure behavior of non-governmental and social movement organizations; and the emergence of think tanks / policy research institutes that do research with a European comparative perspective; the combination of these can be understood as the beginnings of common cleavage formations in a European political space and a tendency to institutionalize them at the European level. At this point, it is justified to pose the question: “are there any common systems of competing networks or interactions, any common systems of competing political discourses, and/or any common channels, platforms, or arenas of communication, which can be regarded as the beginnings of a European public sphere?” An attempt at answering this question requires an investigation of the extent to which there are shared discourses throughout Europe and an assessment of the
nature and scope of trans-European collaboration between important participants in the public sphere.

The analysis will therefore identify the dominant discourses about the European Public Sphere, the European Polity, and diversity as well as the interrelationships and patterns of interaction between the different kinds of social/political actors that are operating in Europe. The comparative analyses will treat the trans-European networks both as trans-European spaces of collaboration, communication and interaction and as social and political actors operating in a trans-European political space. The comparative analyses of the relationships between organizations’ different forms of involvement in trans-European political spaces (defined as trans-European networks of different types and promoting certain discourses that they aim to spread within Europe) as well as their views on the European polity and on the limits of diversity in the public sphere will reveal their contributions to the articulation of larger EPS (in plural).

6.3.2 Organizations
This research focuses specifically on those collective actors and persons that have high visibility in public debates – representing both the most visible mainstream and the most visible alternative discourses and networks. In each of the 16 European countries included in the analysis, we planned to focus on three political parties (the party leading the government, the main opposition party, and the most visible Maverick party in each context), three non-governmental organizations (NGO) or social movement organizations (SMO) (civil society organizations that are both the most visible in their contexts and represent the mainstream and alternative discourses on the selected themes), three think tanks (a policy research organization, an academic think tank, and an advocacy think tank in each context), three print media actors (two main-player newspapers and one smaller newspaper that exhibits anti-establishment views in each context), and two broadcast media actors (one public and one commercial TV-channel that are main players in each context). This makes a total of 224 organizations.

Such assessment also requires a research design that includes collective actors operating at different levels of governance. Therefore, this research also planned to include three European political party federations (PES, EPP, UEN), three trans-European networks of NGOs/SMOs (Social Platform, ENAR, EWL), and two trans-European networks of think tanks (EPIN and TEPSA). Earlier research finds that there are no Europe-wide media actors that are followed by a large European population: Euronews, which comes closest to what may be called a
trans-European media channel, is not amongst the significant news sources utilized by European citizens although it broadcasts in several languages. Facing this fact, the research design had to omit the “trans-European media”.

Due to concern for representing the actors that are the most visible in the public debates, the final sample includes a larger number of organizations: 242 organizations at member-state level (56 political parties, 67 social movement organizations, 46 think tanks, 44 newspapers, and 29 TV-channels, which are spread throughout sixteen European countries) and 8 European umbrella organizations that are the trans-European counterparts of these. In terms of both discourse and networking, these exhibit varying degrees of affiliation with or dissociation from trans-Europeanizing political spaces. Some are contained in national arenas in terms of both discourse and networks; some operate with Europeanizing discourses in trans-European arenas.9

6.3.3 Elites
From each organization, a number of persons in leading positions have been interviewed. The interviewees were selected with a view to represent both the organizations’ dominant official discourses on the selected issues and the internal diversity of views and internal opposition within the organization. Capturing the internal diversity within the organizations that are active in public debates is very important with respect to the theoretical points of departure of Eurosphere. One of the project’s aims is to identify the organizations and the persons in organizations that are pushing for more trans-Europeanization or nationalization –in terms of creating either the respective discourses or the required networks. Thus, in each organization, either the leader, or the vice leader, or someone in the steering board known to be endorsing the leader’s views, was selected. In addition, for each organization, a person known to be the opinion leader but not holding an official leadership position was selected. In cases where the official leader and the opinion leader are identified as the same person, an interview with an additional opinion leader was not conducted. Further, at least one leading person who has official responsibility for, or is known to be interested in the policy areas that Eurosphere is researching on, has been included in the sample. Further, for those organizations with subgroups like women’s groups, minority groups, youth groups etc, we included those persons who lead the group that is the most visible and active in public debates. More information about how the elites to be interviewed were selected is given in the next section.

9 For more detailed information about rules and procedures for selecting organizations and interviewees, see Eurosphere Research Notes no.9 and 13 at http://eurospheres.org/publications/research-notes/.
7 Sample, Data and Analysis Methods

The size of the qualitative sample in each country is determined by four factors: (1) the number of the organization types that the elites are working in (which is four – political party, NGO/SMO, think tank, print media), (2) the number of the organizations’ positions in the public debates (which is three – mainstream, main opposition, Maverick / alternative / anti-anti-establishment), (3) the number of the elite types (which is four - formal leader, opinion leader, internal opposition leader, sub-group leader), and (4) the saturation point for representing internal diversity of views in each organization. This is in order to cover the relevant and important organizational participants in public debates, their positioning in the public debates, and the internal diversity of views in each organization.

The research design stipulates that including 48 elites from each country (representing 4 organization types, 4 elite types, and 3 positions: 4x4x3=48) will provide the optimum coverage of important collective actors that participate in public debates. This makes a total of 768 interviews required to conduct the project. However, in practice, 54 interviews were planned for each country in order to avoid ending up with too few interviews, making a total of 864 planned interviews with organizations at the member state level: 7 persons from each political party, 5 from each NGO/SMO, 3 from each think tank, and 3 from each print media. The number of interviewees planned for political parties is larger because these accommodate almost all types of elites as well as focus on all the three themes that we include in this study. Inversely, SMOs/NGOs, and think tanks do not accommodate all the four kinds of elites, and they usually cover one or two of the selected themes in their work.

In addition, 24 interviews were planned with the leaders of 8 trans-European networks. These are the central operative units of eight European networks, the majority of which are located in Brussels. By operative units, I refer to leaders, boards, and secretariats of European umbrella organizations that bring together national level organizations under their framework.

The final interview data set contains 764 interviews because, in some organizations, the saturation point was reached below the maximum number of planned interviews – indicating a low level of internal diversity in the respective organizations. That is, interviewing more persons would not result in new information about the respective organization. The second factor is inaccessibility of print media elites in the UK and a less satisfactory process of actor selection in the Netherlands.\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) In some analyses where necessary, the Netherlands is excluded. It is also in place to underline that, because of difficulties in accessing leaders of broadcast media, we decided not to interview them (though, the data set contains 12 interviews with media leaders in France and the Czech Republic).
As units of observation, I use organizations, networks of organizations, and people who are in leading positions in these. Discourses about diversity, European polity and European public sphere are mapped through elite interviews. The information about networking and collaboration patterns is institutional level data that is collected from the organizations’ official printed documents and other online publications as well as secondary literature on these organizations.

Each of the three above dimensions – views about diversity, European polity, and European public sphere – and the networking and collaboration patterns are mapped by using many interrelated variables. Therefore, the first task is to create concise indicators by reducing the number of variables with principal components analysis (PCA). PCA is capable of uncovering the underlying dimensions between multiple variables by creating a smaller number of new variables measuring these underlying dimensions. For creating the new scores, I use regression factor scores since this takes into consideration the importance (loadings) of the variables that constitute the respective dimensions.

Concerning the question of whether there exists a system of interrelated and competing Europe-wide discourses and trans-European interaction patterns, an exploratory approach is adopted. By using a series of discriminant analyses, I identify the member-state level organizations that exhibit discourses and collaboration patterns similar to those of the trans-European networks, and vice versa. The grouping variable in the discriminant analyses is simply a dummy variable indicating whether an organization is a national level organization of a trans-European network.

9 Mapping the Discourses

Analyses of interviews with national and trans-European level organizations show that there are clear differences in their approaches to diversity, EU Polity, and public sphere. Although the whole spectrum of views is represented at both levels, the set of the views that dominate at each level is different. The general pattern is that, while discourses favoring more trans-Europeanization are common for elites working in trans-European level organizations, discourses that do not contain such preferences are common in the statements of the member-state level elites. While this can be regarded as almost intuitive, the contents of discourses are not. This is demonstrated in the following sections.

Below, I construct various scales measuring views of all organizations on diversity, EU polity and public sphere by using principal components analyses. Next, I use discriminant analyses to show how these views are distributed at national and trans-European levels.
9.1 Differences between national and trans-European elites’ diversity views

The interviewees were asked to mention persons and groups that they see as relevant for their own idea of a diverse society. After they talked about their own preferences, they were asked to consider whether they would like to include the other categories that they did not mention (see the list of groups in Table 3). Their answers were then registered in a common database. Table 3 presents results from a principal components analysis of the categories mentioned by the respondents.

Table 3: Principal Components Analysis of Groups Seen as Relevant for Definition of the Diverse Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Rotated Component Matrix)</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1.1: Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society? (Valid N= 741)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational belonging (groups that are identifying with more than one country)</td>
<td>.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifting belongings (people whose belongings are under a process of change)</td>
<td>.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European belonging (groups identifying with the EU)</td>
<td>.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global belonging groups (identification with humanity)</td>
<td>.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple/mixed belongings (people identifying with more than one group)</td>
<td>.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-style groups (people identifying with different sorts of life-styles)</td>
<td>.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial belonging (groups identifying with a specific region in a country)</td>
<td>.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological groups (people identifying with a specific ideology)</td>
<td>.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant groups (people coming from non-European countries)</td>
<td>.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender groups (men/women)</td>
<td>.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability groups (people with physical and mental disadvantages)</td>
<td>.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexuality groups (e.g., gays, lesbians, transsexuals, homosexuals, etc)</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (e.g., youth/elderly)</td>
<td>.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (e.g., workers, employers, farmers, rich, poor, etc)</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups (people identifying with a specific ethnic group)</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups (people identifying with a specific religion)</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National belonging (people identifying with a specific nation)</td>
<td>.459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to explained variance (%) | 49.90 | 8.65 | 5.50


The first dimension in Table 3, which explains approximately 50% of the variation, indicates that there is a presence of a global and transnational understanding in the sample. All the variables loading on this dimension concern categories that are not related with the notion of a
homogenous nation state – but other phenomena, other groups and belongings that compete with it. I have called this dimension “Global and Transnational Orientation to Diversity”.

Indeed, this dimension measures the respondents’ tendency to include all sorts of diversity, not only group-based diversity but also individual diversity. This includes also diversity generated by the internal mobility within the EU. Higher scores on this dimension mean very inclusive attitudes to all sorts of diversity.

The second dimension in Table 3, which explains approximately 8.7 % of the variation, clusters the variables measuring the extent to which a respondent is willing to include gender groups, disability groups, sexuality groups, different generations, and social classes in his or her definition of a diverse society. I have called this dimension “Bodily and Individualist Orientation to Diversity”. It is important to note that these variables are associated with the notion of social class as the majority of the respondents were concerned about the fact that such belongings might affect the social class / status of people. Higher scores indicate more inclusive attitudes.

The third dimension in Table 3, which explains approximately 5.5 % of the variation, clusters the indicators measuring whether the respondents would include national, religious, and ethnic groups in their definitions of a diverse society. Based on the loading variables, this dimension has been labeled “traditional orientation to diversity”. In this dimension, we measure how inclusive respondents are to group-based diversity created by the nation-state itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V6 National or Transnational Organization?</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>78,2</td>
<td>21,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td>47,1</td>
<td>52,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Groups Relevant for Diversity Definition

A discriminant analysis of the three scales with the grouping variable “national vs. trans-European organization” gave the results in Table 4: In brief, Table 4 tells us that 158 of totally 724 valid interviewees (21.8 %) from national organizations and 9 of totally 17 interviewees (52.9 %) from trans-European organizations agree on a globally/transnationally-oriented
definition of the diverse society. Inversely, 566 national and 8 trans-European level elites agree on a national orientation to the diverse society. These results also testify to the fact that nationalizing and Europeanizing discourses are disseminated at both national level and trans-European level organizations. The two poles are represented at both levels, but the national orientation is stronger at the national level organizations whereas the transnational/global orientation is stronger at the trans-European level. It is also noteworthy that the share of national discourse at the transnational level organizations is 47.1%.

My second indicator concerning diversity views relates to the normative, ontological or instrumental status each interviewee gives to ethno-national diversity. For this purpose, I used the answers to question V2.1 in the interviews data set. The respondents were asked what they thought about ethno-nationally diverse societies. Their responses were classified with respect to whether they regard ethnic and national diversity as a normatively desirable goal in itself, or an inescapable fact, or a matter that defines the meaningful existence of persons, or a means to achieve other goals. The respondents were not given these categories, but their answers were interpreted and coded into these categories during the analysis process. Respondents’ answers were coded into multiple categories when their answers fitted with more than one category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies? (Valid N= 720)</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as desirable goal to achieve</td>
<td>.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondent does not attribute any normative or ontological status but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of the social life</td>
<td>-.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as an ontological matter without which society’s and/or individual’s existence would not be possible</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondent sees ethno-national diversity as means to achieve some other goals and not as a goal in itself</td>
<td>-.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribution to explained variance (%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.54</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>29.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Results from a principal-components analysis of these four categories are presented in Table 5. The first dimension is labeled “Normative vs. Realist Approach”, and it measures respondents’ tendency to view ethnonationally diverse society as a goal in itself or as an inescapable fact. Large positive values on this scale indicate perception of ethnonational
diversity as a goal in itself. Negative scores with larger absolute values indicate perceptions of ethnonational diversity as an inescapable fact whether or not one sees is as desirable or not. Values close to zero mean that the respective respondents see ethnonational diversity both as a goal in itself and as an inescapable fact.

The second dimension is labeled as “Ontological-Existential Approach”. The higher scores with positive values on this scale indicate that the respective respondents are not necessarily in favor or disfavor of ethnonational diversity, but they accept it since they regard ethnic and national to be the foundation of people’s social existence. It is also noteworthy that the other three variables have negative loadings on this dimension. Higher scores with negative values on this scale, thus, mean that the respective respondents do not perceive ethnonational diversity as an existential matter, but acceptable for other reasons.

The third dimension is labeled “Instrumental Approach”. Respondents who came with some specific statements in connection with this question – e.g. ethnonational diversity “is enriching our culture”, “stimulates economic development and innovation”, “is a god way of fighting an aging society”, “should be tolerated if we want to share our wealth with poor people”, “is acceptable since it leads to a more just society / world”, “is a necessary tool for protecting human rights”, “needed if we want to have a more colorful society etc – are coded into this category. Higher positive values on this scale, thus, indicate instrumentalist approaches to ethno-national diversity.

How are these views distributed between national level and trans-European level elites? The distribution of these views between national and transnational levels is given in Table 6.

Table 6: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Views on Ethno-national Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V6</th>
<th>National or Transnational Organization?</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>39,4</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td>66,7</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 indicates that 294 of 746 (39,4%) interviewees from national level organizations and 12 of 18 interviewees from trans-European organizations (66,7%) share a normative view of diversity as a goal to achieve. On the other hand, 452 national (60,6%) and 6 trans-European (33,3%) level interviewees share an instrumentalist and realist approach to diversity – that is,
not as goal to achieve in itself. That is, amongst the national level elites, ethnonational diversity is acceptable because it is unavoidable, a necessity for meaningful social existence, and needed to achieve other goals. The views that do not see ethnonational diversity as a goal in itself are dominating amongst the national level elites. Inversely, the views that regard ethnonational diversity as a goal in itself are dominant amongst the elites that are working in the trans-European organizations.

9.2 Differences between national and trans-European elites’ views on the EU polity

Application of a principal component analysis on the five items listed in Table 7 (by using all valid interviews from 16 countries and the trans-European organizations) resulted in three dimensions. The first dimension measures the extent to which the respondents want a development where policymaking / decision competences between the member state and EU level are differentiated and divided between levels according to different policy areas. Based on an inspection of the answers about different policy areas in qualitative interviews, I have interpreted this dimension as measuring the preference for a system of multi-level governance (MLG). Also an inspection of the respondents’ preferences concerning decision levels in different policy areas in the quantitative data set support this interpretation. Large positive values mean a preference of multi-level governance whereas large negative views mean the absence of this preference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V3.1 In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future? (Valid N= 663)</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Component 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More centralisation, but in certain policy fields</td>
<td>.804</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More autonomy for the member states, but in certain policy fields</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More federalisation at large</td>
<td>-.293</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td>-.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More autonomy for the member states</td>
<td>-.339</td>
<td>-.722</td>
<td>-.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More centralisation</td>
<td>-.156</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second dimension can be interpreted as measuring the preference for a multi-level federal polity (MLP) versus more autonomy to member states in all areas. It is important to note that “autonomy for member states” and “federalization at large” load on the same dimension with opposite signs, making this dimension meaningfully bipolar. As this was what was to be
expected logically, this is also an indication that the coding done by approximately 70 researchers in 16 countries are consistent. Large positive values on this dimension imply a pro-federalization attitude and large negative values imply pro-member state autonomy attitudes.

The third dimension measures the extent to which a respondent is for more EU centralization regardless of policy areas – that is a preference for the building of a centralized EU polity (EUP). Large positive values on this dimension indicate pro-centralization attitudes and large negative preferences mean the absence of this preference in a respondent. Cases with very low values on all of these three dimensions can be regarded as displaying a general anti-EU preference, and even a preference towards dissolving the EU.

Table 8: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Views on EU Polity Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Trans-European</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V6 National or Transnational Organization?</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b. 76.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
c. 76.6% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified

As indicated in Table 8, 160 of the 705 interviewees (22.7%) from the national level organizations and 8 of the 17 interviewees (47.1%) from the trans-European organizations agree on a development towards the establishment of a multi-level governance (MLG) or (to less extent) a federal EU polity (MLP). On the other hand, 545 national level interviewees (77.3%) and 9 trans-European interviewees (52.9%) agree on more decentralization, more autonomy for the member states.

Further analyses of the decision power that the interviewees want to give to the supranational EU institutions under different policy areas show similar patterns. Because of the extensive character of this analysis, its tables are not given here. The policy areas covered by the EUROSPHERE questionnaire are:

- Free mobility of EU citizens
- Political rights of EU citizens
- Living in other EU countries
- Gender equality
- Rights of native national minorities
- Citizenship
- Immigration of non-EU nationals
- Political asylum
- Illegal migration
- Free movement of non-EU immigrants
- Political rights of non-EU immigrants

Under each of these policy areas, the majority of the respondents were asked about their preferred role of the EU in policymaking / legislation processes. The following categories about the role of the EU were presented to the respondents:

- Clear cut solution on the EU level
- Only flexible prescriptions on the EU level
- Opt-out possibilities from EU regulations
- Possibility for countries’ flexible integration
- Open method of coordination
- Member states should deal with this individually
- This should be decided locally

Based on these questions, I constructed scales measuring the degree of each respondent’s inclination towards accepting one or several of the above roles for the EU. The scales were developed using a principal components analysis of all the IV.10 (a-k) variables in the EUROSPHERE interview registration interface. The rotated component matrix showed that many respondents do not make (or are not able to make) clear distinctions between the above-mentioned different policy areas when they think about the EU’s role / power in policymaking and legislation, and many tend to assign the same role to the EU with little attention to which policy area is of concern (but as our interviews show, there are many important exceptions too, where people make clear distinctions between the policy areas). This justifies combining different policy areas under preferences about the EU’s role as I did in Tables 7 and 8.

9.3 Differences in elites’ views on addressees in the European public sphere

The qualitative descriptions of respondents’ answers about public sphere related questions in several of the EUROSPHERE country reports give a rather detailed picture of how their organizations relate to the existing channels, networks, and structures of communication within both their national public spheres and beyond the boundaries. The interviews also depicted which organizations they prefer to communicate and collaborate with at which levels. The depiction in this section is, however, based on a set of variables measuring the
extent to which the actors want to target as the addressees of their messages or claims in their public sphere communications and interactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, subnational, i.e. regional and/or local) do you want to address with your activities? (Valid N= 544)</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Court of Auditors</td>
<td>.844</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Ombudsman</td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
<td>.774</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency of the Council</td>
<td>.757</td>
<td>.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Committee of the Regions, Agencies</td>
<td>.745</td>
<td>.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>.713</td>
<td>.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
<td>.652</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender organizations/networks</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority organizations/networks</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations/networks</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties and/or party families</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbies</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in general</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>.374</td>
<td>.443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Contribution to explained variance (%)* 41.53  10.08


The first column in Table 9 lists the eighteen different authorities and organizations that the respondents mentioned as the addressees they want to use in the public sphere during the interviews. A principal components analysis of these eighteen variables, based on the valid interviews from sixteen countries and the trans-European organizations, resulted in two dimensions.

The first dimension encompasses the different European and EU political and judicial authorities – that is, the addressee is an institution at the European level and the communication is upward. This dimension explains over 41.5 % of the overall variation.
The second dimension measures the extent to which an actor’s targeted addressees are other organizations, networks, groups, etc, also including the European Commission, the European parliament and European parties/party families. Unlike what is the case in the first dimension, the communication and collaboration here does not necessarily imply a vertical or hierarchical, but rather a horizontal structure of communication.

Table 10: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Actors’ Addressees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V6 National or Transnational Organization?</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-validated(a)</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Trans-European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68,8</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b. 96,0% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
c. 95,8% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.

The above results (Table 10) show that 12 (2,3 %) of the totally 528 interviewees from national level actors and 5 (31,3) of the 16 interviewees from trans-national level actors say that they want to be involved in vertical structures of communication within the European Public Sphere. On the other hand, 97,7 % of interviewees from national actors, and 68,8 % of the interviewees from transnational actors state that they want to be primarily involved in horizontal structures of communication.

The finding here is that there are clear preferences in favor of horizontal trans-European interactions on the part of the collective actors at both national level and the trans-European level. This trend is much more pronounced within the national level organizations. A closer examination of the in-depth interviews also show that many of those who favor being involved in horizontal networks and simultaneously want to involve the EU political institutions as little as possible in their trans-European affairs prefer so because they are skeptical about the democratic qualities of the EU, and they do not want to be part of the legitimization mechanisms that the EU has devised. Some political elites have stated that they already have good reciprocal communication and collaboration channels with their sister parties in other countries, both through the party federations and one-to-one contacts between the party elites. Further, the national level SMO/NGO leaders who prefer horizontal Europeanization say that, this is a process that started before the European Union existed, and
it should continue especially now in the new political context of Europe which is characterized by pooling of sovereignties so that the new concentrated power can be effectively criticized and controlled by citizens. They also think that, in issues on which some national governments are not responsive enough (e.g., women’s rights, minority rights, environmental protection), the European level institutions can be a good tool for making the national governments to change their course of action. Since their own aim is to make sure that the interests they try to voice be protected, a horizontal Europeanization that is not influenced by the EU premises is, for them, a better alternative. If necessary, European political institutions can be addressed for this purpose, but the European level should not, in their eyes, be taken for granted as a legitimate authority in all matters. This trend is clear concerning the organizations that are operating at the national level.

In addition to those who favor horizontal trans-Europeanization, the national level elite views also include some attitudes that seek to address only the national governments and authorities in their activities. Here, the concern is rather the survival of the nation state than the democratic legitimacy of the EU political institutions.

The trans-European elites, on the other hand, perceive their role as mediators between the European Union institutions and the national level organizations that they strive to integrate under their umbrella. Elites that we interviewed who work at trans-European organizations state that they are aware that they cannot claim to be representing anybody, but what they do is important and needed, because the new power structures in Europe requires trans-European organizations that can articulate the interests of the European civil societies. However, they strive on both edges. Their access to EU decision-making mechanisms are difficult although some of the organizations have been defined by the European Commission as official consultation partners in the matters that they specialize in. They think it is also difficult to gain the full trust of the national level member organizations because they are sometimes regarded as too close to the EU. This is confirmed also by the interviews with national level political party and SMO/NGO elites, though worded somewhat differently. In addition to the perception that the trans-European elites may be ideologically somewhat closer to the EU than to the civil society in the grassroots, the national level elites are also concerned about the EU-terminology adopted by the trans-European elites. In their eyes, the difficulty of this terminology makes communication between the national and trans-European level elites at times ineffective, and that such difficulty also makes it difficult for the national level elites to participate actively in the trans-European level activities. On the other hand, the trans-European elites tend to see the usage of EU-terminology as a practical necessity that makes it
possible to communicate with and disseminate contention towards the EU policymakers. The majority of the trans-European elites state that it is important that the national level civil society and political organizations understand the necessity of acting together on issues that require European level solutions, but that it is not always easy to convince their member organizations to be more active.

Further, the elite interviews and our institutional data document that trans-European organizations are usually operating with a very small number of full-time staff members, something which makes it difficult for many of them to prioritize integration activities towards the national level organizations. The trans-European organization that is the most ambitious in creating a high level of integration, by creating a common understanding of the common problems, is the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). This organization is using considerable staff resources, and voluntary resources as well, to integrate, for instance, the women’s organizations from Central and Eastern European countries. Also, European Network Against Racism (ENAR) appears, judging from the elites’ statements, to be concerned about linking with the member-state level anti-racist organizations.

On the other side of the coin, 2.3% of the national level and 33.3% of the trans-European level elites say that they want to address the intergovernmental and supranational bodies in Europe with their activities. The trend within the trans-European organizations is not negligible. Amongst the trans-European organizations, the Social Platform appears to be the one that is most oriented towards using the European Union institutions, and specifically the European Commission, as one of their primary addressees of their activities.

9.4 Discursive misalignments between national and trans-European level elites?

These findings are important as they may be pointing to misalignments between the values of national and trans-European elites. If it is possible to claim that trans-European organizations are supposed to represent / aggregate the interests of the European civil society towards the European level political institutions, this can be perceived as a legitimacy problem on the part of the trans-European organizations. Even when we assume a somewhat less ambitious mission for them, such as articulating interests, it is not possible to ignore this mismatch. Certainly, diversity of views and political polarization in public sphere is necessary and desirable from a democracy point of view. However, what we observe here is not only a horizontal polarization, but also a vertical, hierarchical polarization between the member-state and trans-European level organizational elites.
Some of the trans-European elites that we interviewed are working in organizations that are officially involved in EU-level policy processes as regular consultation partners – this is especially so for the Social Platform of European NGOs, European Network Against Racism (ENAR), the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). While an overwhelming majority of the interviewed trans-European NGO/SMO elites are aware of the fact that they cannot claim to be representing the European civil society, they also claim that they represent some social and political norms which are for the good of all – thus investing in output legitimacy rather than input legitimacy.

The three party federations that we interviewed are supposed to be representing their member parties, and they have representatives in the European Parliament. Low electoral turnout, combined with mismatches between national level and trans-European level elite views, also points to a hierarchical structuring of the trans-European political spaces.

Although the think tank networks – EPIN and TEPSA – and their member organizations that we interviewed are not expected to represent anybody else than themselves and their expertise, it is important to remember that they are giving policy assessments, evaluations, and advices to the European Union.

The European Commission, and other EU political institutions take these trans-European organizations as the most relevant conversation partners in certain policy issues, and they have privileged them and institutionalized their participation in consultation processes in different ways. On the other hand, the views they disseminate about diversity in general, ethnonational diversity, and the legitimate addressees in the European public sphere are fundamentally different from the views expressed by the elites working in national level organizations.

While closing this discussion, it is also important to remind that the European Union’s consultation system also gives opportunity to both other organizations and individual citizens to express their views on policy issues.

10 Organizations’ Networks and Interaction Patterns

In the following set of principal components and discriminant analyses, the unit of both observation and analysis is organizations. Data about the organizations networking and interactive patterns were gathered from their printed and online documents (annual reports, activity reports, leaflets, brochures, descriptions of ongoing projects and project partners, and secondary literature where available). The following set of principal components and
discriminant analyses of organizations networking patterns include sub-national, national and trans-European interactions.

10.1 Collaboration patterns of organizations

Table 11 gives the results from a principal component analysis of the operative levels of networks that our organizations are actually involved in. The 46 media actors in the data set are excluded from this analysis as the kinds of networking they do is not comparable with the networking of the other three types of organizations.

Table 11: Principal Components Analysis of the Organizations’ Networks
(Rotated Component Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations/networks the organization collaborates with N= 158</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional organizations/networks</td>
<td>.921</td>
<td>-.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organizations/networks</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-European organizations/networks</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to explained variance (%)

|                                      | 49.64  | 31.22  |


The first component measures the extent to which an organization is involved in sub-European (regional and national) networks, and the second measures an organization’s involvement in both trans-European networks and national networks. The variable “national organizations/networks” loads on both dimensions. This indicates that majority of the organizations in our data material have national networks. However, those with large positive scores on the first dimension are also involved in sub-national (regional) networks, and those with large positive scores on the second dimension are, in addition to their national networks, also involved in trans-European networks. This implies the presence of and a distinction between national multi-level and trans-European multi-level networking structures in Europe, strengthening my expectation in the very beginning that both national boundaries and the European multi-level governance structures would lead to this kind of networking structure.

Table 12 presents the distribution of these two networking patterns between trans-European and national level organizations. We observe that 98 % of member-state level organizations collaborate primarily with national and sub-national networks of organizations. On the other hand, 71.4 % of the trans-European organizations are also primarily collaborates with national and sub-national level organizations, whereas 28.6 % of trans-European organizations are engaged in cooperation with other trans-European networks.
Table 12: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Organizations’ Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-validated</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97,9</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71,4</td>
<td>28,6</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the percentage of the national level organizations that are involved in collaboration with trans-European networks is low (2.1%), and the percentage of the transnational organizations that collaborate with national level organizations is high (71.4%), this means that the trans-European organizations are collaborating with only a small selection of national level organizations. This is certainly so in the case of the trans-European think tank networks, which prefer to include only one think tank from each EU member country. The same argument also goes for the party federations, which collaborate with a limited number (preferably only one) political party in each member country. As to the SMOs and NGOs, ENAR and EWL also has limited number of organizations from each country, and often only one, in their membership lists. On the other hand, the Social Platform is a network of networks, and it is not possible for individual organizations to be members in the Social Platform.

Even without considering the results presented in Table 12, the membership structure of the trans-European organizations testify to the fact that the number of national level organizations involved in trans-European networks is quite low. It is also striking that the results we obtained from the analysis of interviews (Table 10, p.34) are almost identical with the results we obtained from this analysis of the institutional data. Combining these results, we conclude that the organizational elites are quite consistent in their intentions and actions: To a large degree, they do not want to have intergovernmental and supranational authorities as addressees of their activities; in practice, they do not either collaborate with the trans-European organizations that have these authorities as main addressees of their activities.

10.2 Scope of organizations’ collaboration with networks and other organizations

A principal components analysis of six variables indicating how organizations collaborate in their national, sub-national and trans-European networks resulted in one component (Table 13). The list of variables in the first column of Table 13 measure different types of collaboration forms. The variables “attempts at mutual information sharing”, “efforts to synchronize separate projects/action plans”, “collaborative projects/actions”,

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“joint/projects/actions”, “attempts to formulate common objectives to address common concerns”, and “attempts to formulate [simply] common objectives” represent actually the ordinal-ranked categories of the variable collaboration scope – in the order given above. The ordinal ranking can also be interpreted as the intensity of collaboration. However, the principal components analysis did not distinguish between the variables measuring project/action based collaboration and more strategic collaboration to achieve long-term objectives, I will stick to the interpretation of this scale as an indicator of organizations’ collaboration scope.

Table 13: Principal Components Analysis of the Organizations’ Actions in Trans-European Networks
(Rotated Component Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=158</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to synchronize separate projects/action-plans</td>
<td>.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts at mutual information-sharing</td>
<td>.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts to formulate common objectives</td>
<td>.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint projects/actions</td>
<td>.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative projects/actions</td>
<td>.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to formulate common objectives to address common concerns</td>
<td>.622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to the explained variance (%) 51.93

Thus, the extracted single component can be interpreted as a measure of the size of the collaboration repertoire of organizations. The larger the score of an organization, the more collaborative activity types. Smaller scores indicate less collaboration activity with networks and other organizations. On the other hand, the largest scores with positive sign can also be interpreted as forms of collaboration aiming to achieve longer term common objectives.

Whereas the indicators that I constructed in the previous section measure the extent to which organizations network with organizations operating at different levels, this single indicator tells us what they do when they collaborate.

Table 14 shows that the 60 % trans-European level organizations have larger collaboration scope or repertoire and 76.5 % of the national level organizations have smaller collaboration repertoires. This is certainly not surprising at all since the survival of the trans-European networks to a large extent relies on collaboration both with their member organizations and the other networks.
Table 14: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Organizations’ Actions in Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National or transnational?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>76,5</td>
<td>23,5</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>60,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b. 75,9% of selected original grouped cases correctly classified.
c. 0% of unselected original grouped cases correctly classified.
d. 75,9% of selected cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.

What do these numbers actually tell us about the national and trans-European level organizations? Firstly, we can with a high degree of certainty say that the much fewer national level organizations than trans-European organizations get involved in collaboration that requires agreeing on common objectives. Secondly, also a considerable portion (40%) of the trans-European organizations has this collaboration repertoire. Still, if our figures are really representative, 23,5% of national level organizations and 60% of trans-European level organizations do get involved in collaboration that either may lead to or has led to formulation of common objectives. Indeed, this is a lot and implies that individual organizations are coming together to stand on the different poles of whatever kind of political spaces they are operating in.

While digesting these findings, it is important to keep in mind that the analysis in this section does not distinguish between the levels at which collaboration happens (local, national or European). The results cover collaboration at all levels.

10.3 Organizations’ membership status in networks

The EUROSPHERE institutional data collection also covered information about the analyzed organizations’ membership status in the different trans-European networks of organizations that they collaborate in and with. The principal components analysis presented in Table 15 is based on three variables indicating whether the analyzed organizations have active or passive membership status or an observer status in the networks that they are involved in. The principal components analysis gave two components. The two components distinguish between organizations that are members and organizations that only have observer status in the networks that they are involved in.
Table 15: Principal Components Analysis of the Organizations’ Membership Status in Networks
(Rotated Component Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of the organization in selected networks</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passive membership status (only voting rights)</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active membership status (with voting and representation rights)</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer status</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to explained variance (%): 40.03 32.1


The first component measures whether an organization has active membership status in the network with voting and representation rights (large positive values). The larger scores indicate membership with both voting and representation rights, and the smaller values indicate only passive membership status without representation rights.

The second component measures whether a non-member organization has observer status in an organizational network. Larger values indicate observer status, and smaller values indicate the absence of observer status.

Organizations that score low on both dimensions are those that have no membership or observer status in any organizational networks; however, this does not mean that they do not collaborate with networks.

Table 16: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Membership Status in Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>National or transnational?</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-validated(^a) Count</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.

Table 16 shows that 6.5 % of national level organizations and 20 % of trans-European organizations have strong membership statuses in organizational networks. The one trans-national organization that has a strong membership status in a network is ENAR – which is a member of the Social Platform.
10.4 Organizations’ geographical orientations

In the final principal components analysis, I included the variables indicating the geographical focus of each organization in their collaborative work. The organizational foci that are registered for each organization, include global, European, transnational and national orientations. Table 15 gives the results from a principal components analysis of these variables.

Whereas the analysis presented in Table 11 (p.42) is based on the other organizations and networks that the actors actually collaborate with, this analysis includes variables that inform about the objectives and ambitions concerning the breadth of collaboration and networking.

Table 17: Principal Components Analysis of the Organizations’ Geographical Focus
(Rotated Component Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations Focus</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global focus</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European focus</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>-.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational focus</td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National focus</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to explained variance (%)

|                      | 43.98       | 24.65       |


The analysis resulted in two components. The first one measures the beyond-national focus in networking (global, European, and transnational). The second component measures the extent of an organization’s national orientation in networking. Organizations that score low on both dimensions are not active in collaboration with other organizations and networks. On the other hand, those organizations that score high on both dimensions have a broad spectrum of networking focus – covering levels from national to global.

Table 18: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Geographical Focus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National or transnational?</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-validateda</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.

b. 83.5% of selected original grouped cases correctly classified.

c. .0% of unselected original grouped cases correctly classified.

d. 83.5% of selected cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.
Results from a discriminant analysis are given in Table 18. Also here, the beyond-national focus dominates in trans-European organizations, whereas national focus is dominant in national level organizations – a pattern that we have observed in all the dimensions of collaboration and networking in the previous sections.

11 The structuring of trans-Europeanizing political spaces

The conceptual framework of this paper defines “the articulation of trans-Europeanizing political spaces” in terms of two features: (1) generation of trans-European discourses and (2) creation of trans-European networks. The fulfillment of any one of these two criteria means contribution to the creation of trans-Europeanizing political spaces.

The finding concerning creation of Europeanizing discourses is that, while both Europeanizing and non-Europeanizing discourses are found to exist in both national and trans-European level organizations, non-Europeanizing discourses dominate in the national level organizations, and Europeanizing discourses dominate in the trans-European organizations. These discourses concern organizational elites’ statements about diversity, EU polity and their preferred addressees in the public debates.

The analysis of organizations’ interaction and networking patterns at the institutional level also indicate that very few national level organizations are involved in trans-European relations with other organizations.

The picture that the above analyses of discourses and networks point to is that there are trans-Europeanizing spaces, with Europeanizing discourses and / or trans-European ties between organizations at both national and European levels. Earlier research convincingly shows that the current European public sphere is horizontally segmented along national lines in Europe. What this current study adds to the existing knowledge is that, the communicative public space component of the European public sphere, which is expected to contribute to the weakening of these national boundaries divides the European public sphere vertically: There are important discursive gaps between the views of national and European level elites on the issues of diversity, EU polity and who they see as legitimate addressees of their activities. Further, networking patterns also show that this gap is not only in discourses, but also in interactions.

This currently weak vertical division may in the future contribute to the emergence of a both horizontally and vertically segmented European public sphere.
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